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Summary 
This dissertation considers whether the approach to the regulation of property in the 
constitutional context is compatible with either one of the major theoretical approaches in 
private law, namely that ownership is fundamentally absolute or alternatively that regulatory 
limitations are inherent to ownership. It finds that the inherent/external debate is of limited 
value in South Africa’s constitutional context because there has been a shift toward a stronger 
emphasis on reconciling individual entitlements with other (constitutional) interests.  
In response to the inadequacy of the existing (private law) approaches, this dissertation 
proposes a systemic constitutional approach. In terms of this approach, property is regarded 
as part of an inherently regulated constitutional legal system. Disputes regarding the 
protection of entitlements must be addressed with reference to the objectives of the system as 
a whole and regulation is understood as a mechanism through which constitutional values are 
promoted. Thus, regulation of the use of property does not erode the institution of private 
property, because the system provides for constitutional or statutory control over the 
regulatory process.  
In this context there is an overlap between sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution, since the 
secondary regulatory function can be fulfilled by the principles of either constitutional 
property law or administrative law, when the use of property is regulated through 
administrative action. The complicating factor is that not all regulatory measures are also 
administrative actions. The use of property can also be regulated directly through common 
law or legislation, or through acts of the executive or judiciary. In terms of the systemic 
constitutional approach, direct application of section 25 should be reserved for cases of direct 
statutory or common law deprivation. Where more than one regulatory framework is 
potentially applicable, the subsidiarity principles should identify the appropriate framework, 
to avoid the creation of parallel systems of law. Ultimately, reconsideration of the 
relationship between property and regulation is part of an ongoing constitutional conversation 
which can only take place when we explicitly engage with questions regarding the role, 
function and status of property and regulation in the constitutional legal system. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif heroorweeg die benadering tot die regulering van eiendom in die 
grondwetlike konteks om te bepaal of dit strook met die teoretiese benadering in die 
privaatreg, naamlik dat eiendomsreg fundamenteel absoluut is, of alternatiewelik dat 
eiendomsreg inherent beperk is. Dit bevind dat die waarde van hierdie intern/ekstern-debat 
beperk is, aangesien daar in die grondwetlike konteks wegbeweeg word van oormatige klem 
op individuele regte na versoening tussen individuele regte en ander (grondwetlike) belange.  
Omdat beide benaderings tot regulasie in die privaatreg onvoldoende is, stel die proefskrif ‘n 
sistemiese grondwetlike benadering voor. In terme van hierdie benadering word eiendom 
beskou as deel van ‘n inherent-gereguleerde grondwetlike regsisteem. Geskille  rondom die 
beskerming van individuele regte (in eiendom) moet besleg word met verwysing na die 
oogmerke van die sisteem as geheel en regulering word ingevolge hierdie benadering beskou 
as ‘n meganisme waardeur grondwetlike waardes bevorder word. Daarvolgens bedreig 
regulasie nie die instelling van privaat eiendom nie, aangesien die sisteem voorsiening maak 
vir grondwetlike of statutêre beheer oor die regulerings-proses.  
Vir doeleindes van hierdie proefskrif is daar in hierdie opsig ‘n mate van oorvleueling tussen 
artikels 25 en 33 van die Grondwet, omdat die sogenaamde sekondêre reguleringsfunksie 
moontlik deur die beginsels van óf grondwetlike sakereg óf administratiefreg vervul kan 
word. Problematies is die feit dat die oorvleueling net gedeeltelik is; nie alle regulerende 
maatreëls is ook administratiewe handelinge nie. Die gebruik van eiendom kan ook 
gereguleer word deur direkte toepassing van wetgewing of die gemenereg of deur handelinge 
van die uitvoerende of regsprekende gesag. In terme van die sistemiese grondwetlike 
benadering moet direkte toepassing van artikel 25 slegs geskied indien daar geen 
administratiewe handeling is nie. Die subsidiariteitsbeginsels moet die gepaste raamwerk 
identifiseer, om sodoende te voorkom dat daar paralelle regsisteme onder die Grondwet 
ontwikkel. Heroorweging van die verhouding tussen eiendom en regulasie vorm deel van ‘n 
voortdurende grondwetlike gesprek wat net kan plaasvind wanneer ons uitdruklik met vrae 
rondom die rol, funksie en status van eiendom en regulasie in die grondwetlike regstelsel 
omgaan. 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost I wish to thank my promoter, Prof André van der Walt. There are no 
words with which to adequately express my gratitude for all that he has done for me. Through 
his patient mentoring he has led me to critically question many things I simply assumed to be 
true and he has greatly influenced my thoughts and aspirations. His willingness to share his 
extensive knowledge of the law and his passion for research is unique, and I have benefitted a 
great deal from his experience and dedication. In the last year especially, he has been an 
inspiration.  
I am also greatly indebted to Prof Geo Quinot, my co-promoter. His knowledge, work ethic, 
enthusiasm for various intellectual endeavours, support, and guidance proved invaluable and 
I will forever remain slightly in awe of him. I would also like to thank him for his initiative in 
including me in the “brownbag think tank” sessions, which taught me a great deal, provided 
support and encouragement, welcomed me into the weird and wonderful world of 
administrative law and always gave me a lot to think about. Both my promoters invested 
considerable time and effort in this project and in my development as an academic, and I 
appreciate everything that they have done for me.  
The three years I spent as a doctoral candidate at the SARCPL would not have been the same 
without my colleagues and friends there. Our seminars and discussions have shaped my 
thoughts and taught me so much and I thank each and every one of you for your support, 
friendship, advice and for everything you shared so selflessly with me. A heartfelt word of 
thanks to Carolien, Clireesh, Jan-Harm, Karen, Lizette, Nhlanhla, Norman, Priviledge, 
Reghard, Silas and Sonja for their support – I have come to see myself as part of the 
SARCPL family, an honour that I will always treasure. A special thanks to colleagues and 
friends at Stellenbosch University and SARCPL alumni for their encouragement. I am 
especially grateful to Karen Bezuidenhout and Reghard Brits for reading my work and 
discussing it with me. Furthermore, the members of the administrative justice research group 
also contributed greatly to my experience as a doctoral candidate. I offer a word of thanks to 
all the academics that were willing to discuss my work and theirs; this is what every young 
academic dreams of. In particular, I thank Prof Jeannie van Wyk, Dr Rachael Walsh and Dr 
Emma Waring – the academics who examined this dissertation – for taking the time to read 
and comment on my work and for their votes of confidence in my future as a legal academic. 
v 
 
I also wish to thank the administrative and support staff of Stellenbosch University, 
especially Mrs Annette King and Mrs Gerda Adams, for all that they do. 
For the financial support of my research, I thank the South African Research Chair, 
sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National 
Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University, as well as the Ciucci Centre for 
Law and Social Development. I am extremely grateful to these institutions for the 
opportunities that they create for legal scholars.  
My parents’ contribution to this endeavour cannot be overstated. Their unconditional love, 
support and belief in my abilities enabled me to pursue this project and their commitment to 
my success gave me the determination to persevere, no matter what. My parents were my 
first teachers, they instilled a deep love of knowledge in me and went to extraordinary lengths 
to help me pursue an academic career and for that I am extremely grateful. Thank you for the 
example you set, the lessons you taught me and for the countless sacrifices you made. My 
dissertation is dedicated to you. 
This experience has challenged me in ways I could never have imagined and I feel truly 
grateful for the love, health, friendships, mentors, and opportunities that have lined and 
guided my path so far. I am indebted to everyone who listened to me ramble on and on (and 
on) about my research and who had a kind word to spare. I am most deeply indebted to all of 
you who forced a measure of balance into my life and for joining me on this great adventure. 
Mom, dad, Henk, Zan, Lizanne, Stephan, Sonja, Silke, Jolané, Karen, Zsa-Zsa, Bradley, 
Richard, Dorothy, Ilke, Tuuli, Justin, Ilschen, Jamie, Linda – thank you.  
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of contents 
 
Declaration  ........................................................................................................................ i 
Summary  ....................................................................................................................... ii 
Opsomming  ..................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. iv 
Table of contents .................................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
1 1 Context  ....................................................................................................................... 2 
1 2 Research problem ........................................................................................................ 9 
1 3 Two approaches to regulation of the use of property ................................................ 11 
1 4 A preliminary proposition .......................................................................................... 18 
1 5 Terminology .............................................................................................................. 22 
1 6 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 25 
Chapter 2: Ownership and limitations in doctrinal thinking ....................................... 32 
2 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 33 
2 2 Background and terminology .................................................................................... 34 
2 3 Thematic discussion of certain historical developments ........................................... 45 
2 3 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 45 
2 3 2 A bird’s eye view of the development of ownership ......................................... 46 
2 3 3 A brief note on the notion of absoluteness in common law ............................... 59 
2 3 4 The influence of Pandectist thought .................................................................. 62 
2 3 5 The Immanenztheorie......................................................................................... 67 
2 3 6 Marx’s view of ownership and its function in society ....................................... 69 
2 3 7 The functionalist approach: The Dutch reaction to absolutism ......................... 72 
2 3 8 The erosion of ownership................................................................................... 80 
vii 
 
2 4 Ownership in South African law ............................................................................... 81 
2 5 Conclusion: The inherent/external debate in private law doctrine ............................ 87 
Chapter 3: The regulation of property in the constitutional context ........................... 93 
3 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 94 
3 2 Overview and terminology ........................................................................................ 97 
3 3 Regulation of the use of property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution ..... 104 
3 3 1 Background ...................................................................................................... 104 
3 3 2 The FNB methodology ..................................................................................... 109 
3 4 An analysis of limitations ........................................................................................ 127 
3 4 1 New or extended regulation of vested or exercised rights ............................... 127 
3 4 2 The relevance of the source of the limitation ................................................... 139 
3 4 3 The relevance of the extent of the limitation ................................................... 143 
3 5 The approach to regulation under the Constitution ................................................. 147 
3 6 A comparative perspective: German law ................................................................. 152 
3 6 1 Overview .......................................................................................................... 152 
3 6 2 Regulation of property in the German constitutional context .......................... 157 
3 6 3 An example from German constitutional case law: BVerfGE 58, 300 
(Naßauskiesung) ............................................................................................ 167 
3 6 4 Concluding remarks: Property and regulation in German constitutional law .. 169 
3 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 171 
Chapter 4: The regulation of property and the right to just administrative action . 175 
4 1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 177 
4 2 The system of the Constitution ................................................................................ 181 
4 2 1 The supremacy of the Constitution .................................................................. 181 
4 2 2 Subsidiarity principles ..................................................................................... 186 
4 2 3 The regulation of regulation: The problem of more than one potential 
regulatory system ........................................................................................... 189 
4 3 The right to just administrative action in the property law context ......................... 191 
viii 
 
4 3 1 Reconsidering the relationship between property law and administrative law in 
light of the Constitution ................................................................................. 191 
4 3 2 Administrative law principles impacting on the regulation of property .......... 193 
4 4 Overlap and non-overlap cases ................................................................................ 199 
4 5 Parallel development ............................................................................................... 205 
4 6 Developments in overlap and non-overlap cases ..................................................... 210 
4 6 1 Background ...................................................................................................... 210 
4 6 2 The role and function of the principle of legality ............................................ 212 
4 6 3 Procedural fairness ........................................................................................... 220 
4 6 4 Meaningful engagement................................................................................... 226 
4 6 5 Arbitrariness and reasonableness ..................................................................... 236 
4 6 7 The role of legality reconsidered ..................................................................... 243 
4 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 246 
Chapter 5:  Theoretical perspectives on the systemic constitutional approach ........ 251 
5 1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 252 
5 2 General systems theory and complexity theory ....................................................... 254 
5 3 Systemic thinking in property theory ...................................................................... 261 
5 3 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 261 
5 3 2 Systemic thinking and information theory ....................................................... 263 
5 3 3 Systemic features of other theoretical approaches ........................................... 268 
5 3 3 1 Background ............................................................................................... 268 
5 3 3 2 A systemic democratic view of property .................................................. 269 
5 3 3 3 A modest systemic role for property ........................................................ 271 
5 3 3 4 A unified theory of property ..................................................................... 274 
5 4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 277 
Chapter 6: Conclusion .................................................................................................... 279 
6 1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 280 
ix 
 
6 2 Regulation of the use of property in the constitutional context ............................... 283 
6 2 1 Overview .......................................................................................................... 283 
6 2 2 Continued relevance of the inherent/external debate ....................................... 285 
6 2 3 An alternative approach to the regulation of the use of property .................... 288 
6 2 4 Implications of the conclusions ....................................................................... 296 
6 3 Final remarks ........................................................................................................... 298 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 300 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Contents 
1 1 Context ........................................................................................................................ 2 
1 2 Research problem ........................................................................................................ 9 
1 3 Two approaches to regulation of the use of property ................................................ 11 
1 4 A preliminary proposition ......................................................................................... 18 
1 5 Terminology .............................................................................................................. 22 
1 6 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 25 
 
 
 
2 
 
1 1 Context  
 
“In a free and democratic society, property rights must be limited – they must be regulated – to 
make them consistent with our commitment to live in a nation of free and equal persons.”1 
 
Regulation and private property are often depicted as two conflicting notions that exist 
uncomfortably alongside one another. In this paradigm, regulation inhibits freedom. The 
research problem investigated in this dissertation is based on the assumption that it is possible 
to reconceive the relationship between property and regulation in such a way that regulation 
promotes and protects a variety of constitutional values, including freedom. The legal 
framework of regulation is what allows the institution of private property to function in a 
complex, modern society.  
The regulation of the use of property is a contentious issue and problems with the 
regulation of property do not arise in a modular fashion. More often than not, the focus of a 
dispute regarding the regulation of property will either be the validity of the regulation or the 
possibility of compensation as an alternative to a declaration of invalidity. This leads to 
questions relating to either substantive legal principles or the procedural fairness of the 
process followed. Often the focus falls on the balancing of competing interests or the 
proportionality of the regulatory measure. While this focus has value, especially for the 
protection of individual property interests, it is also worthwhile to consider whether the 
underlying approach to the regulation of the use of property is in line with the Constitution.
2
 
There is currently no clear indication when the validity and effect of regulatory limitations 
imposed on property will be adjudicated in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution and 
                                            
1
 Singer JW “Should we call ahead? Property, democracy and the rule of law” (publication forthcoming) 6. 
2
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”. 
3 
 
when the issue will be dealt with in terms of section 33, read together with the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).
3
 Because there are indications of an overlap between 
property law and administrative law pertaining to the regulation of the use of property, 
guidelines are required to determine which of these two areas of law applies, how the choice 
is made, and what the relationship between the two sets of constitutional controls is once the 
decision has been made. If there is a theoretical discrepancy between the approaches to the 
regulation of property rights in private law and constitutional law or between property law 
and administrative law, the distinction must be justified for the overall analysis to be 
theoretically and constitutionally sound. 
In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town,
4
 a property developer 
purchased property with the intention of developing a township on it. Approval for the 
required rezoning and subdivision depended on whether the development was in line with the 
existing land use planning framework, including the structure plan.
5
 In terms of the 
applicable structure plan, provision had to be made for certain primary roads over the 
property. Arun adhered to the requirements of the planning regime when drawing up its 
application and approval was subsequently granted for the development, including 
confirmation of the rezoning of portions of the land to public streets, and conditions 
pertaining to the design of the road infrastructure.
6
  
                                            
3
 3 of 2000.  
4
 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC). Hereafter referred to as APD.  
5
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) para 7.  
6
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2012] ZAWCHC 399 (31 October 2012) para 5. 
Section 42(2) of LUPO makes provision for local authorities to impose conditions on developers when granting 
approval.  Arun applied for approval on three occasions for three phases of the development, and each approval 
was subject to conditions. The High Court specifically emphasised that it was not made a condition of the 
approval that the road portions had to be ceded without compensation. 
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The regulatory processes involved in planning law are examples of “regulation” of the use 
of property as the term is used in this dissertation, namely that it constitutes regulation of the 
use, exploitation or enjoyment of property.
7
 Regulation, such as the regulatory process set out 
in the applicable provincial Land Use Planning Ordinance,
8
 is not in itself controversial or 
problematic; it is an accepted part of organised, modern life. However, regulatory processes 
(such as the one in LUPO) limit property rights and therefore require regulation or control.
9
 
This idea of “regulation of regulation” aptly describes the situation in the property law 
context, where the imposition of limitations (in the form of regulation) is regulated to ensure 
adherence to constitutional and statutory requirements. This “secondary regulatory function” 
can be fulfilled by the principles of either constitutional property law or administrative law, 
but it is not always clear which regulatory system applies to a specific case.
10
 
The facts of the APD case is an example of exactly this problem, namely that where 
property rights are limited by regulation, at least two regulatory systems are potentially 
applicable. The two regulatory systems are either the regulatory framework created by 
section 25(1) of the Constitution, or the regulatory framework of section 33 of the 
Constitution, together with PAJA. The regulation of regulation is governed by either one of 
these regulatory systems, or possibly a combination of the two.   
                                            
7
 Regulation is defined in more detail in section 1.5 below.  
8
 15 of 1985. Hereafter referred to as LUPO. LUPO was an ordinance of the (former) Cape Province, but it is 
still applicable in the Western Cape. See Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) 
SA 584 (CC) para 2 footnote 1. It should be noted here that the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 
16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) came into effect on 1 July 2015, which will have an impact on LUPO’s applicability in 
the Western Cape, although SPLUMA does not explicitly repeal LUPO. 
9
 Administrative law is sometimes described as “the regulation of regulation”. See for example Farina CR 
“Administrative law as regulation: The paradox of attempting to control and to inspire the use of public power” 
(2004) 19 South African Public Law 489-512 490.  
10
 The difficulty of identifying the applicable regulatory system is dealt with in more detail in sections 1.2 and 
1.3 below.  
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This means that a decision has to be made as to which set of controls ought to apply to a 
specific case. This dissertation addresses the question of how the choice should be made, but 
it also considers the importance of the relationship between them once that decision has been 
made, to ensure coherent legal development within a single system of law,
11
 as mandated by 
the Constitution.
12
 The notion of promoting a “constructive alliance” between sections 25 and 
33 is explored further, with the hope of aligning the approach to the regulation of property 
across these two fields of law, to ultimately support a property system with constitutionally 
desirable characteristics.
13
 
In APD, the Constitutional Court framed its decision around the question whether the 
vesting of excess land constituted an expropriation. It held that section 28 of LUPO compels 
a loss of ownership and that there is no reason not to apply the relevant rules of statutory 
interpretation to work out the implications of section 28. One such rule of statutory 
interpretation holds that the intention to authorise expropriation without compensation should 
not be imputed to a provision without an express indication of such legislative intent. 
Moreover, if the provision is interpreted to allow for the transfer of the land without 
compensation, that interpretation would make the section contrary to section 25(2) of the 
Constitution, and legislation should be interpreted in line with the Constitution where 
reasonably possible.
14
 Therefore, the section had to be interpreted to allow for compensation. 
The Court therefore seems to acknowledge a type of ex lege expropriation or legislative 
                                            
11
 This principle was set out in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re 
Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44 and is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4.2. 
12
 Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa. The implications 
of constitutional supremacy are discussed in Chapter 4.2. 
13
 Quinot G “An administrative law perspective on ‘bad building’ evictions in the Johannesburg inner city” 
(2007) 8 ESR Review 25-28 28 argues in favour of engaging with potential overlaps between fundamental rights 
to develop “constructive alliances” between provisions in the Bill of Rights.  
14
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) paras 41, 58-59.  
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compulsory acquisition, describing it as “an ex lege transfer of ownership … [which] has the 
same effect as an expropriation.”15 
The Court’s approach of starting with the common law to interpret the legislation in 
question, and thereafter supporting its interpretation with reference to the Constitution, is 
noteworthy. So is the Court’s consideration of whether section 25 of the Constitution is the 
appropriate framework to regulate the regulation in question. The Court’s engagement with 
the question of whether PAJA was applicable to the dispute was brief and superficial. 
Moreover, expropriation usually involves administrative action, because the decision to 
expropriate is usually an administrative decision, bringing the matter within the ambit of both 
PAJA and section 25(2) of the Constitution. However, because the Court held that the 
transfer in this case happened by operation of law, it concluded that the expropriation falls 
outside of PAJA’s scope, and must be dealt with entirely within the regulatory framework of 
section 25 of the Constitution and LUPO. However, the Court’s reasoning on the lack of 
challengeable administrative action is not persuasive.
16
  
The APD case, like many property regulation cases, can be framed in various ways, 
depending on the context. For example, regulation disputes can be framed as section 25(1) 
issues, where the focus would fall on the requirements for non-arbitrary deprivation of 
property. Because of the uncertainty in South African law regarding the doctrine of 
constructive expropriation or compensation for regulatory measures “that go too far”, 
regulation disputes might also be framed as section 25(2) issues, usually with the aim of 
claiming compensation. Moreover, cases dealing with the regulation of property by 
administrative action can be brought before the court as applications for judicial review, 
based on the provisions of PAJA.  
                                            
15
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) paras 65-66, 73.  
16
 This aspect of the judgment is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.   
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In APD, the Court briefly considered treating the regulatory process as a purely section 
25(1) issue (as a deprivation and not an expropriation).
17
 The argument was not accepted by 
the Court for two reasons. Firstly, the land vested in the municipality without the consent of 
the owner and secondly, the state had acquired the land in question.
18
 However, in Agri South 
Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy
19
 Cameron J, in a separate concurring judgment, 
emphasised that “[a]cquisition by the state is … a general hallmark of expropriation. But not 
necessarily and inevitably so.”20 Even where there is state acquisition, the state action in 
question will not always amount to expropriation (such as in the case of taxation or criminal 
forfeiture) and the question of whether the regulatory measure amounts to deprivation or 
expropriation is therefore not a simple question with a self-evident answer.  
Furthermore, the Court did not critically engage with the question of whether this case 
could not have been dealt with more appropriately in terms of administrative law. Although 
the possibility of seeking judicial review under PAJA was considered, the court held that 
Arun would “have to confront a legion of obstacles” to bring an application for judicial 
review. These obstacles included finding a decision to impugn and seeking condonation for 
bringing an application for review outside of the 180-day time limit in PAJA.
21
 Given the 
importance of the outcome of this case, and the relative uncertainty it created regarding ex 
lege expropriations, it is questionable whether this brief and superficial consideration of the 
applicability of administrative law, as an alternative regulatory framework, is sound.  
                                            
17
 This argument was put forth on behalf of the City of Cape Town. See Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v 
City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) paras 54-62.  
18
 It was with reference to the acquisition requirement that the Court distinguished the APD  case from Reflect-
All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and 
Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC), where the land in question was not acquired by the state. 
19
 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
20
 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 77.  
21
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) para 66.  
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Even within the parameters of the Constitutional Court’s decision that section 25(2) was 
the appropriate regulatory framework, the question of authorisation is more problematic in 
the APD case than the decision suggests. The Court considered the requirements of section 
25(2) when it held that its preferred approach to section 28 of LUPO would align it with the 
compensation requirement in section 25(2) of the Constitution, but compensation is not the 
only requirement in section 25(2). The Court arguably failed to address the antecedent 
question of whether section 28 of LUPO authorises the particular expropriation (namely the 
expropriation of additional land for roads not necessitated by the specific development). An 
expropriation is arguably only constitutionally valid if law of general application authorises 
the specific expropriation. On the facts of the APD case, it seems plausible that the 
authorisation question was in fact the heart of the matter, and there should arguably have 
been closer scrutiny of whether the ex lege transfer of the excess land was authorised. On 
closer consideration, it might have been decided that there was no authorisation for the 
transfer of excess land. In fact, the Court alluded to this problem when it stated that: 
 
“section 28 [of LUPO], whose constitutional validity is accepted by all, does not authorise any 
deprivation beyond normal needs. It follows that any deprivation beyond the normal need 
would take place outside of legislative authority and would thus be arbitrary.”22 
 
The facts of the APD case are one example of the intricate relationship between potentially 
applicable regulatory systems that have an impact on property. Property and administrative 
law overlap in a great variety of areas in practice, including planning law, environmental law 
and expropriation law. There are also indications of a potential overlap (together with section 
26 of the Constitution) in the housing context. The overlap between section 25 and 33 of the 
Constitution is not always easily recognisable; it requires awareness and reflection to identify 
                                            
22
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) para 60. 
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it and to decide how to deal with it. There are no clear answers or simple steps to follow, but 
this dissertation proposes some suggestions as to an appropriate methodology for addressing 
overlap and non-overlap cases in the context of regulating the regulation of property. Because 
of the single-system-of-law principle, it is necessary to align the approach to the regulation of 
property across legal fields. In section 1.3 below I set out two approaches to the regulation of 
property and consider the implications of each in light of the new constitutional dispensation 
in South Africa.  
 
1 2 Research problem 
The research problem that this dissertation addresses revolves around the regulation of the 
use, enjoyment and exploitation of property, specifically the question of what an appropriate 
approach to that regulation is in light of the Constitution. At the outset, this dissertation 
reconsiders a prominent debate in private law, namely whether limitations imposed on 
property are inherent or external to ownership, and argues that this debate is ill-suited to the 
constitutional property context because neither characterisation assists with the development 
of an appropriate approach to the regulation of the use of property in the constitutional 
dispensation.  
In South African constitutional property law there has been a shift away from focusing on 
the protection of individual property rights toward a stronger emphasis on reconciling 
individual entitlements with other (constitutional) interests. The inherent/external debate fails 
to respond to constitutional challenges regarding the nature and role of property and 
regulation in a constitutional legal system, because it retains the focus on individual rights. 
This focus makes it impossible to move beyond South Africa’s private law doctrinal heritage.  
10 
 
To respond to the shortcomings (for constitutional purposes) of both the theoretical 
approaches regarding the limitation of property rights in private law doctrine, this dissertation 
proposes a systemic constitutional approach to the regulation of the use of property as an 
alternative. The systemic constitutional approach treats the protection of individual 
entitlements as one aspect of the system (instead of as the whole picture) and views 
regulation as a mechanism through which a variety of democratic and constitutional values, 
such as liberty, dignity and participation, are promoted, whilst avoiding the unjust 
concentration of power, haphazard developments and uncertainty regarding the influence of 
the Constitution on existing property rights. 
In the systemic constitutional approach to the regulation of the use of property, the scope 
and content of property rights are determined in part by regulation. Both rights and 
limitations originate from the system. Limitations on property can be imposed ex lege by the 
common law, legislation or the Constitution, or by acts of the administration, the executive or 
the judiciary. However, the as yet unexplored question of how these different types of 
limitations are dealt with in the constitutional context raises important questions regarding the 
basis on which limitations can be challenged, the justification for the effect of limitations and 
the relationship between potentially applicable areas of law.  
The core of the research problem is that the regulation of the use of property is subject to 
statutory or constitutional controls, and the secondary regulatory process could be governed 
by either constitutional property law principles in terms of section 25 of the Constitution or 
administrative law principles in terms of section 33 of the Constitution, together with PAJA, 
or possibly a combination of the two. This area of potential overlap between property and the 
right to just administrative action is engaged with to determine how the systemic 
constitutional approach can assist in identifying overlap cases, how the choice between the 
11 
 
two regulatory systems should be made, and, finally, what the relationship between the 
systems is after a decision has been made. 
In this dissertation four research questions are identified from the context of the research 
problem. Firstly, which approach to the regulation of the use of property is subscribed to in 
private law doctrine? Secondly, is the regulatory limitation of property in the constitutional 
context compatible with either one of the major theoretical approaches in private law, namely 
that ownership is absolute or unlimited in principle or that regulatory limitations are inherent 
to ownership, respectively? Thirdly, if neither of the existing theoretical approaches to 
regulation of the use of property is satisfactory, what is an appropriate approach to the 
regulation of the use of property for constitutional purposes? Finally, how does the proposed 
approach respond to potential overlaps between regulatory systems? Below I describe two 
antithetical approaches to regulation of the use of property in more detail and then provide a 
brief overview of the chapters to show how the research questions are addressed in the course 
of the dissertation.   
 
1 3 Two approaches to regulation of the use of property 
The regulation of property can be approached in two fundamentally different ways. On the 
one hand, property can be conceptualised as a natural, pre-social right that is unregulated in 
principle. Limitations can be imposed, but they are viewed as external and temporary 
interferences with an otherwise unlimited right. I refer to this as the absolutist approach. The 
absolutist approach is influenced by themes from the political theory of liberalism.
23
 The 
view of property as a right that provides the individual with protection against an intrusive 
state is especially influential in private law doctrine, hence the importance attached to the 
                                            
23
 Davies M Property: Meanings, histories, theories (2007) 10. 
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question whether limitations of property are inherent or external. In terms of the absolutist 
approach, property is a pre-legal, natural right which protects pre-social rights emerging from 
relationships between individuals and “things”.24 This view of property makes it possible to 
regard limitations as interferences with or infringements of property rights, instead of the 
regulation of property rights that exist only to the extent recognised by law.
25
  
The alternative to the absolutist approach that is proposed here is the systemic 
constitutional approach, in terms of which property (as a constitutionally-framed right) is 
never unregulated and rights as well limitations form part of a single constitutionally-framed 
property system. The systemic constitutional approach refers to a methodology that considers 
the legal system in its totality, with emphasis on the complex nature of the system as well as 
the interactions between sub-components (such as different areas of law) of the system. In 
other words, a systemic perspective means that the regulatory system is seen as a sub-
component in a larger system of law, and specifically for purposes of this dissertation as part 
of a larger constitutional legal system.
26
 Both property rights and their limitations originate 
from the constitutional system and exist to the extent that they are recognised by that system. 
Rights are therefore held and exercised in a legal system that always includes the possibility 
of regulation. Moreover, the system provides for the regulation of regulation, meaning 
constitutionally framed control over the imposition of limitations. The regulation of property 
itself is subject to regulation, and there are constitutional and statutory measures in place to 
ensure that the regulatory measures meet certain requirements.   
                                            
24
 Davies M Property: Meanings, histories, theories (2007) 17.  
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 Davies M Property: Meanings, histories, theories (2007) 16.  
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 Systems theory and complexity theory are briefly discussed in Chapter 5, but the systemic elements of the 
approach that I suggest are predominantly based on the single-system-of-law-principle and supremacy of the 
Constitution, rather than general or classic systems and complexity theory. Refer to Chapter 4.2 and Chapter 5.2. 
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Describing limitations as inherent or external is central to the absolutist approach, but not 
in the systemic approach. The inherent/external question is a problem in private law doctrine 
because of the underlying assumptions and logic of the absolutist approach with its focus on 
individual entitlements. In terms of the systemic constitutional approach the question is 
significantly less problematic because the relationship between rights and regulation is 
framed differently in the constitutional context. Even if the inherent/external question is 
analysed in terms of the systemic constitutional approach, it is of limited value because one 
can recognise the existence of an inherent limitation, but still ask questions about the form 
and content of the limitation in legislation or other law that creates it. More importantly, one 
can question the constitutional validity and justification of the limitation. The limitation can 
change and the change can be seen as a deprivation of property that must comply with section 
25(1) without thereby denying that the limitation as such is inherent to the system.  
Ultimately, I suggest the systemic constitutional approach not only because it is 
descriptively in line with the Constitution and the way constitutional cases regarding the 
regulation of the use of property have been decided, but also based on normative 
considerations. The normative aspect of the argument is based on the view that property is 
protected in the Constitution not simply as an end in itself, but as a means for realising other 
constitutional objectives, and that the extent of protection is determined by the whole system, 
including private law and public law. Neither one of these can be said to carry more weight 
than the other, because the entire system is based on the notion of constitutional supremacy.  
The systemic constitutional approach differs from the absolutist approach in several 
important ways. Firstly, in terms of the systemic constitutional approach, limitations (in the 
form of regulation) are not imposed externally on rights, but exist alongside property rights as 
an ever-present part of the system. Regulation is seen as a mechanism through which 
constitutional goals and objectives are promoted and unwanted systemic effects are 
14 
 
minimised.  Furthermore, every individual regulation does not require theoretical 
justification, because it is systemically accepted that property is held and exercised subject to 
the possibility of regulation, and that the scope and content of property entitlements are 
determined in part by regulation.
27
  
Secondly, describing property as a fundamentally regulated right does not erode the value 
of private property because the system is set up to include an element of control over the way 
in which property is regulated. This is referred to as the “regulation of regulation”. Either 
section 25 or section 33 of the Constitution (or a combination) can fulfil this secondary 
regulatory function. The role of administrative law in the property context is conceptualised 
differently in each of the approaches. In the absolutist approach, administrative action erodes 
ownership and imposes limitations on property with the effect of diminishing the otherwise 
complete rights previously held. Owners use the principles of administrative law to curb the 
exercise of public power and to limit the intrusion of public power upon the private domain. 
In terms of the systemic constitutional approach, administrative law plays a more facilitative 
role in the property context to realise constitutional objectives and to balance the protection 
of property with the public interest, in a way that is constitutionally valid and justifiable.
28
  
The third difference is the role of the various sources of law. The role and impact of the 
Constitution is limited in the absolutist approach, because any limitation of ownership 
supposedly diminishes the owner’s rights. The impact of the Constitution is limited to section 
25(1) featuring as a means of protecting established common law entitlements from new or 
more extensive regulation. The same argument can be made for legislative limitations of 
                                            
27
 Singer JW “Should we call ahead? Property, democracy and the rule of law” (publication forthcoming) 10-11; 
Michelman FI “Property as a constitutional right” (1981) 38 Washington and Lee Law Review 1097-1114 1098-
1099, 1112-1113. 
28
 The notion of developing a “constructive alliance” between sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution is 
considered in more detail in Chapter 4.4.  
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property. The result is that common law is regarded as the primary source of law, which leads 
to undue weight being attached to common law property rules and principles.
29
 A different 
relationship between the sources of law is envisioned in the systemic constitutional approach. 
Because the legal system is characterised as constitutional, based on the notion of 
constitutional supremacy, all sources of law derive from and are recognised to the extent to 
which they are compatible with the Constitution. The extent of constitutional protection of 
property is shaped by both private law and public law sources of law, the relationship 
between them in a particular case being determined in accordance with constitutional 
principles.
30
 
The practical difference between the two approaches can be illustrated with reference to 
the Victora & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner of the Western Cape
31
case 
that dealt, amongst other things, with the question of the extent of an owner’s right to exclude 
persons from his property. The court indicated that the right to exclude is not an absolute or 
unqualified entitlement and that it is in fact limited in various ways. In effect, the extent of 
the owner’s right has to be determined with reference to the context (which includes an 
analysis of the nature and function of the property) and with reference to other applicable 
constitutional provisions, such as the right to life and freedom of movement. Ultimately, the 
court held that in the constitutional context the owner did not have the right to exclude the 
                                            
29
 Consider, for example, the Constitutional Court’s approach in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) paras 41, 58-59 where the common law rules of statutory interpretation was 
considered first, and the fact that the interpretation was in line with section 25(2) of the Constitution supported 
the preferred reading of the statutory provision in question. For a more detailed discussion of the primacy of the 
common law, see Michelman FI “Expropriation, eviction, and the gravity of the common law” (2013) 24 
Stellenbosch Law Review 245-263. 
30
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 19-35. 
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beggars in question permanently from its property.
32
 The court indicated that when a dispute 
involved two or more opposing fundamental rights of the parties, the tension had to be 
resolved by optimising each right, in so far as possible, with regard to the limits imposed by 
the other right.
33
 Although the Waterfront case purports to adopt a type of balancing or 
optimisation approach, the reasoning and outcome of the case suggests that the beggars’ 
constitutional rights to life and freedom of movement were not exceptions that imposed 
external limitations upon the owner’s right to exclude.  The common law entitlement of an 
owner’s right to exclude is conceptualised differently in the constitutional setting, considering 
various aspects of the constitutional system in its totality, instead of starting with the 
assumption that ownership (including the right to exclude) is a fundamentally unregulated 
right that merely tolerates temporary limitations. If an absolutist approach was followed, it 
would have been much more difficult for the court to justify the imposition of such a 
limitation on the right to exclude, and even then the limitation would be seen as an exception 
to an otherwise unlimited right.  
The systemic constitutional approach fits in with the “single-system-of-law” principle that 
was set out by the Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others.
34
 In terms of the systemic constitutional approach to regulation, an owner derives his 
entitlements from the legal system as a whole, rather than from pre-constitutional 
arrangements or from a single section in the Constitution that explicitly protects property. 
                                            
32
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 49-52.  
33
 Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal 
Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 451. 
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The framework for regulation is deduced from the entire constitutional context and not only 
from the principles of private law or from section 25 of the Constitution. 
In a systemic constitutional approach, the regulation of the use of property could have an 
impact on various other constitutional rights (either the rights of the property holder or the 
rights of others). However, the only intersection that is critically engaged with here is that of 
property law and administrative law, because the latter is an alternative system of regulation, 
through which the regulation (of property) itself is regulated. Because the use of property can 
be limited in various ways, one is often faced with the difficult problem of identifying the 
applicable or appropriate regulatory framework.  Limitations on property can be imposed ex 
lege (through the operation of the common law or legislation, as well as the Constitution) or 
by acts of the executive, the administration or the judiciary. Depending on the source of the 
regulation, the regulation itself is regulated on the basis of the Constitution, legislation or the 
common law. This secondary regulatory function usually takes place in the province of either 
administrative law or constitutional property law. The systemic constitutional approach, 
together with the subsidiarity principles, offers a way of dealing with the area of overlap in a 
rational and consistent manner.
35
 In terms of this suggestion, I argue that the regulation of 
regulation should primarily be an issue of administrative law, unless the source of the 
limitation excludes this option. In such a case the next option is direct reference to 
constitutional principles, which include but are not restricted to the constitutional property 
principles based on section 25 of the Constitution.  
Thus far, the regulation of the use of property in the intersection between property law and 
administrative law in the constitutional context has remained largely unanalysed and 
underdeveloped. The overlap between sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution represents an 
important opportunity to work out how cases dealing with the regulation of property should 
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 The subsidiarity principles are discussed in Chapter 4.2.2. 
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be approached. Additionally, the wording of PAJA is intriguing insofar as it supports the 
impression that certain post-1994 legal instruments can be interpreted to support the 
absolutist approach, according to which limitation is viewed as external to rights. But most 
significantly, the problematic aspects of the regulation of property emphasise that it is 
important not to view the provisions in the Bill of Rights in a modular fashion. Overlaps 
exist, although they often only become apparent after careful consideration, and should be 
engaged with explicitly to develop a methodology in line with the single-system-of-law 
principle.  
 
1 4 A preliminary proposition  
The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that a systemic constitutional approach to the 
regulation of property under the Constitution is the most appropriate way to address issues 
arising from the regulation of property. The systemic constitutional approach is proposed as 
an alternative to the absolutist approach, which has had some influence in private law 
doctrine. The systemic constitutional approach is particularly relevant with reference to three 
aspects of the regulation of the use of property, namely the existence of limitations, the 
validity requirements for limitations and the justification for the effects of limitations.  
In the course of the dissertation, I investigate this hypothesis in three contexts before 
considering the theoretical foundations of the systemic constitutional approach in more detail. 
There is a degree of overlap between the topics discussed in the chapters, and the division is 
artificial to some extent. However, it serves the useful purpose of emphasising that a systemic 
approach is preferable to a modular or compartmentalised approach. Throughout the 
dissertation, but especially in Chapters 3 and 4, it is evident that many issues pertaining to 
regulation arise in more than one area of law and that it is difficult and undesirable to try and 
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solve these problems only within a single area of law, without reference to the broader 
constitutional matrix and the interconnectedness of the sub-components of the legal system. 
By acknowledging the connectedness of these issues, legal scholars can address broader 
normative and methodological questions.  
I set out the point of departure in Chapter 2, regarding the relationship between ownership 
and limitations in private law doctrine. Here we find indications of adherence to the absolutist 
approach to the regulation of property. This means that property and ownership are 
conceptualised as pre-social, pre-constitutional rights, with an abstract, absolute and 
individual nature. In this case, the imposition of every individual limitation (in the form of 
regulation) on property must be justified, because ownership is viewed as a fundamentally 
pre-social, unregulated right. However, it becomes evident in this chapter that the absolutist 
approach is by no means universally accepted, even in private law doctrine, and the position 
in South African law needs to be re-evaluated in light of the Constitution. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that property is not an unregulated, pre-social right. This chapter 
shows that the regulation of property (as a constitutionally-framed right, as opposed to a 
constitutionally-guaranteed right) is best explained by a systemic constitutional approach to 
the regulation of property. In this chapter it appears that the nature of the justification for 
limitations is different in the systemic approach than the absolutist approach. The question is 
not whether limitations are inherent to the right, because limitations are inherent to the 
constitutional system. The requirements for valid deprivation within the system become more 
important when one accepts that there are always limitations present and that it is a normal 
part of how the system functions, as long as the requirements for the way limitations are 
imposed are met. Limitations have to be constitutionally justified within the systemic 
approach, to ensure that the way in which limitations are imposed is constitutionally valid. 
However, the constitutional legal system includes controls that do more than ensure due 
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process. The effects of limitations can also be scrutinised to ensure a measure of 
proportionality between means and ends. Therefore, I turn my attention to the requirements 
for a constitutionally valid and justified limitation, specifically in the context of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. Chapter 3 includes a comparative section, where article 14 of the Basic 
Law of the German Federal Republic is considered as an example of a jurisdiction that adopts 
something like a systemic constitutional approach.  
In Chapter 4, I test the hypothesis in the context of the overlap between property law and 
administrative law to determine whether the systemic constitutional approach to regulation 
can contribute to more coherent legal development. Essentially, the relationship between 
these fields of law contextualises the research problem, and specifically helps to consider the 
constitutional justification of and requirements for deprivation of property, when the 
limitation is regulated by another field of law, other than (constitutional) property law. 
According to the systemic constitutional approach, one must assume that property law and 
administrative law must fit into the single, constitutionally-framed system of law, and that 
both fulfil some kind of distinct function in relation to the regulation of property. Essentially, 
both systems of regulation (property law and administrative law) can potentially apply to the 
regulation of the use of property. When the systemic constitutional approach is followed, it is 
important to determine when each system finds application and how the choice between them 
is made. With the systemic constitutional approach there is an additional issue to consider, 
namely that once the decision has been made, it is important to determine what the 
relationship (if any) between the two regulatory systems is, especially in light of higher-order 
constitutional commitments. In other words, it is important to not only set out how the two 
regulatory systems fit into the system, but also how they are interrelated. The systemic 
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constitutional approach shows that both these questions are important to avoid the creation of 
parallel systems of law.
36
  
In Chapter 5, I analyse the theoretical underpinnings of the constitutional systemic 
approach and consider examples of constitutional systemic thinking in property theory. The 
theoretical perspectives considered in this chapter illustrate the point that the absolutist 
approach denies the complexity of the system from which both the right and the regulation 
arise. The point of the theoretical analysis in Chapter 5 is therefore not to explain the 
“phenomenon” of regulation in terms of systems theory or complexity theory, but rather to 
support the argument that it is problematic to describe regulation as something that occurs 
outside of a complex system, in a reductionist manner.
37
 Chapter 5 includes a brief discussion 
of general systems theory and complexity theory in the legal context to introduce systems 
terminology and consider to what extent (if any) systems theory and complexity theory have 
influenced property theory.
38
 
This dissertation sets out to prove that in South Africa’s constitutional context, the 
inherent/external question is less important, because the constitutionally-framed property 
system requires us to view the relationship between property rights and regulation differently. 
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Therefore, instead of focusing on the inherent/external question, the systemic constitutional 
approach is proposed in an attempt to critically reconsider (and possibly develop) the 
relationship between property and regulation in the constitutional context by adopting a 
systemic constitutional approach. Chapter 6 focuses on the conclusions drawn throughout this 
dissertation and reflects on their implications. 
 
1 5 Terminology 
It is especially important (and challenging) to be precise with terminology in the context of 
problems that arise in more than one field of law.  Where necessary, terms are explained at 
the beginning of every chapter, but it is useful to define a few core terms from the outset.  
Firstly, I want to draw attention to the distinction between ownership (the preferred term 
in private law doctrine) and property (the preferred term in the constitutional setting). The 
notion of property is foreign to South African private law, where “things” are the objects of 
real rights and ownership refers to the most comprehensive right one can have over a thing.
39
 
In Anglo-American common law (as opposed to civil law) the terminology is less 
problematic since “property” is widely used in private and public law.40 Common law 
jurisdictions do not have the same technical, formal definition of ownership as the civil law 
tradition. Moreover, property is less of a physical notion in common law, especially in, for 
example, post-Realist American law, where property refers to the right and not the object of 
the right.
41
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Gray and Gray define the term property as “an abbreviated reference to a quantum of 
socially permissible power exercised in respect of a socially valued resource.”42 What is 
particularly useful of this definition is the clear distinction between the relationship of control 
over the thing and the actual thing or resource, which ought not to be conflated or equated. 
Property is not the thing itself, but “particular concentrations of power over things”.43 The 
question is how much power the system allows the property holder at any given time.  
I use the term “ownership” specifically in Chapter 2 when dealing with private law 
doctrine, but I generally use “property” throughout the dissertation because “ownership” is a 
narrower term with limited value in the constitutional and regulatory context. The idea of 
being “owner” of a “thing” could, especially in private law doctrine, obscure the fact that 
holding individual property rights in a resource cannot exclude a degree of regulatory control 
over the use of that resource. More importantly, it might seem to deny the complexity of the 
system of which property and regulation form part. Therefore, the term “property” is used to 
refer to power over things and not to the “things” themselves.44  
“Regulation” and various forms of this term (including “regulatory measures”, “regulatory 
limitation”, “regulatory process” and “regulatory restriction”) are usually used to indicate 
state involvement, and specifically to refer to the police power of the state, to regulate the use 
of property in the public interest or for a public purpose.
45
 “Regulation” is used throughout 
this dissertation in this wide sense to refer to any public action that affects the use, enjoyment 
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or exploitation of property. As a manner of shorthand, I often refer simply to “regulation of 
property” or “regulation of the use of property”, but unless the context indicates otherwise, it 
should be understood to refer to regulation which in principle can affect any incident of a 
property right. The notion of the “regulation of regulation” or the “secondary regulatory 
function” is used in this dissertation to describe statutory or constitutional controls that 
govern regulatory processes through either section 25 or section 33 (together with PAJA) of 
the Constitution. This notion is a central feature of the systemic constitutional approach. 
The term “limitation” is also significant, and is used in various ways in the literature.46 In 
the constitutional context, limitation refers to the “infringement” (“restriction”) of a right in 
the Bill of Rights, which can possibly be justified in terms of the general limitation clause, 
section 36 of the Constitution, or limitation provisions in other sections of the Bill of 
Rights.
47
 The term “limitation” is also used (especially in pre-constitutional literature) to 
generically refer to curtailment of property rights in the widest sense. Limitation is the result 
of regulatory measures that are imposed on property. Thus, regulation results in the limitation 
of property rights, in the sense of the second, general meaning of limitation, but not 
necessarily in the technical, constitutional sense. However, “deprivation” (in terms of section 
25(1) of the Constitution) is not synonymous with a limitation of the section 25 right in the 
technical, constitutional sense. Only an unauthorised or arbitrary deprivation is a limitation of 
property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
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The various meanings of absoluteness are discussed in Chapter 2, but the meaning that is 
especially problematic in the context of this dissertation is when absoluteness conveys the 
idea that property is fundamentally absolute in the sense of being a pre-social, unregulated 
right that merely tolerates exceptional (and usually temporary) limitations. This meaning of 
“absolute” is the basis of the absolutist approach.  
Finally, I distinguish between the systemic constitutional approach and a systems 
approach based on general systems theory. In general system theory and complexity theory, it 
is commonplace to refer to a “systems approach” when developing or applying ideas based 
on systems or complexity theory.
48
 In this dissertation the term “systemic approach” is 
preferred, specifically to differentiate it from the term used by proponents of general systems 
theory, since the systemic constitutional approach is derived from the single-system-of-law 
principle and not from classic systems theory.
49
 
 
1 6 Methodology  
The primary methodology relied on in this dissertation is a literature study to determine what 
the approach to the regulation of property is in private law, and to assess whether it is 
compatible with the approach in constitutional law.  
It does not fall within the ambit of this study to undertake a comprehensive historical 
analysis of private ownership – there is adequate discussion of the topic in the literature and 
therefore I rely on secondary sources for large parts of especially Chapter 2. The discussion 
in that chapter is not aimed at a primary or a critical analysis of the sources of private law 
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property, but rather a thematically-structured look at the doctrinal discussions of ownership; 
the approach is therefore mainly descriptive. The thematic discussion aims to show that there 
has been a tendency at various times in the past to describe ownership in a more responsive 
light with limited success, because the possibility of such a description of ownership within 
the tradition of private law doctrine is limited.  
From Chapter 3 onward, I increasingly rely on primary sources, such as the Constitution, 
case law and legislation, but also critically engage with secondary sources. Chapters 3 and 4 
consist mainly of a constitutional analysis of the regulation of the use of property, focusing 
on the regulatory frameworks created by sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution respectively 
and how these sets of constitutional controls function in relation to one another with reference 
to the regulation of property.   
In Chapter 5, property theories are analysed from a systemic constitutional point of view, 
with the purpose of evaluating and comparing their systemic elements. General systems 
theory and complexity theory are briefly discussed for three reasons. Firstly, it serves as a 
brief overview of the development of systemic thinking to introduce systems-terminology. 
Secondly, it supports the argument that the absolutist approach to the regulation of property 
denies the complexity of the property system by focusing on the individual right in an 
abstract manner and by treating limitations as something separate from or external to the 
framework in which the right exists. Thirdly, the discussion shows that the property theory 
proposed here is not a continuation or development of classic systems or complexity theory.  
The theoretical component of this study is not intended to serve as an overview of all 
potentially relevant property theory. Instead, I selected a few theorectical arguments because 
of their systemic elements, to consider where the systemic constitutional approach suggested 
in this dissertation fits into the existing property theory landscape.  
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Engaging with the overlap between property law and administrative law provides the 
biggest challenge from a methodological point of view. The point of departure is that in order 
for this dissertation to be manageable, the focus area of the problem would have to be limited, 
both in scope and in content. This means that corresponding themes and issues that relate to 
the overarching notion of regulation of property are identified in property law and 
administrative law. The selection does not amount to a complete or even extensive 
comparison of the two regulatory systems. The result of this decision is a “bird’s-eye” view 
of the central theme of regulation of the use of property, with a strong focus on synthesis, in 
addition to analysis. Waring has stated that this type of “bird’s eye” approach to certain legal 
problems has merit, especially when the method is used in studies that are broad in scope and 
aim to give a first broad overview and assessment of the problem, while providing the 
foundation for further analytical research (where a doctrinal methodology would feature more 
prominently).
50
  
This dissertation arguably falls in this category that Waring identifies and therefore I only 
offer tentative suggestions regarding an appropriate methodology for this type of legal 
problem and for an appropriate approach to the regulation of the use of property in the South 
African constitutional context, in the hope that it will create the foundation for future 
academic work. Because of the “bird’s eye” approach, I do not consider the implications of 
the systemic constitutional approach in specific contexts (like the environmental or 
expropriation contexts) in detail. However, I postulate that it would be an effective 
mechanism for addressing overlaps in those cases as well. This dissertation has a more 
general research objective, but future research might focus on more specific aspects of its 
application. 
                                            
50
 Waring E Aspects of property: The impact of private takings (2009) 14. 
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In a similar vein, the comparative aspect of this dissertation is limited and not intended to 
serve as an in-depth or comprehensive comparative analysis. I focus on very specific aspects 
of property and regulation in German constitutional law as a form of the functional method of 
comparative law.
51
  I chose German law because of the wording and structure of its 
constitutional property clause, specifically the formulation of article 14.1.2 of the German 
Basic Law, which states that the content and limits of property is determined by law as it 
stands at a specific time. The formulation of the property clause, together with the fact that 
German private law is codified, points toward a systemic constitutional approach to the 
regulation of the use of property. The German property clause differs in certain fundamental 
ways from the South African property clause, but it is useful to consider its implications for 
the approach proposed in this dissertation.  
The comparative analysis concentrates on article 14 because it represents an example of 
the systemic constitutional approach to regulation. I do not set out to do a complete 
comparison of the two jurisdictions, partly because such an extensive study has already been 
done,
52
 but also because it would have added very little value to this dissertation, because this 
study is not concerned with the other aspects of the property clause (in either South African 
law or German law). The value of the comparative analysis is to support the argument in 
favour of a systemic constitutional approach in the South African context, as an example of 
how such an approach functions, albeit in a different legal, social, and economic context.  
In the preceding sections, I set out what the purpose of the dissertation is. Even more 
important is to set out what it is not. The central theme of property and regulation offers an 
                                            
51
 Akkermans B “The comparative method in property law” (2014) 3 Property Law Review 203-211 205-206.  
52
 See in general Mostert H The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the 
reform of private law and land ownership in South Africa and Germany (2002); Mostert H “Engaged citizenship 
and the enabling state as factors determining the interference parameter of property: A comparison of German 
and South African law” (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-273.  
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endless variety of aspects to focus on and many important questions come up along the way. 
Answers to several of these questions are assumed in order to limit the scope of the study. For 
example, questions regarding what is (or ought to be) included in the definition of 
constitutional property were largely left untouched, and I only briefly consider the “new 
property” debate.53 For purposes of this dissertation, the focus is not whether the 
constitutional property concept include interests that are not traditionally regarded as 
“property” in common law, but rather to determine what property law is and what it should 
do.
54
  
If property is not necessary to protect other constitutional non-property interests (such as 
dignity or equality) in a complete Bill of Rights, it is not a political but an economic right, 
and we should deflate the notion accordingly. However, I argue that property has a role to 
play as a constitutionally-framed, political right, and not only as an embodiment of economic 
freedom, and therefore that property for constitutional purposes should be interpreted widely. 
The relevance of this question recently surfaced in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of 
the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Eastern Cape and Others,
55
 and although the definition of property for constitutional 
purposes is an interesting and important question, it is not central to the research problem that 
I engage with in this dissertation. 
Historically relevant questions such as justifications for the institution of private property 
also fell outside the scope of the dissertation, since my point of departure is that both property 
and regulation are essential parts of modern life, which makes a critical consideration of the 
justification for its existence superfluous for purposes of this dissertation.  
                                            
53
 The new property debate is briefly referred to in Chapter 3.4. 
54
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 131.  
55
 [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015). 
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This dissertation does not address the customary law tradition and conceptualisation of 
property. The influence of customary law on the constitutional notions of property and 
regulation has not yet been established. I would argue that it should have an impact on how 
property and regulation are viewed in the constitutional context, especially in light of the 
single-system-of-law principle. For purposes of this dissertation an additional field of law 
would have made the scope of too broad. The primary purpose of this dissertation was to give 
an overview and first assessment of the problem. However, the systemic constitutional 
approach should arguably create ample space for customary law to be considered when 
necessary, and it should in principle create awareness of any area of overlap with property 
law principles in the constitutional legal system, and not only the area of overlap that I set out 
in Chapter 4.  
Furthermore, despite the focus on synthesis and unity of the legal system, this dissertation 
does not propose a so-called “theory of everything” or grand unified theory of regulation of 
the use of property. It does not propose a metanarrative of property and regulation. The 
research objective is to reconsider the best approach to the regulation of property and to 
critically engage with the intersection between property law and administrative law in one 
very specific context, namely the regulation of property.  
Finally, it is central to the validity of the conclusions in Chapter 6 that the systemic 
constitutional approach is developed on the assumption that it functions as part of a 
constitutional system where both property and administrative justice are entrenched and 
justiciable rights. It may very well be that these aspects are necessary conditions for the 
systemic constitutional approach to function as it is described and envisioned in this 
dissertation. The systemic constitutional approach is thus very context specific and its 
features are informed by the structure of the South African constitutional legal system. 
However, as the theoretical perspectives in Chapter 5 show, many aspects of a systemic 
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approach are universal, and can address similar issues in other jurisdictions with a different 
legal structure, despite certain doctrinal differences.  
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2 1 Introduction 
Ownership is said to be one of the most important institutions of private law.
1
 Cowen goes so 
far as to suggest that landownership falls into the same class of “basic familiar things” as life, 
death, sex and friendship,
2
 and Birks remarks that it is human nature to hanker for 
ownership.
3
 With this as backdrop, it is clear that ownership is a fundamental part of modern 
life and that the regulation of the use of property is an issue worthy of consideration.
4
 
One of the research aims of this dissertation is to reconsider a prominent debate in private 
law, namely whether limitations are inherent or external to ownership, and to determine how 
this problem is addressed in constitutional property law. This chapter sets out the historical 
and doctrinal frameworks within which the regulation of property occurs. In particular, this 
chapter considers the nature, characteristics and historical development of ownership, as well 
as the status and role of regulation in private law doctrine.  
By determining the doctrinal position regarding the regulation of property, a foundation is 
laid for examining whether (and, if so, how) the influence of the Constitution makes it 
necessary to re-examine the approach to the regulatory limitation of property. It is not 
universally acknowledged that the Constitution had any influence on ownership. In Betta 
Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh
5
 the court was of the opinion that the right of ownership 
as understood before the advent of the Constitution was unaffected by the provisions of the 
                                            
1
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 1; 
Honoré AM “Ownership” in Guest AG (ed) Oxford essays in jurisprudence (1961) 107-147 107; Badenhorst PJ, 
Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2005) 91. 
2
 See Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re 
potestas (1984) 1, where he discusses the role of landownership as part of this class of “basic familiar things”. 
3
 Birks P “The Roman law concept of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership” 1985 Acta Juridica 1-37 7. 
4
 Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on 
property (1997) 55 refers to this as the “systematic importance of property”, to indicate the important role that 
property plays within a scientific and abstract system of rights. 
5
 2000 (4) SA 468 (W). 
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Constitution.
6
 In this dissertation, I argue that this view is false and that the Constitution in 
fact requires a new understanding of how property and regulation function in society. 
However, before turning to the constitutional analysis on this point, I set out the origins of 
absolutism in private law doctrine and consider how it continues to influence legal doctrine.  
 
2 2 Background and terminology 
A doctrinal study of property is a necessary part of understanding the role and function of 
property in law, but it does not and cannot represent the whole picture.
7
 The institution of 
ownership is influenced by social, economic, political and legal factors.
8
 Ownership is not 
separate from the social context in which it operates.
9
 Ownership has been highly 
conceptualised,
10
 and the concept does not necessarily reflect the contextual nature of the 
institution, which means that it makes little sense to merely determine what has been 
understood under the concept of ownership up to now. However, by looking at “some of the 
critical moments in the establishment of the private-law property concept”, important aspects 
of the historical development of the definition of ownership and its underlying assumptions 
come to light.
11
 The process of defining ownership is closely linked to the construction of a 
hierarchy of rights, because all other property interests are defined with reference to 
                                            
6
 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 10.1. 
7
 Dixon M “A doctrinal approach to property law scholarship: Who cares and why?” (2014) 3 Property Law 
Review 160-165 164. 
8
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2005) 91. 
9
 Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” 
(1988) 21 De Jure 16-35 17-18.  
10
 Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on 
property (1997) 17, 54. 
11
 Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on 
property (1997) 17.  
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ownership. Because property interests are defined abstractly and in relation to how they 
compare with ownership, it was possible to create an abstract, hierarchical system of rights.
12
 
Property rights are to a certain extent still organised in a hierarchical way in South African 
private law doctrine, where a personal right is always trumped by a limited real right; the 
latter in turn being trumped by the only full real right (that is, ownership).
13
 This is the typical 
fixed hierarchy of civil law.
14
 With this in mind, the importance of ownership as the 
proverbial trump-all in property law cannot be overstated.  
Although this hierarchical system can be criticised, it shows why ownership is viewed as 
the pinnacle right, which in turn emphasises the importance of explaining how and why the 
(inherent or external) limitation of ownership is such an important but contested point in 
private law doctrine. The doctrinal and hierarchical supremacy of ownership is often linked to 
the absoluteness of ownership, which is discussed in more detail below.
15
 
However, this hierarchal paradigm has come under pressure. In Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers
16
 the Constitutional Court of South Africa indicated that a 
fundamental shift is required in terms of the Constitution. The abstract system of rights needs 
to make way for a more contextual, non-hierarchical way of thinking about property.
17
 
Before embarking on a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of ownership, it is 
necessary to say something about the terminology used to discuss the characteristics. An 
                                            
12
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 29.  
13
 Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” 
(1988) 21 De Jure 16-35 21. 
14
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 28. Some differences between civil law and common law are 
mentioned in section 2.3.3 below.   
15
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 32. 
16
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 11-23. Hereafter referred to as PE Municipality. 
17
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 521. This shift is discussed in more detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
36 
 
overview of the literature makes it clear that inconsistent use of certain terms has contributed 
greatly to what is already a convoluted topic and in an attempt to sidestep the same pitfalls, 
certain terms are explained briefly below. 
Defining a controversial term such as “ownership” briefly is no easy feat.18 In Gien v 
Gien
19
 the court defined ownership as the most comprehensive real right a person can have 
over a thing, subject to the limits of the law.
20
 This definition is used as the point of departure 
when referring to ownership in South African law. 
A core term to define in the context of this dissertation is “absoluteness”. The term is used 
by various authors in different contexts to convey different characteristics of ownership,
21
 
and it is central to one of the primary theories put forth in private law to explain the existence 
and legitimacy of limitations. The trend in the literature is to focus on absoluteness as a 
characteristic of specifically ownership (as opposed to the broader notion of property), since 
ownership is the only property right that lends itself to description in terms of absoluteness. 
Other property rights are limited in their very nature and description and therefore a 
discussion of absoluteness only makes sense in the context of ownership.
22
  
                                            
18
 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re 
potestas (1984) 3; Pienaar G “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 295-308 295. 
19
 Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T). The origins of the definition will be discussed in greater detail in section 
2.3.2 below. 
20
 Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120.  
21
 Honoré AM “Ownership” in Guest AG (ed) Oxford essays in jurisprudence (1961) 107-147 144 argues that 
the term “absolute” is probably one of the most ambiguous and imprecise terms used in any discussion 
pertaining to ownership. 
22
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 114-115. 
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Absoluteness is used to describe at least four different aspects or characteristics of 
ownership.
23
 When referring to ownership as being “absolute” (or not), authors intend to 
convey vastly different ideas, although without careful analysis the differences are more often 
than not unclear and uncertain. This can have particularly serious consequences where 
authority for a particular view is cited, without due concern for the confusion that surrounds 
the manifold uses of the term.    
Firstly, absoluteness can be understood to mean that ownership is a real right that is 
absolute in the sense that it is enforceable “against the whole world”.24 In this sense, 
absoluteness is a characteristic of all real rights (ownership and limited real rights) which all 
have an in rem nature that makes them generally enforceable.
25
 This meaning does not relate 
to the debate on the nature of limitations, although it does relate to the hierarchy of rights, 
because it is a distinguishing characteristic of real rights, as opposed to personal rights. 
Furthermore, absoluteness is this sense creates certain legal presumptions that can determine 
the point of departure during adjudication of property disputes. The presumptions in this case 
relate to vindication, namely who is bound by the right and the manner in which the right is 
enforced or vindicated. 
Secondly, absoluteness is often used to describe ownership as a non-fragmented and 
unitary right and to convey that ownership is a singular notion.
26
 In this sense absoluteness is 
a synonym for uniformity or totality. This meaning of absoluteness has no bearing on the 
                                            
23
 Van der Walt AJ & Kleyn DG “Duplex dominium: The history and significance of the concept of divided 
ownership” in Visser DP (ed) Essays on the history of law (1989) 213-260 213. 
24
 Pienaar G “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 295-308 295; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 12; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & 
Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2005) 51. 
25
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 170 indicates that the notion of property as absolute, in the sense of 
being enforceable against the world at large, stems from Roman-Dutch law. 
26
 Pienaar G “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 295-308 295; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 13.  
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topic of the nature of limitations either, but it creates presumptions regarding the creation and 
transfer of rights. A presumption of alienability, for instance, is not a problematic result 
stemming from this characteristic of ownership.   
Thirdly, absoluteness is used to convey the idea that ownership is the most comprehensive 
and complete right that a person can have over a thing.
27
 This indicates that in principle the 
owner holds all the entitlements over a thing.
28
 Typically, this description is used to 
differentiate between ownership (as the only complete real right) and limited real rights,
29
 and 
is the source of the perception that ownership is the most valuable and most important 
property right.
30
 Absoluteness in this sense is not doctrinally problematic, but it does relate to 
the private law debate that deals with the nature of limitations. In terms of presumptions 
created by this meaning of absoluteness, one can say that it creates a presumption of a use 
entitlement in favour of the owner.  
Fourthly, absoluteness can mean that an owner can do whatever she wants with her 
property (so-called free use), unless a particular use is prohibited by law.
31
 Historically, this 
                                            
27
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 169. This is the definition endorsed in Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 
1113 (T) 1120 that was mentioned above. Also see Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” (1988) 21 De Jure 16-35 19-20; Sonnekus JC “Property 
law in South Africa: Some aspects compared with the position in some European civil law systems – The 
importance of publicity” in Van Maanen GE & Van der Walt AJ (eds) Property on the threshold of the 21st 
century (1996) 285-331 300. 
28
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 169. 
29
 Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” 
(1988) 21 De Jure 16-35 19-20; Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden 
begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 34; Van der Walt AJ & Kleyn DG “Duplex dominium: The history and significance of the 
concept of divided ownership” in Visser DP (ed) Essays on the history of law (1989) 213-260 214. 
30
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 114. 
31
 Van der Walt AJ & Kleyn DG “Duplex dominium: The history and significance of the concept of divided 
ownership” in Visser DP (ed) Essays on the history of law (1989) 213-260 213; Van der Walt AJ “The South 
African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” (1992) 25 De Jure 446-457 446. 
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is the definition of dominium that Bartolus relies on to distinguish it from posssessio,
32
 which 
is doctrinally unobjectionable insofar as it merely identifies a presumptive starting point, 
while taking it for granted that limitations imposed by law are always possible and to be 
expected. In that form, which largely survived in Roman-Dutch law, the notion of 
absoluteness as freedom from limitation indicates nothing more than a presumptive or 
evidentiary point of departure,
33
 without implying that limitations on ownership are in 
anyway normatively problematic or unusual. However, over the course of centuries this same 
definition also acquired the air of a normative judgment about the existence or legitimacy of 
limitations, and eventually it became associated with the assumption that ownership is a pre-
social right, the absoluteness of which guarantees private freedom against state interference. 
Limitations imposed upon ownership are therefore by definition external, later in time, and in 
principle to be treated with the necessary circumspection. 
This is the essence of the absolutist approach, and the most controversial meaning of 
absoluteness. Absoluteness in this sense directly affects the topic of limitation, by creating a 
strong, normative presumption against limitation. If ownership is absolute (as meant here), 
the point of departure is that it is treated as a pre-social, fundamentally unlimited right that is 
only subject to the will of the owner. This is essentially the Pandectist definition of 
ownership, which is discussed below.
34
 Absoluteness, in the sense that an owner can do with 
                                            
32
 See Feenstra R Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen van het Nederlands privaatrecht (1990) 37-41; Van der Walt 
AJ “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 305-321 307; Visser DP “The absoluteness of ownership: 
The South African common law in perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 43. Bartolus’ definition is discussed 
in section 2.3.2 below. 
33
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 172 states that the notion of (fundamentally) unlimited ownership, 
which can be limited by the legislature in exceptional circumstances, is expressed by the procedural rule that 
ownership is regarded as unlimited in principle, and that the person relying on a limitation bears the burden of 
proving the existence and scope of the limitation.  
34
 Refer to the discussion in section 2.3.4. 
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her property whatever she wishes unless expressly prohibited by law, is intimately linked 
with economic liberalism and the view that ownership provides a guarantee for personal 
freedom, which in turn leads to the view that the thing owned and the actions of non-owners 
relating to it are subject to the owner’s will, and that the owner’s freedom should not be 
unnecessarily limited.
35
 As long as ownership is defined as the right to do whatever is not 
prohibited it can be described as absolute in some sense.
36
 This view is explored in more 
detail below. The terms “absolute” or “absoluteness” are used in this study to refer to this 
fourth meaning, unless indicated otherwise. 
Various characteristics of ownership have been emphasised (often not explicitly) as being 
more important than others, leading to a skewed view of the content and nature of ownership. 
Below, I discuss in more detail what the characteristics of ownership are, analyse the 
importance of each characteristic and its implication for the effective regulation of property 
and finally, consider whether a progressive view of ownership is possible within the existing 
doctrinal framework.  The purpose of discussing historical developments is to highlight the 
dynamic nature of ownership and to show how the institution has adapted to different 
societies at different times, according to economic or social pressure.  
An overview of the literature on this topic indicates that it is discussed by prominent 
property scholars who hold diverging views on what the essence of property is and, 
correspondingly, what the characteristics of private ownership are. Furthermore, there are 
differing opinions regarding the manner in which an inquiry into the nature and 
                                            
35
 See the discussion of this viewpoint by Van der Walt AJ “The South African law of ownership: A historical 
and philosophical perspective” (1992) 25 De Jure 446-457 447. 
36
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 26; Van 
der Walt AJ “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” 1992 De Jure 
446-457 457. 
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characteristics of ownership ought to be conducted.
37
 In this section I discuss the general 
characteristics broadly accepted by most academics, with specific emphasis on those 
characteristics that explain the absolutist doctrinal approach to limitations on ownership.
38
  
As a point of departure, ownership is characterised as a “mother right”, which means 
ownership is a right from which other rights are derived.
39
 An owner can grant a number of 
personal or limited real rights over his property to another person, because of his entitlements 
as owner of said property. The characterisation of ownership as a mother right has significant 
implications and is closely related to other characteristics of ownership, which are discussed 
below. 
Ownership is regarded as a singular right and therefore it is characterised as 
“individual”.40 There is only one form of ownership and more than one person cannot be 
owner of the same thing simultaneously,
41
 with the exception of co-ownership, where co-
                                            
37
 See, for example, Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 173-176; contra Honoré AM “Ownership” in 
Guest AG (ed) Oxford essays in jurisprudence (1961) 107-147 113-128; Van der Walt AJ “Ownership and 
personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 569-589 580-584; Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and 
constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on property (1997) 105-147. 
38
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 34; Van 
der Walt AJ “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership” 
(1993) 56 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 569-589 582. Also see Van der Merwe CG 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 175-176, who discusses the general characteristics of real rights, since these 
characteristics are part of ownership as well. According to Van der Merwe, the only distinguishing characteristic 
of ownership is that it is an independent real right that grants the most comprehensive entitlements over a thing. 
39
 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 175.  
40
 Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” 
(1988) 21 De Jure 16-35 21. 
41
 In this context, ownership can also be described as uniform or singular, as opposed to pluriform or 
fragmented. See Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 
1988) 34; Van der Walt AJ & Kleyn DG “Duplex dominium: The history and significance of the concept of 
divided ownership” in Visser DP (ed) Essays on the history of law (1989) 213-260 214. 
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owners own a thing in undivided shares.
42
 This characteristic implies that the owner is 
entitled to grant rights to others, but the decision resides solely with the owner, since this 
characteristic is closely related to the mother-right status of ownership. A second implication 
of this characteristic is that the owner can exclude all others from using his property.
43
 The 
right to exclude as an entitlement of ownership is closely linked to the absoluteness of 
ownership. Ownership is also in principle not limited in duration and therefore it is 
characterised as “indeterminate”.44 Its indeterminate nature does not make ownership 
absolute. The importance of absoluteness as characteristic of ownership is explained below. 
Furthermore, ownership is characterised as abstract in the sense that it is more than the 
sum total of its entitlements.
45
 Because of the abstract nature of ownership, the sum total of 
individual restrictions cannot determine the nature of ownership either.
46
 Honoré refers to this 
as the “residuary nature” of ownership and explains that an owner may alienate his 
entitlements to third parties but remains the “ultimate residuary”.47 This characteristic is 
closely linked with the elasticity of ownership. 
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The elasticity of ownership means that ownership is able to tolerate limitations, but that all 
limitations are regarded as temporary and unnatural and that ownership will return to its 
original and complete form eventually.
48
 Limitations do not permanently diminish the 
completeness of ownership or alter the nature of ownership.
49
 The image of an elastic ball is 
sometimes used to explain this notion: it can tolerate some interference, but will resume its 
original (full) form as soon as the imposed burden falls away.
50
 Elasticity is sometimes 
referred to as the “minimum residual right” to indicate that no matter how many limitations 
are placed on ownership, the owner will retain the reversionary right.
51
 This characteristic is 
subject to criticism, since numerous limitations are in fact permanent in nature, such as the 
owner’s susceptibility to loss of ownership through prescription and expropriation. The 
characteristic of elasticity is not easily reconcilable with the notion that an owner may be 
permanently divested of his property. Despite practical examples to the contrary, elasticity is 
regarded as a characteristic of ownership that ties in with the abstract completeness of 
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ownership in the sense that limitations are regarded as external and temporary and that 
ownership will return to its original, complete form in due course.  
In South African law the uniformity of ownership is often viewed as a characteristic dating 
back to Roman and Roman Dutch law,
52
 but academics have shown that a concept of divided 
ownership was recognised and developed to some extent by Roman and Roman Dutch 
jurists.
53
 The numerus clausus principle potentially serves as a guarantee against 
fragmentation by prohibiting the creation or recognition of other types or categories of 
property rights. In South African law it appears to be generally accepted that the numerus 
clausus principle applies, but even where it is disputed (in the sense that South Africa has an 
open system of property rights) ownership is a unitary right because of the requirements for 
acquisition and transfer.
54
 
These characteristics of ownership in private law doctrine emphasise the role of property 
as the embodiment of economic freedom and its status as being subject to the free will of the 
owner, which corresponds with the absolutist approach to regulation of the use of property. In 
the next section, I set out certain critical moments in the development of a definition (and 
corresponding characteristics) of ownership, to consider why certain aspects that support 
absolutism have been emphasised or developed and how this continues to influence South 
African law. The purpose of the historical and doctrinal overview below is to determine the 
origins of the private law debate regarding the nature of limitations, to establish what the 
relationship between property and regulation is in private law doctrine.  
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2 3 Thematic discussion of certain historical developments 
2 3 1 Introduction 
Private property plays a central role in society.
55
 As such, ownership cannot (and arguably 
should not) be regarded as independent from the society in which it operates. It is a dynamic 
institution, able to adapt to the ever-changing social, economic and political demands of 
society.
56
 Moreover, ownership is not ideologically neutral. As a social institution, it has been 
influenced by a wide range of social factors and has undergone many developments over 
time.
57
 
This is not a comprehensive or critical historical analysis of private ownership – there is 
adequate discussion of the topic in the literature and therefore I mainly rely on secondary 
sources. The thematic discussion that follows primarily aims to show that there has been a 
tendency or desire at various times in the past to make ownership more “socially 
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responsible”. The means through which societies have hoped to achieve this end has been 
diverse, with varying levels of success.
58
  
 
2 3 2 A bird’s eye view of the development of ownership  
The details regarding the origin of the institution of ownership are obscure, but ownership (in 
some form) was known since the pre-classical Roman law era and therefore Roman law 
provides a starting point for a discussion regarding the historical development of ownership.
59
  
The term dominium was presumably first used by the jurist Labeo in the pre-classical 
period (250-5 BC), although it was not expressly or formally defined and not used in the 
technical legal sense we associate with ownership today.
60
 The development of a distinct 
notion of ownership can be traced to classical Roman law (5 BC-250 AD), where ownership 
became separated from other real rights, specifically as a right distinct from possession.
61
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Cowen states that the Roman idea of dominium as plena in re potestas can mainly be 
attributed to the late-classical and Justinian periods.
62
 Plena in re potestas is understood to 
mean that dominium confers upon an owner the most extensive powers to decide the use and 
disposition of the thing owned.
63
 Other real rights were per definition limited, which creates 
the idea that ownership was the only right that was absolute in the sense of granting full and 
complete disposition over the property. However, Cowen’s historical analysis is somewhat 
superficial, and the matter is more complex than it appears. The term occurs in that period but 
had a much more restrictive meaning than he attributes to it. Cowen’s word choice was 
presumably influenced by later Pandectist developments of the definition and understanding 
of ownership.
64
 For instance, insofar as dominium was recognised in classical Roman law and 
until the late Middle Ages it was not a uniform right; there was always at least two or three 
different forms.
65
 Furthermore, the neighbour law principles in Roman law indicate that the 
notion of plena in re potestas was not absolute, meaning that the extensive powers of an 
owner were limited by the restrictions imposed by law.
66
 What did exist in the Roman 
sources was the contrasting notions of dominium plenum and dominium minus plenum, but 
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they only indicated whether the owner was using the property himself or has transferred some 
entitlements to another person or persons. 
In classical Roman law there were already certain developments of dominium. It was 
extended to immovable property, and there was greater emphasis on the individualised nature 
of ownership, presumably because of the individualisation of Roman society around that 
time.
67
 However, this should not be equated with the way individualism (as characteristic of 
ownership) is understood today.
68
 In Roman law there was more than one type of 
dominium,
69
 and there could be more than one owner of a particular thing, thus negating the 
illusion of uniformity or absoluteness.
70
 
One possible explanation as to why the concept of dominium was left undefined in Roman 
law is that the focus of Roman law fell on the possible actions of an owner, such as the rei 
vindicatio.
71
 It then made sense to place emphasis on the actions that protected the right, 
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rather than on the content of the right.
72
 In post-classical or so-called vulgar Roman law, the 
sharp distinction that was drawn between possessio and dominium in classical Roman law 
was blurred.
73
 The distinction became less definite because actions were not as important and 
terminology became less clear and less important than was the case in classic Roman law.
74
  
Since there was no formal definition, it is difficult to determine the exact content of the 
Roman law notion of dominium.
75
 The risk arises that a contemporary understanding of 
ownership can influence how the sources on the matter are interpreted, and in this manner 
dominium can be construed to resemble its modern counterpart.
76
 However, there are both 
similarities and substantial differences between dominium in Roman law and the concept of 
ownership as it is understood today.
77
 Feenstra expressly warns against superficially equating 
the two with one another and argues that it is illogical to assume that the institution has 
remained unchanged and still fulfils the same functions as it did in Roman law.
78
 The 
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important point that this discussion of Roman law makes is that there was no formal, 
technical definition of dominium, although private ownership was known and rules existed to 
govern the institution. Significantly, the idea of a singular, absolute and individual notion of 
ownership does not derive from Roman law.
79
 
Medieval philosophers also engaged with the notion of dominium, but not from a 
technical, legal perspective and therefore their writings were not always in line with strict 
legal dogma.
80
 Nonetheless, this does not mean that their views did not have a significant 
impact on how ownership developed. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) addressed the question 
whether possession of “exterior” things can be regarded as “natural dominium” or not.81 The 
importance Aquinas placed on the human will or potestas is particularly telling because he 
moves away from viewing ownership as a natural, pre-social right, and emphasises that 
ownership is subject to human will.
82
 William Occam (1290-1349) continued in this vein, 
furthering the subjective approach to property and ownership.
83
 
Another important line of development was introduced by the Glossators, who 
distinguished between two forms of ownership, namely dominium directum and dominium 
                                                                                                                                       
35, 38-40. Also see Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 
ed 1988) 6; Van der Walt AJ “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 305-321 306. 
79
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 41.  
80
 Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” 
(1988) 21 De Jure 306-325 317. 
81
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 82-83; 
Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on 
property (1997) 23. 
82
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 37-38; 
Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on 
property (1997) 23. 
83
 Kroeze IJ Between conceptualism and constitutionalism: Private-law and constitutional perspectives on 
property (1997) 23. 
51 
 
utile.
84
 Dominium directum (“direct ownership”) contrasted the direct ownership of the 
landowner with the beneficial use of the vassal, with dominium directum and dominium utile 
regarded as different forms of ownership. This fragmentation of ownership (acknowledging 
more than one form of ownership) can be attributed to various social, political and 
philosophical factors, most notably the feudal land system.
85
 In the Bolognese law school in 
the Middle Ages a further distinction was drawn between dominium utile and dominium 
eminens (“state ownership”).86  
A landmark development was the definition penned by Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313-
1357) in the 14
th
 century.
87
 Bartolus defined dominium as the most complete or 
comprehensive control (“perfect control”) that a person could have over a thing, insofar as it 
is not prohibited by law.
88
 His definition would go on to form the basis of many other 
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academic definitions of ownership, most notably the works of other Post-Glossators, the 
Spanish moral philosophers and the German Pandectists.
89
 
Bartolus’ definition was interpreted and analysed by several of these schools of thought 
and influenced the legal developments proposed by each school.
90
 When engaging with 
Bartolus’ definition, much emphasis was placed on the words “perfecte disponendi”, as a 
means of establishing authority to favour the absolute nature of ownership. Schrage argues 
that the term perfecte disponendi formed the basis of the “eternal myth of the unlimited, 
unrestricted and borderless power of the owner to do whatever he pleases”.91 However, 
academics have since argued convincingly that when the context of the definition and 
secondary interpretations thereof are considered, Bartolus used the term perfecte disponendi 
merely to differentiate dominium from possessio and that it was never intended to introduce 
or support an absolutist view of ownership.
92
 Moreover, one cannot easily ignore his clear 
qualification that the owner’s freedom only extends to that which is not prohibited by law. 
Finally, Bartolus did not have the intention of placing dominium in a privileged position in a 
hierarchy of rights, because he acknowledged three kinds of dominium.
93
 Bartolus deals with 
                                            
89
 See in general Van der Walt AJ “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert 
die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 305-321. 
90
 Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip (2
nd
 ed 1988) 24; Van 
der Walt AJ “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” 
(1986) 49 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 305-321 311-313. 
91
 Schrage EJH “Ius in re corporali perfecte disponendi: Property from Bartolus to the New Dutch Civil Code of 
1992” in Van Maanen GE & Van der Walt AJ (eds) Property law on the threshold of the 21st century (1996) 35-
67 44. 
92
 Feenstra R Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen van het Nederlands privaatrecht (1990) 37-41; Van der Walt AJ 
“Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 305-321 307; Visser DP “The absoluteness of ownership: 
The South African common law in perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 43. 
93
 Van der Walt AJ “Roman law, fundamental and law reform” (1998) 61 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 400-422 417. 
53 
 
three kinds of dominium,
94
 namely dominium directum, dominium utile and quasi-dominium; 
all of which were treated as forms of ownership.
95
 This view of ownership effectively 
precludes ascribing characteristics such as absoluteness, individuality and uniformity to 
ownership, and these characteristics are therefore not compatible with Bartolus’ definition 
when viewed in its proper context.
96
 
Pursuant to Bartolus’ definition, two different views emerged over time, which 
emphasised Bartolus’ distinction between disposition (by the owner) and use (by the 
possessor).
97
 The emphasis was either placed on the entitlement of an owner to dispose of or 
alienate the thing, or on the use entitlement.
98
 If the emphasis is placed on the entitlement of 
disposition and alienation, dominium directum is regarded as “true” or effective ownership. 
The use entitlement is then of lesser importance. This lost its force in the post-feudal “shift” 
of ownership towards the actual user, presumably because in feudal law the overlords seldom 
used the land. Accordingly, the other viewpoint which held that dominium utile was true or 
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effective ownership and which valued the right to use the property, gained momentum in 
post-feudal law.
99
 
These two views were also influential in the works of the Spanish moral philosophers. The 
most popular view, under the influence of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, focused on the 
use entitlement of the owner. The Spanish moral philosophers defined dominium as a human 
facultas and the interpretation of Bartolus’ reference to perfecte disponendi as “free use” was 
generally accepted.
100
 This approach led to greater emphasis on the comprehensiveness of an 
owner’s use entitlement, which contributed to the impression that the owner’s power was 
fundamentally unrestricted.
101
 Fernando Vazquez de Menchaca (1512-1566), also a Spanish 
moral philosopher, did not follow the approach of his contemporaries, but sided with the 
alternative view mentioned above. He took perfecte disponendi to refer to the entitlement of 
an owner to alienate his property, and consequently attached less importance to the use 
entitlement.
102
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Both of these interpretations enjoyed a certain amount of support in legal thinking at 
various times and initially there was no clear preference for one above the other.
103
 However, 
from the 17
th
 century onward there was a shift toward a preference for the approach that 
emphasises the owner’s absolute or unlimited use entitlement.104  
Similarly, in Roman-Dutch law ownership was defined with emphasis on the use 
entitlement, rather than the entitlement of alienation. However, Grotius’ contribution to the 
development of the ownership concept was extremely influential.
105
  He was the first Roman-
Dutch jurist to expressly distinguish between dominium plenum (“full ownership”) and 
dominium minus plenum (“limited ownership”).106 He argues that full ownership is restricted 
or diminished by the creation of limited real rights in the thing owned.
107
 His distinction 
between ownership and limited real rights on the basis of the greater value of ownership 
marked the movement away from the medieval concept of divided ownership. Instead, 
Grotius associated ownership with the complete or residual right, and limited real rights with 
individual (use) entitlements separated from ownership and transferred to others.
108
 Grotius’s 
formulation of the principle of dominium plenum implicitly viewed this form of ownership as 
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the pre-eminent right over property.
109
 His work therefore presented a subtle shift in thinking, 
away from the medieval notions of dominium directum and dominium utile as two forms of 
ownership and toward a hierarchical view of full ownership and limited real rights.
110
 
According to Milton, this aspect of Grotius’s work was particularly influential at the time that 
Jan van Riebeeck travelled to South Africa, and was introduced as part of Roman-Dutch law 
at that time.
111
 
The French Revolution and the accompanying abolition of the feudal system of land rights 
had a profound impact on the conceptualisation of ownership.
112
 In fact, the French 
Revolution and the rise of liberalism are often regarded as the main reasons for the 
development of the absolutist view of property. The view of ownership as a “droit inviolable 
et sacré” became increasingly popular and, with the movement toward political and 
economic freedom, state interference was regarded as a limitation of liberty and was subject 
to greater scrutiny than ever before.
113
 With the rise of capitalism, there was a keen interest in 
and fierce protection of private ownership. Although the Revolution and subsequent political 
and social climate did have an impact on property’s role and function in society, Feenstra 
argues that the Revolution and liberalism played a smaller and less significant role in the 
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development of the absolutist, individualised view of ownership than the German Pandectists, 
and that the Revolution’s effects should not be overemphasised or distorted.114 On the 
assumption that Pandectism indeed played a significant part in the development of the 
absolutist approach, the influence of Pandectism is discussed separately below. 
An interesting line of development to consider is the justification for the institution of 
private property and its role in society after the rise of the modern state. The work of John 
Locke (1632-1704) was particularly influential in this regard. Locke’s primary contribution to 
the development of the concept of ownership was his natural law justification for private 
property. In his most influential work, Two Treatises of Government, Locke synthesises 
natural law with the theory of individual rights and argues that there are three inalienable or 
natural rights, namely life, liberty and property.
115
 The natural rights theory of property 
developed by Locke provided an influential directive to establish the legitimate scope of 
property rights.
116
   
Locke’s theory is premised on the idea of a “state of nature” where natural resources are 
God-given to humanity. When an individual “mixes” his labour with something of the 
common, the property becomes exclusively his.
117
 However, reference to individualism in 
Locke’s work should not be equated with individualism as it is understood in private law 
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doctrine today and Locke’s Second Treatise is not necessarily a defence of individual or 
absolute rights to property.
118
 Locke attached important conditions to ownership of private 
property, most notably that the mixing of labour-theory can only apply when there is 
adequate property of equal quality available to others.
119
 However, a specific reading of 
certain parts of Locke’s work supported a liberal economic approach and these aspects were 
emphasised in classic liberalism.
120
 
In the next section, the institution of private property is briefly discussed in the context of 
Anglo-American common law. The discussion shows that despite property’s unique origin, 
terminology and development in the common law, many similar assumptions exist regarding 
its role and function in society, in both common law and civil law.
121
 These brief remarks 
emphasise the universality of issues relating to ownership, limitations and the rights paradigm 
and makes property theory from common law jurisdictions both interesting and relevant for 
South African law.   
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2 3 3 A brief note on the notion of absoluteness in common law  
Anglo-American common law does not have a general formulation or definition of “anything 
resembling a comprehensive or holistic theory of dominium in the continental sense,”122 but 
the institution of private ownership is part of the common law legal system and therefore, 
despite variances in terminology, many problems regarding regulation and the absoluteness 
of “ownership” or, more generally, property rights, that arise in civil law also arise in 
common law.
123
 Specifically, the issue of absolutism of property is also problematic in 
common law, although it is based on a completely different line of development, since 
German Pandectism (a major influence in the development of the absolutist view in civil law) 
did not influence the development of common law.  
The rise of absolutism in common law is attributed to a specific reading of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.
124
 In particular, Blackstone’s description of property 
as “sole and despotic dominium” often forms the basis of the argument that property is 
exclusive and grants free disposition.
125
 However, as Rose argues, when Blackstone’s 
description is read in context, it seems at least questionable whether he intended the 
definition literally or technically, in the way that has been ascribed to the specific passage.
126
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Despite the strong formulation, the context of the rest of Blackstone’s exposition of property 
shows that he was aware that this definition did not correspond with the institution of private 
property found in English law at that time.
127
 Blackstone’s definition was particularly 
influential in early Anglo-American law, and eventually found its way into American case 
law and legal theory.
128
 However, Blackstone’s work in itself cannot be seen as clear 
authority for absolutism.  
Despite the doctrinal and historical differences between common law and civil law, the 
notion of absolutism exists in both traditions. Academics have attributed the existence of a 
similar notion of absoluteness in common law and civil law to the influence of economic and 
political liberalism.
129
 In 17
th
 century England, property was primarily regarded as “an 
embodiment of local political sovereignty.”130 The economic implications of private property 
were subject to its political importance. However, there was a shift from political freedom to 
economic liberty in property discourse after the 17
th
 century, which meant that property was 
increasingly understood in terms of its guarantee of economic liberty alone; a view that edged 
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to the forefront in the 19
th
 century.
131
 Property as political freedom became less important in 
the face of economic liberalism as a social system.
132
 
The liberal individualist conception of property as an economic right is still influential in 
common law. The view of property as an individual, absolute right that is in principle free 
from limitations is just as problematic in common law as in civil law, and has elicited many 
of the same points of criticism.
133
 For instance, Gray and Gray argue that the law fluctuates 
between three perspectives regarding property in common law jurisprudence. Doctrinal 
uncertainty exists because it is unresolved whether property should be understood as 
“empirical facts, artificially defined rights, or duty-laden allocations of social utility.”134 The 
three perspectives represent three models of property, namely property as a fact (the 
behavioural aspect), property as a right (the conceptual aspect) and property as a 
responsibility (the obligational aspect). 
According to Gray and Gray, this is indicative of “deep structural indeterminacy”, which 
simultaneously explains some of property law’s quintessential problems, and prohibits the 
development of effective and innovative solutions to these problems.
135
   All three 
perspectives can be useful at times and will overlap and interact to some extent, but “the idea 
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of property … oscillates ambivalently” between these three models.136 Thus, in common law, 
as much as in civil law doctrine, the role and function of context, obligation and the public 
interest in property law is not clear. The “property as a right” model corresponds with civil 
law conceptualism and makes it possible to view property as an abstract, exclusive, 
individual and absolute right that resembles the notion of absolutism in civil law that 
developed under the influence of Pandectism.  
 
2 3 4 The influence of Pandectist thought 
The definition of the ownership concept that exhibits the characteristics of absolutism and 
individualism most explicitly can be linked to several historical factors, inter alia the 
scientification of the law by the German Pandectists.
137
 The creation of a more structured 
(hierarchical) and formal property law system greatly influenced early South African private 
law doctrine and legal thinking in general.
138
 Pandectist thinking has been influential in the 
scientification of the legal system as well as the “verabsolutering van eigendom”, in the sense 
that Pandectists accepted and developed a fundamentally absolute conceptualisation of 
ownership.
139
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An interpretation of Bartolus’ definition of ownership was widely accepted in 19th century 
Europe, but in a form that was foreign to Bartolus. This is seen most clearly in the work of 
Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846) and Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892).
140
 The 
Pandectists claim that their ideas are a revival of classic Roman law, but insofar as the 
Pandectists refer to ownership as a singular, uniform, individual, abstract and absolute right, 
it is not readily reconcilable with either Roman law or Bartolus’ original definition.141 
Puchta, for example, describes ownership as the complete or absolute legal submission of 
a thing to the human will.
142
 This approach emphasises the extent of the owner’s use 
entitlement, namely that it was almost unlimited or absolute in principle.
143
 Puchta’s work 
also gives a new element to the definition of ownership, namely that it is described as the 
totality of the owner’s entitlements. The focus still falls on the extent of the owner’s use 
entitlement, but it is now approached from a slightly different angle.
144
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Similarly, Windscheid defines ownership with reference to subjective rights and the 
assumption that rights are enforced through human will.
145
 If the right allows the holder to 
exert her will over the object “in the totality of its relations”, it is ownership. If the 
entitlement only allows one to exercise one’s will with reference to a specific relation or 
group, it is a limited real right.
146
 A legal system will issue a principle which allows certain 
actions, and this principle is granted to a person “for free disposal”. An owner is at liberty to 
exercise her will to decide whether or not to enforce her freedom.
147
 Furthermore, 
Windscheid distinguishes between real rights and personal rights, since the role of human 
will is decisive for a thing in terms of a real right, whereas with a personal right a person’s 
will is decisive for the actions of a specific person.
148
 This implies that an owner is at liberty 
to decide over the actions of “the world at large” with regard to the thing he owns. In terms of 
this construction, the right to exclude all others from interfering with the rights of the owners 
is central to the ownership concept; as is the notion that although an owner’s rights can be 
limited, limitations or restrictions cannot affect the fundamental nature of ownership.
149
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The notion that ownership is the exercise of individual freedom not only over a thing, but 
also vis-à-vis other persons, reinforces the idea that there is a special bond between property 
and liberty.
150
 Windscheid engaged with the liberal trend in the social-political environment 
and was influenced by the reigning philosophical and political views of his time, although 
classic Roman law was said to be the basis of the Pandectists’ argument in favour of absolute 
and exclusive ownership.
151
 
The idea of the supremacy of the human will featured strongly in the works of the moral 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). There are significant areas of overlap between the 
work of Windscheid and Kant and Windscheid was influenced by Kant’s ideas. Noteworthy 
is the emphasis both writers placed on ownership not only as rights over a thing, but also as 
establishing the parameters of relationships between individuals. A significant aspect of 
Pandectist thinking about ownership and its relationship with expressions of the human will 
is the fact that that the liberty that is guaranteed by ascribing absoluteness or the absence of 
external limitations to ownership is regarded as an important guarantee of the freedom or 
space that is required for unfolding or development of the human personality.
152
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The social, political and philosophical context of the 19
th
 century was conducive to the 
development of conceptual formalism that regarded ownership as a universal right with 
standard characteristics that were politically and philosophically “neutral”. Under the 
influence of Pandectism, the concept of ownership was moulded to reflect the views of the 
reigning ideology, namely that ownership is individualistic, abstract and absolute, leaving an 
owner free to do with his property as he pleases, while merely tolerating external 
interferences.
153
 
Wolff developed the Pandectist view of ownership even further in the 20
th
 century to 
explain the relationship between individual ownership and the public interest, and his theory 
was relied on, in certain private law circles, to explain the relationship between the first part 
of article 14.1 of the German Basic Law and the limitations placed on ownership in the 
second part of article 14.1 and article 14.2.
154
 Wolff’s theory was widely accepted at the 
time.
155
 According to Wolff, ownership is the unlimited right to use one’s property as you see 
fit, while exceptional limitations and restrictions are imposed by the state to protect the 
interests of weaker citizens and to promote and protect social order.
156
 This theory reflects the 
Pandectist ideal, namely that ownership is a universal and abstract right that remains 
fundamentally unaffected by the temporary or exceptional limitations that might be imposed 
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on an otherwise absolute and unlimited right.
157
 While the necessity of regulatory limitation 
of ownership is recognised, it remained clear that such interferences were exceptional and 
thus to be limited to instances where they were unavoidable. 
 
2 3 5 The Immanenztheorie 
In response to the absolutist view of ownership, the so-called Immanenztheorie was 
developed in German constitutional law, in terms of which at least some limitations are 
inherent or immanent to ownership. The Immanenztheorie was offered as an alternative 
explanation of how ownership is viewed in terms of article 14 of the Grundgesetz of 1949. 
According to the Immanenztheorie, ownership is inherently restricted or limited by the 
second part of article 14(1) and article 14(2); proponents of the Immanenztheorie argued that 
it was factually inaccurate and morally misleading to regard ownership as fundamentally 
absolute or unlimited.
158
 Another “version” of the Immanenztheorie was offered by 
proponents of Funtionseigentum, in terms of which ownership is inherently or immanently 
limited by the function or nature of a particular type of property.
159
 
In terms of the now widely accepted Immanenztheorie in the constitutional context, 
Blaauw-Wolf and Wolf assert that if fundamental rights are not explicitly limited it is 
presumed that their limits are set by the immanent norms of the right itself.
160
 Van der Walt 
argues that it is not clear whether property falls into the category of rights that are restricted 
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by their own immanent limitations and states that it will depend on whether or not one 
accepts the theory of inherent limitations of property.
161
  
The theory of inherent limitations of property rights is supported by the argument that 
article 14 establishes that the content and limits of property are determined by law, that the 
use of property should serve the public interest, and finally, that property may legitimately be 
expropriated in the public interest. Van der Walt indicates that the counterargument is that 
property is not limited by the immanent limits of the right itself, but is limited or restricted by 
or pursuant to a law of general application. Arguably, the limits of property are thus 
determined by legislation (law of general application), in terms of the constitutional 
provision, and not by the provision itself.
162
 
Van der Walt concludes that the most accurate position regarding the theory of inherent 
limitations is to say that at least some limitations are inherent to property. These inherent 
limitations derive directly from the property clause or the Constitution. However, article 14 
explicitly states that the limits and content of property has to be determined with reference to 
standing law. The nature and extent of the majority of limitations are not evident from article 
14; they appear from law (both private and public) as it stands at a given point. Furthermore, 
there are many other limitations that are imposed by legislation in a constitutionally valid 
manner.
163
  All limitations and their effects are subject to the proportionality principle and the 
constitutional validity of limitations can be tested, regardless of whether or not the limitation 
is said to be inherent.
164
 The important point at this stage is that the Immanenztheorie is part 
of the larger theoretical framework of constitutionalism, which represents a reaction against 
private law doctrine on a larger scale and is addressed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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2 3 6 Marx’s view of ownership and its function in society 
A thematic discussion of ownership should at least briefly consider the fundamentally 
different direction for the development of private ownership that was introduced by Karl 
Marx (1818-1883). A comprehensive discussion of Marx’s ideas is not necessary in light of 
the objectives of this chapter and therefore the focus will be restricted to one theme, namely 
his radically different view of property’s role in society. Marx’s approach illustrates the point 
that the role of property and ownership is not self-evident or fixed, but defined by various 
social, political, economic and ideological factors.  
“Ownership” is not expressly defined in Marx’s work, mainly because in the type of 
society Marx envisions, it is not important to determine who the owner of property is, but 
rather who is entitled to use property.
165
 Furthermore, Marx is critical of the language of 
“rights”, since it involves a perpetuation of the notion of rights as trump cards over the 
interests of others or the community.
166
 Marx envisions a society where reliance on “rights” 
is unnecessary. 
Marx places private property central to the discussion regarding economic and social 
relations.
167
 According to Marx, private property is the “antithesis to social, collective 
property”168 and therefore he advocates the abolition of (modern, bourgeois) private property 
and states that all land and means of production must be “collectivised or communalised” for 
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the benefit of the community.
169
 When land and the means of production are privately owned, 
it affords the opportunity to transform individual property to bourgeois property or capital 
through the exploitation of others, thereby creating an unequal and classist society.
170
  
Moreover, Marx argues that communism does not deprive a person of the opportunity to 
“appropriate the products of society”; instead it serves to curtail the power of individuals to 
exploit the labour of others for personal gain.
171
 This approach leads to a distinction between 
several categories of ownership.
172
 Firstly, private ownership of consumer goods is allowed 
(so-called “personal ownership”), provided that it is not profit-generating, in which case it 
becomes a means of production. The second category is socialist ownership of land and the 
means of production. This category is further divided into state ownership (primarily 
pertaining to land) and collective ownership (primarily pertaining to means of production). In 
the case of collective ownership there is no free or absolute power of disposition of the 
entitlements of the thing owned; its use is subject to stringent limitations imposed by the 
state.
173
 
In light of the preceding discussion of the influence of Pandectism and the accompanying 
emphasis on individual autonomy and freedom, it is interesting to note the role that 
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individualism and freedom plays in Marx’s work. He views private property as an institution 
that suppresses or undermines individuality.
174
 Marx states that private property induces 
individuals to view others as potential threats to their freedom, in the form of placing 
limitations on their otherwise absolute freedom,
175
 and argues that true freedom can only be 
achieved in cooperation and association with others.
176
 Therefore he is critical not only of the 
disregard for the interests of others that capitalism fosters, but also of the very fact that such a 
severance between members of a community and their interests is allowed to occur at all.  
This criticism illustrates the point of Marx’s argument that the institution of private 
property is inherently incompatible with the ideal form of community. Moreover, a system 
that allows for private property creates relations that pit the interests of owners against the 
interests of non-owners and induces both parties to view the other’s interest as “alien and 
hostile”.177 This results in different classes of individuals who feel the need to protect their 
interests against others.
178
 Marx argues that such an environment is not conducive to human 
freedom, and even property earned through own labour can at best contribute to a very 
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limited development of individuality.
179
 His conclusion is that true freedom can best be 
achieved when an individual is part of a classless community with harmonised interests.
180
 
A cursory glance at ownership in a socialist context creates the impression that the concept 
of ownership departs quite drastically from its liberal Pandectist counterpart that is known for 
its exclusivity, abstractness and absoluteness. Ownership cannot be characterised as absolute 
in a socialist or communist society, since it is subject to the overpowering social function of 
property.
181
 Recently, some of Marx’s ideas are being taken up again, albeit in a different 
context, since it is no longer a case of pitting socialism or communism against capitalism. 
Instead, it represents another reaction against private-law absolutism, like many other 
attempts to break free of the individual ownership paradigm.
182
 
 
2 3 7 The functionalist approach: The Dutch reaction to absolutism 
In terms of property law doctrine, it is necessary to establish whether all types of property are 
treated equally, especially insofar as the regulation of property is concerned. It is an open 
question whether it is sound to “regard ownership as a concept having the same uniform 
meaning, regardless of the nature of the particular object or thing owned”.183 The role of the 
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nature of property is explored briefly as part of the discussion of the Dutch functionalist 
approach.  
The Dutch functionalists recognised the need to make ownership socially responsive and 
tried to bring about certain developments within private law at the time the Burgerlijk 
Wetboek was being redrafted. Their focus on private law stems from the fact that there is no 
constitutionally entrenched property clause in the Dutch Constitution. Dutch functionalism 
represents a reaction against the absolute and abstract nature of property in private law and is 
an attempt to “subject the private law traditions to social control.”184 
The functionalists’ concern with the definition of ownership in modern Dutch law 
provides an interesting example of the reaction against the abstract, absolute and individualist 
conceptualisation of ownership that was popular in most Western European countries at that 
time.
185
 The movement attempted to reintroduce the social function of property by creating a 
so-called pluriform concept of ownership.
186
 This meant that although the functionalist 
approach was supposed to be a challenge to the existing private law tradition, it remained 
squarely within the framework of conceptualism.
187
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After World War II the emphasis on the social role that property plays increased,
188
 but the 
traditional conceptual approach to ownership and hierarchical rights paradigm did not leave 
much room for developing a more “socialised” version of ownership.189 Because of the 
different social circumstances after the War, Dutch functionalists argued that the nature of 
ownership ought to be scrutinised and re-evaluated. The argument was premised on the belief 
that the 19
th
 century ownership concept was unable to meet the needs of the post-war 
Netherlands, where importance was increasingly attached to the common interest and less 
emphasis was placed on the absolute and individual character of ownership.
190
 This issue was 
debated extensively in the 1970s and 1980s, with different suggestions put forward on how 
the concept of ownership could be developed to adequately reflect the different social and 
political environment.
191
  
The functionalist approach sought to remedy the shortcomings of the absolutist view of 
ownership in private law doctrine by arguing that contextual changes affect the very nature of 
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property rights, and therefore reform of ownership itself is necessary.
192
 A possible solution 
was to amend the uniform character of ownership to provide for a more nuanced definition 
that acknowledges the differentiation between various types of property (the objects of 
ownership).
193
  
Van Maanen’s justification for a pluriform or functionally divided concept of ownership is 
two-fold.
194
 Firstly, he argues that there is already such a differentiation in practice since 
different types of property are treated differently, at least to some extent. Legal recognition of 
this factual situation would lead to enhanced legal clarity. Secondly, Van Maanen argues that 
a pluriform ownership concept creates space for legal reform and development. By 
recognising three different types of ownership, defined with reference to the object of 
ownership, a platform for the recognition of community interests is created.
195
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The pluriform concept of ownership did not find favour with the drafters of the Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (“NBW”) and the “new definition” of ownership in section 5:1:1 was a 
restatement of the traditional position, with certain technical improvements.
196
 The decision 
not to redefine ownership as a pluriform concept was not condemned by all. Van den Bergh, 
for example, is of the opinion that there is inadequate historical support for such a 
development, and that changed societal circumstances do not justify such a radical 
department from Bartolus’ definition.197 Moreover, Van den Bergh argued that Bartolus’ 
definition, properly understood, was wide and flexible enough to adapt to the demands of 
society.
198
  
A second proposition for development of the ownership concept involved a balancing or 
weighing up of the interests of parties concerned.
199
 Van Maanen argues that the balancing of 
interests can be implemented fruitfully when dealing with unlawful occupants 
(“onrechtmatige krakers”), since the balancing of interests can ensure the equitable treatment 
of the unlawful occupant, without disregarding the interests of the owner. The result, 
according to Van Maanen, is a more socially responsible ownership concept.
200
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The question was whether the limited balancing of interests that was possible in terms of 
the law should be expanded, and also whether it had the effect of changing the institution of 
ownership by awarding a reflexive right to the beneficiaries. The answer was negative, which 
is why Van den Bergh argued that nothing had really changed.
201
 Amendments to the 
Burgerlijk Wetboek with regard to property were “cosmetic” at best, since the new clause did 
not include either a social obligation or a pluriform concept of ownership.
202
 If a type of 
social obligation to balance private and public interests were to be included in the definition 
of ownership, it would have to be effected by legislation, which neatly remains within the 
framework of Bartolus’ definition and qualification of ownership.203 This means that even if 
such a reflexive right was attached to ownership through legislation, it would not change the 
institution of ownership. However, Van den Bergh is critical of relying on the public interest 
to justify the imposition of a burden on an owner. He argues that an owner should not have to 
consider the interests of the community when acting within the confines or limits as set out 
by the law and there is insufficient historical evidence to argue that such an obligation ever 
existed.
204
 
Ultimately, as a result of increased social consciousness, ownership was subjected to 
greater legislative and administrative regulation than was the case in the 19
th
 century. Some 
of the changes to the institution of private property that the functionalists advocated for did 
happen, but it did not come from changes in private law doctrine. Instead, it came from 
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public law driven changes, such as legislative and constitutional regulatory measures, as well 
as from the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.  
More extensive regulation of the use, exploitation and enjoyment of property effectively 
resulted in the so-called “erosion” of the traditional concept of ownership, since the extensive 
rights of owners were said to be effectively curtailed to give adequate consideration to the 
public interest.
205
 Valkhoff and Van Maanen argue that this erosion of ownership was not 
necessarily a negative development since it led to the “socialisation” or 
“vermaatschappelijking” of ownership.206  However, socialisation presupposes the individual 
and absolute nature of property – meaning it was absolute and individual, but became (or can 
become) more socialised.
207
 This shows the limits of the functionalist approach – the change 
that could be effected through private law was restricted.  
A type of functionalist approach also appeared in German literature.
208
 The German 
movement proposed a distinction between different types of property, namely 
Funktionseigentum and kleineres Eigentum. According to this theory the traditional view of 
ownership as an absolute, individualistic and abstract right should only apply to kleineres 
Eigentum, where individual autonomy and freedom is linked closely enough to the property 
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to trump the public interest.
209
 Ownership of property classified as Funktionseigentum should 
reflect greater social consciousness and should be subject to the public interest.
210
 This 
“diversification” of ownership is an attempt to restrict the influence of the private law 
tradition of ownership as individual freedom.
211
 This approach, which focuses on 
constitutional or public law and its relationship to private law, was adopted is some form in 
modern German law, whereas the Dutch functionalist approach was primarily restricted to 
private law, lost momentum and was largely overtaken by developments in public law. I 
return to some of the constitutional aspects of the German approach in Chapter 3. 
The debates surrounding the erosion of ownership and the possibility of adopting a 
pluriform ownership concept that took place in the Netherlands had a profound impact on 
South African legal thinking. Many of the solutions that were proposed by Dutch authors are 
still revisited by South African scholars, in an attempt to deal with various issues related to 
property in the South African context. Dutch functionalism is particularly interesting for 
purposes of this dissertation insofar as it illustrates the point that problems in private law 
doctrine are not necessarily solved by approaching the problem from within the conceptual 
framework that gave rise to the problem in the first place. The limited success of 
functionalism shows the importance of recognising and developing the link between private 
law and public law. In the context of the regulation of the use of property, this specifically 
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means recognising and developing the link between private law doctrine and legislation, 
administrative law and the Constitution.
212
  
2 3 8 The erosion of ownership 
Erosion theorists work with a truly absolutist (or libertarian) notion of ownership as a right 
that is by nature unrestricted, so that any new limitation is unnatural and too much limitation 
causes erosion of ownership. Erosion of ownership refers to the perception that ownership 
has been “whittled away” through increased regulation and that erosion threatens freedom 
and property, which lie at the heart of Western societies.
213
 
The idea of erosion of private ownership is linked to the traditional public law-private law 
divide. An increase in regulation is perceived as an encroachment of the public on the private, 
in the sense that ownership is closely connected to the protection of individual freedom.
214
 
However, property has never been exempt from social control, and increased regulation stems 
from social demands regarding the role and function of property.
215
 Sax points out that 
property does not adapt automatically to social, political or economic changes, and regulation 
is one way of bringing property in line with new circumstances.
216
 
Erosion, despite its negative connotations, is not per se a negative development, because 
certain limitations serve the public interest and ensure adequate social responsibility within 
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the concept of ownership.
217
 Van der Walt states that the increase in legislative limitations 
results in a larger convergence of private and administrative law and that this should not be 
met with concern, since this convergence is not new or foreign to property law.
218
 
Furthermore, he argues that the convergence may increase the functionality of property and 
could lead to a more socially responsible concept of ownership.
219
 
The perception that the quality or value of property rights is diminished through increased 
regulatory measures is not confined to civil law jurisdictions and the question has also come 
up in American property theory. Macey, for example, argues that the US Constitution 
endeavours to protect property rights and that while the basic structure of the Constitution has 
not changed, the protection offered has lessened.
220
 While this may be true, Singer argues that 
increased regulation is necessary because of the increasingly complex nature of society. 
Increased regulation of the use of property is a necessary response to complexity.
221
 In this 
view, regulation does not erode the institution of private property, but makes it sustainable in 
and consistent with a free and equal society.
222
  
 
2 4 Ownership in South African law 
The South African definition of ownership is the product of various developments discussed 
above and the law of ownership has been heavily influenced by the interpretations and 
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debates of centuries past. At present, ownership is defined as the most complete and 
comprehensive right that an owner can have over a thing and that he may, in principle, do as 
he pleases with his property,
223
 within the boundaries set by public and private law.
224
  
This definition, accepted by courts and academics such as Van der Merwe and Scott, is 
regarded as authoritative in South African law.
225
 It originates from Bartolus’ definition in the 
14
th
 century and Grotius’s definition in the 16th century.226 However, ownership is not treated 
exactly the same in case law and in academic texts. The definition of ownership in case law 
such as Gien v Gien
227
 is precisely Bartolus’ definition and is compatible with Grotius’s 
approach in Roman-Dutch law.
228
 The courts stay within this definition and even when they 
use the term “absolute” it is to refer to the comprehensiveness of the owner’s entitlements, 
and not absolute as meant by the Pandectists that is associated with the assumption that 
ownership is a pre-social and fundamentally unlimited right. In certain academic texts there 
are additional elements that are not reflected in case law and these elements exhibit 
Pandectist influence,
229
 although the authority cited is often from Roman or Roman-Dutch 
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law.
230
 The influence of Pandectism is visible when the characteristics of ownership are 
discussed by academics, because they refer to notions of elasticity, abstractness, individuality 
and absoluteness to support the idea of the absolute use entitlement of owners, and to explain 
limitations as “exceptions” to an otherwise unqualified right.231 Insofar as these 
characteristics convey the idea that ownership is absolute in the sense of being a pre-legal, 
fundamentally unlimited right, it is problematic.  
The absolutist approach has had some influence in private law doctrine. However, the 
question arises whether the absolutist view is still relevant, especially in light of the influence 
of the Constitution. There are indications of the continued influence of absolutism on South 
African law. One example of general acceptance of this approach is found in a recent article 
published in the South African practitioner’s magazine, De Rebus. The article opens with the 
statement: “The concept of absolute ownership is one that is deeply entrenched in our 
law.”232 The author adds that although limitations are imposed by law, the owner has 
“absolute control” over a thing owned.233 Therefore, despite express acknowledgements in 
the literature that ownership is subject to the limits of the law, at least some authors still treat 
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ownership as unrestricted and unlimited in nature, capable of tolerating limitations as 
exceptions that interfere with the otherwise unlimited rights of the owner. 
Many authors have indicated dissatisfaction with the traditional view of ownership as an 
absolute right and various suggestions have been made to develop the South African 
ownership concept to provide for a greater measure of social responsibility.
234
 The historical 
importance of ownership cannot be disputed, but little research is needed to establish that the 
final word has not yet been spoken, especially in post-apartheid South Africa.
235
 Moreover, 
as Van den Bergh explains, ownership is one of the “fundamental factors” in shaping our 
social and political thought.
236
 This implies that in changing social and political times the re-
evaluation of the role, function and limitation of ownership will be of renewed importance.
237
  
The concept came under intense scrutiny after a lecture presented by Cowen in 1984.
238
 
This lecture caught the attention of various academics, and several papers pertaining to the 
transformation of ownership were published in response to it.
239
 Cowen argues that the 
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traditional concept of ownership is being developed by “new patterns of landownership”.240 
He focuses on the “mutability of the concept”, emphasising that institutions such as 
ownership are alive and although it is desirable for the law to be stable, it cannot stagnate and 
refuse to adapt to new circumstances.
241
 Van der Walt and Kleyn link the academic debate 
surrounding the absoluteness of ownership to another pressing question relating to the 
uniformity or plurality of ownership.
242
 Similar to the functionalist approach advocated by 
Dutch writers, Van der Walt and Kleyn argue that by accepting a divided or pluriform 
concept of ownership, the absoluteness of the traditional concept can be negated and allow 
for a socially responsible concept.
243
 
The next big debate after Cowen’ lecture was inspired by the political negotiations and the 
first drafting of a new constitution to transition to a new democratic dispensation. It opened 
up many of the “old” debates regarding the nature, role and function of property in society 
and necessitated a critical reconsideration of many of the themes in this chapter.
244
 I return to 
this point in Chapter 3. 
Not all academics are of the opinion that there are any significant developments taking 
place with regard to the concept of ownership, or that there is any need for future 
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developments. Scott, for example, argues that the definition of ownership that was adopted in 
modern South African law can accommodate any changes in the legal landscape, as it has 
done over centuries. According to Scott there is no indication that there has been a shift in the 
approach that has been followed in South African law.
245
 However, her research focuses 
mainly on changes relating to or brought about by neighbour law. Many developments have 
taken place in the sphere of public law regulatory limitations, rather than in the sphere of 
limitations stemming from private law.
246
  
Although I agree with Scott that Bartolus’ definition can respond to changed 
circumstances, there has been subtle shifts in South African law, for instance from the idea 
that the owner can do what she likes toward more recognition of the qualification in Bartolus’ 
definition, which might indicate one form of denying or responding to the absolutism of 
private law doctrine. Furthermore, there was some sympathy for functionalism at one stage, 
but with limited success. However, Dutch functionalism (or rather, its inadequacies) showed 
that change does not have to come from inside doctrine to be relevant or effective. The 
definition of ownership as it stands in South African law is therefore not in itself problematic 
and it is wide enough to adapt to social change. However, no property law system adapts 
automatically, and in the next chapter I consider how the Constitution influences ownership 
and the regulation of property. 
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2 5 Conclusion: The inherent/external debate in private law doctrine 
The property law landscape is still to a large extent dominated by the traditional abstract 
concept of ownership and the hierarchy of rights. However, South Africa is in the 
(continuous) process of restructuring its legal landscape to adapt to the changes that were 
introduced by the Constitution. This chapter set out a prominent private law debate for 
purposes of determining what the relationship between property and regulation is in private 
law doctrine. In this chapter, I consider some of the historical, doctrinal and theoretical 
aspects of ownership. This provides the foundation to critically consider the nature of 
limitations, the approach to regulation, and ultimately, the position of property (both 
doctrinally and theoretically) in South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation.  
In doctrinal thinking two theories are offered to explain how ownership is limited by 
regulation. The first theory regards ownership as a pre-social, pre-legal, fundamentally 
unlimited right and accounts for the occurrence of regulatory limitations by explaining that 
ownership can tolerate limitations that are exceptional and temporary, while ownership will 
revert back to its complete and absolute form as soon as the limitation falls away (elasticity). 
Authority for the absolutist approach is often sought in Roman or Roman Dutch law,
247
 but 
various authors have shown convincingly that this is a result of overemphasising certain 
characteristics,
248
 while not paying enough attention to others, as well as the inconsistent use 
of terminology.
249
 The absolutist concept of ownership in fact derives from the influence of 
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political and economic liberty and Pandectist theory in the 19
th
 century.
250
 The characteristics 
attributed to ownership by especially the Pandectists that support the absolutist view are 
dispensable, since these characteristics are not part of Bartolus’ or Grotius’s original 
definition and never formed part of Roman-Dutch law.
251
 Although the absolutist approach 
did play some role in private law doctrine, this was mostly in academic texts. It does not 
enjoy much support in case law.
252
  
The second (alternative) theory holds that ownership is an inherently limited right and that 
regulatory limitations are manifestations of these inherent limitations. According to this 
theory, ownership never manifests itself without at least some limitations, although the 
content and scope of limitations can vary. This issue highlights the difference between 
inherent limitation of and external limitation of rights, since, depending on which theoretical 
approach is supported, the outcome might be completely different.  
Insofar as the inherent limitation theory is supported, it could be argued that because 
property is subject to the inherent limitation of building restrictions, any restriction imposed 
on the property is a manifestation of the inherent limitation and the right holder is not 
deprived of any entitlement because he never held that entitlement to begin with. The 
manifestation of the limitation must adhere to the constitutional and statutory requirements 
for a valid deprivation, and its effects can be tested to ensure a measure of proportionality, 
but the imposition or existence of the limitation need not be justified. Conversely, if the 
absolutist approach is supported, every newly decreed limitation must be justified because the 
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limitation is imposed externally on an otherwise complete right. This is the basis of the 
perception that the right-holder is losing some entitlement that he previously held. 
The point of the discussion in this chapter is to do more than to show that property rights 
have always been subject to some form of limitation. Specifically, the historic overview 
shows that there is little to no tendency towards absolutism before Pandectism. However, it 
illustrates the point that the question of absolutism and its implications for purposes of 
regulation arises in both common law and civil law traditions, despite doctrinal and historical 
differences. I argue that the centrality of the inherent/external debate in South African private 
law doctrine is based on assumptions regarding the role, nature and function of property in 
private law doctrine and the traditional rights paradigm which is based on Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law and influenced to a certain (limited) extent by Pandectist thinking. Even if 
the inherently-limited approach is accepted, its potential for enabling transformation of the 
ownership concept is limited, because it is firmly rooted in private law doctrine. 
Arguably, Bartolus’ definition in its original form could be adequate to serve the needs of 
modern day society.
253
 The definition, prior to the interpretations and developments imposed 
by the Pandectists, is broad enough to serve as a point of departure, especially when equal 
importance is attached to “perfecte disponendi” and “nisi lege prohibeatur”. Such an 
approach would possibly allow for ownership to be regarded as inherently limited. If 
ownership is treated as an inherently limited right, not all instances of regulation or restriction 
would be seen as manifestations of these inherent limitations, but the fact of limitation would 
be inherent. This view implies that specific instances of limitation or restriction can be 
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increased or varied, depending on the needs of society, without depriving the owner of any of 
her rights. This would allow for greater flexibility within the institution of private ownership 
to determine the content of an owner’s rights or entitlements at any given time with reference 
to the current social and economic needs. 
Pienaar argues convincingly that developments with regard to ownership in modern South 
African law should not be met with suspicion or concern, but rather with a degree of realism, 
since continued development is not only inevitable, but also desirable.
254
 Furthermore, 
although he is not critical of the more individualised approach to ownership per se, he is of 
the opinion that ownership of especially immovable property should be within the grasp of as 
many people as possible and an absolutist view might hinder the achievement of this goal.
255
 
Pienaar expressed this opinion in 1986 and it still rings true almost 30 years later. In fact, the 
argument can be made that these considerations of “opening up” the absolute nature of 
ownership is in line with a constitutional imperative of creating an equal and just society.  
Social influences on the ownership concept do not necessarily translate into a socialist 
view of ownership, since all legal systems are influenced by a variety of social factors and 
considerations.
256
 However, insofar as the private law doctrine concept of ownership does not 
make adequate provision for the duties or obligations that attach to ownership, it is a serious 
shortcoming.
257
 The point of departure is that property is (and always has been) subject to 
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Afrikaanse Reg 295-308 303. 
257
 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and Another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37C-D. Also 
see Rabie MA “The influence of environmental legislation on private landownership” in Van der Walt AJ (ed) 
Land reform and the future of landownership in South Africa (1991) 81-101 82, 100. See Alexander GS “The 
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limitations and thus it seems desirable to opt for an approach that will acknowledge that at 
least some limitations are inherent to ownership, instead of maintaining that restrictions are 
unnatural or exceptional instances of limitation of an otherwise absolute concept. However, I 
argue from Chapter 3 onward that in light of the Constitution, the alternative private law 
theory of inherently limited ownership is also inadequate, because it stays within the 
framework of conceptualism that is part of private law doctrine. A more radical departure 
from tradition is needed to address issues of property and regulation in the constitutional 
context, because, as Van der Walt points out, “the answers that we are looking for will not be 
found within the paradigm of established conceptual reasoning.”258  
Contrary to the position taken in doctrinal thinking, the parameters of property 
entitlements should continuously be re-evaluated.
259
 In that sense there is an important lesson 
to take from the Dutch functionalists. The idea of functional diversification had promise and 
strong aspects, but ultimately it was limited by the fact that the functionalists were working 
within the established private law doctrinal tradition where ownership dominated the 
hierarchy of rights.
260
 Many of the most significant (social) changes to ownership came from 
outside of private law doctrine.  
Private law doctrine focuses on individual entitlements, and both private law theories (that 
explain the nature of limitations imposed on property) retain this focus. The reason why this 
is problematic seems to be that the focus on individual rights leaves little scope to consider 
                                                                                                                                       
social-obligation norm in American property law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745-819 for an overview of 
some of the arguments why obligations ought to feature more prominently in property discourse. 
258
 Van der Walt AJ “The fragmentation of land rights” (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 429-
450 433. 
259
 Underkuffler LS “A theoretical approach: The lens of progressive property” (2014) 3 Property Law Review 
152-159 154. 
260
 Van der Walt AJ “The fragmentation of land rights” (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 429-
450 446.  
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non-property interests or contextual factors. Moreover, the over-emphasis of the individual 
interest (to the detriment of other constitutional considerations) is problematic insofar as it 
appears to contradict the approach to property and regulation in terms of section 25 of the 
Constitution.
261
  Secondly, the complexity of the legal system in which both property rights 
and limitations exist is not adequately accounted for in private law doctrine, being 
reductionist in nature.  The private law tradition of conceptualism relies on simplification, but 
property goes beyond private law doctrine, as it is also a social, cultural and public 
phenomenon.
262
 Therefore a different approach to the regulation of the use of property is 
necessary in the constitutional setting. The approach that I propose is set out in more detail in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
This chapter provides a bird’s eye view of how ownership, as an institution and as a 
concept, developed over time and in different societies. The most important conclusion that 
can be drawn  at this stage is that ownership is not necessarily the abstract, timeless, universal 
institution that is regarded as the embodiment of economic freedom, but rather “a process that 
works itself out in dialogue”.263 In South African law, this “conversation” will be based on 
and influenced by the Constitution. The Constitution provides a framework for a new 
understanding of the property system in South African law, and in Chapters 3 and 4 I 
consider the role and status of property and regulation in this “new” framework in more 
detail.  
                                            
261
 Consider for example the dictum of Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) paras 11-23.  
262
 Davies M Property: Meanings, histories, theories (2007) 2. 
263
 Van der Walt AJ “The fragmentation of land rights” (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 429-
450 448. The formulation of ownership as a process of dialogue stems from the work of Callies RP “Eigentum 
als Institution: Aspekte zur Theorie des Institutions” in Kaufmann A (ed) Rechtstheorie: Anzdtse zu einem 
kritischen Rechstverstendnis (1971) 119-174 121. 
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3 1 Introduction 
The constitutional protection of property was an extremely contentious issue in South Africa 
during the negotiations for a peaceful transition to a democratic society.
1
 One of the reasons 
why the constitutional protection of property is such a vexed question is the perceived 
incompatibility of the idea of private property and the idea of change.
2
 Traditionally, there are 
traces of absolutism in South African private law doctrine, which characterises ownership as 
an abstract, universal and absolute right. This makes it possible to view property as a natural, 
fundamentally unregulated right that is impervious to external influence (context), although it 
can tolerate some limitations.  
In this view, limitations do not change the essence of the right; it will revert back to its full 
and unlimited form when the limitation falls away. Any changes to property entitlements are 
therefore regarded as temporary. This perceived incompatibility of the idea of property with 
the idea of change is problematic in South Africa’s current legal, social and political 
landscape, where there is an on-going process of “transformative constitutionalism”.3 In light 
of the changes introduced and mandated by the Constitution,
4
  it became unavoidable to 
                                            
1
 See Chaskalson M “The property clause: Section 28 of the Constitution” (1994) 10 South African Journal for 
Human Rights 131-139 for a more detailed discussion. 
2
 Underkuffler LS “Property and change: The constitutional conundrum” (2013) 91 Texas Law Review 2015-
2037 2016 argues that the collision between the idea of property and the idea of change explains the incoherence 
of American takings jurisprudence as developed by the US Supreme Court. However, the difficulty in 
reconciling the idea of change with the traditional perception of property is a broader problem and arguably also 
describes the South African position.  
3
 Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 146-188 150 uses the term “transformative constitutionalism” to refer to a “long term project of 
constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed … to transforming a country’s political and 
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction.” See also 
Davis DM & Klare K “Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law” (2010) 26 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 403-509 409.  
4
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”. In the previous 
chapter the discussion centred on the nature and characteristics of specifically ownership. In this chapter the 
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critically consider the role of property in society. The constitutional protection of property is 
meant to have both a protective and a transformative objective.
5
 However, because property 
rights (and ownership in particular) are viewed in a particular way in private law doctrine, the 
protective aims of section 25(1) are often over-emphasised. In reaction to the (potential) 
absolutism of private law doctrine, debates regarding the nature of ownership and limitations 
receive new attention. In pursuance of constitutional aims and objectives, existing property 
entitlements are subjected to new or more intense regulatory measures and increased 
legislative and administrative intervention in the private domain, which caused erosion 
theorists to protest against the influx of regulatory measures.  
Recently, Froneman J emphasised the importance of the constitutional conversation 
regarding the role and function of the protection and regulation of property entitlements.
6
 He 
stated that this conversation is vital to South Africa’s constitutional project, and that 
ultimately, solutions must be developed by seeking “a conception of property in the 
Constitution itself, and not by falling back on preconceived notions of property not rooted in 
the Constitution.”7 He stressed that it is necessary to “seek our own constitutional conception 
of property within the normative framework of the fundamental values and individual rights 
                                                                                                                                       
focus will widen to discuss the effect of regulation on property rights in general, since the constitutional notion 
of property goes beyond ownership and includes rights to which the idea of absoluteness in the sense of abstract 
completeness does not and cannot apply. Furthermore, section 25 does not clearly specify whether “property” 
refers to objects of property or rights in property, although section 25(4)(b) indicates that “property is not 
limited to land”. See Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 113-114, 118; Mostert H The 
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and land 
ownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 530. 
5
 Alexander GS “The potential of the right to property in achieving social transformation in South Africa” 
(2007) 8 ESR Review 2-9 2-3. 
6
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 4, 30-36. 
7
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) para 36.  
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in the Constitution.”8 This is precisely the aim of this chapter: to contribute to the 
development of a property law system that is in line with the normative framework of the 
Constitution, by specifically focusing on the relationship between property and regulation.  
South African lawyers, judges and academics are continuously involved in the process of 
reconsidering these debates in the constitutional context. This dissertation forms part of that 
process by reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation. Chapter 2 shows 
that the rise of absolutism in private law doctrine was not inevitable, nor did it form a 
unanimously accepted part of South African private law, and the problematic aspects of 
Pandectism are not a sine qua non for private ownership.  
In Chapter 3, I argue that property is a constitutionally-framed, inherently regulated right 
that fits into the larger constitutional legal system. I set out the role and status of regulation of 
the use of property with reference to section 25(1) to determine what the approach to 
regulation should be in the constitutional setting. The constitutional analysis in this chapter 
shows that there is more emphasis than before on reconciling individual property entitlements 
with other interests, and property is protected only to the extent that is reconcilable with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The approach to regulation that I suggest 
follows this trend, and does not focus on individual rights, but instead is based on a systemic 
perspective of property and regulation. The normative framework of the Constitution 
envelops the legal system and all law exists within its boundaries, which creates the 
opportunity to adopt a systemic constitutional approach to the regulation of the use of 
                                            
8
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) para 36. 
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property.
9
 I discuss the approach to the regulation of the use of property in German 
constitutional law, as an example of how a systemic constitutional approach functions.  
 
3 2 Overview and terminology  
Section 25 of the Constitution protects property as part of the Bill of Rights. However, this 
constitutional protection does not mean that property is insulated against regulatory 
limitation.
10
 Instead, because the state must be able to regulate property to promote and 
protect the public interest, section 25(1) explicitly makes provision for deprivation of 
property and sets out the requirements that must be met in order for deprivations to be 
constitutionally valid.
11
 Consequently, the property clause must be interpreted in such a way 
as to strike the appropriate balance between the protection of private property and the need to 
ensure that property “serves the public interest”.12 
                                            
9
 This argument is based on the supremacy of the Constitution and the single-system-of-law principle which are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.2. 
10
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 190; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2005) 96. 
11
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 214, 218, 251. 
12
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 81. Also see Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 17, 42; 
Chaskalson M “The problem with property: Thoughts on the constitutional protection of property in the United 
States and the Commonwealth” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 388-411; Van der Walt AJ 
“Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South African property law (part 2)” 2006 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 1-31. 
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Traditionally, the state’s regulatory power or “police power” is said to enable it to regulate 
property in the interest of public health and safety.
13
 However, with the rise of the 
administrative state, it is clear that the state can limit property rights for a wide range of 
reasons, including environmental conservation, land use management and cultural and 
heritage conservation, to name but a few. However, the question whether a regulatory 
measure falls closer to or further from this “core function” of regulatory power might 
influence the standard of review.
14
 
In this section the meaning of “deprivation” is set out to establish clarity. Conceptual 
clarity is central to the regulation of the use of property with reference to section 25(1), 
because “deprivation” is sometimes used interchangeably in the literature with “limitation” or 
“regulation” to signify that the use, enjoyment or exploitation of property is or can be 
restricted.
15
 However, these terms are not synonyms in the constitutional context.
16
  
Defining the term “deprivation”, as used specifically in the context of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, is the first step to determine when the regulation of property constitutes a 
deprivation. The approach of the Constitutional Court has thus far not been uniform when 
presented with the opportunity to engage with the difficulties surrounding the terminology.  
As a point of departure, a deprivation is generally defined as an “uncompensated, 
regulatory restriction or limitation on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property, in 
                                            
13
 The state’s power in relation to property has three dimensions, namely the police power, the power of eminent 
domain and the taxing power. See Murphy J “Property rights in the new constitution: An analytical framework 
for constitutional review” (1993) 56 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 623-644 630.  
14
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 214, 218, 251. 
15
 The terms “limitation” and “regulation” are defined in Chapter 1. 
16
 See for example Mostert H The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the 
reform of private law and land ownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 315 where it is explained that 
“deprivation” is a generic term which circumscribes a whole range of various interferences with the rights of 
citizens to their property. She also indicates that the terms “regulatory interference” and “acts of police power” 
are sometimes used to convey the same idea. 
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terms of legislation or other ‘law’”.17 This is referred to as the “police power” of the state to 
regulate the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property to protect and promote public health 
and safety.
18
 Deprivations are usually distinguished from expropriations insofar as both 
constitute a restriction of property rights, but rights-holders are usually not compensated for 
deprivations, whereas expropriation is usually subject to payment of compensation.
19
 One of 
the main distinguishing factors between deprivation and expropriation is the factor of state 
acquisition.
20
 Especially after Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy
21
 it seems 
clear that state acquisition is an element of expropriation,
22
 while deprivations are primarily 
aimed at the regulation of the use and enjoyment of private property. However, deprivation 
can bring about a substantial measure of loss or reduction in value of the property.
23
 
The interpretation of section 25(1) of the Constitution was the focal point of First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance.
24
 In this decision the 
Constitutional Court declined to give a comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the term 
“deprivation”, but supported a wide interpretation of the term in principle.25 In terms of this 
                                            
17
 Van Wyk J Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 213. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 
196 for a more detailed discussion. 
18
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 195.  
19
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 192; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2005) 543; Mostert H The constitutional protection and 
regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and land ownership in South Africa and 
Germany (2002) 279. 
20
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2005) 541. 
21
 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
22
 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 48. Hereafter referred to as 
Agri South Africa. 
23
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 196. 
24
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). Hereafter referred to as FNB. 
25
 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 46-1 – 46-37 at 46-18. 
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wide approach all restrictions imposed on property will be regarded as deprivations, since 
“any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property” qualifies as a 
deprivation that must comply with the requirements set out in section 25(1).
26
  
This broad formulation was not applied uniformly in subsequent case law. In Mkontwana 
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng
27
 the Constitutional Court apparently restricted the 
interpretation given to the term “deprivation” in the FNB decision.28 This decision created 
confusion, since it indicated its agreement with the interpretation provided in FNB, but upon 
closer inspection the scope of the definitions is not identical.
29
 In the Mkontwana decision 
deprivations were defined as instances of regulation “that go … beyond the normal 
restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society”.30 It has 
                                            
26
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. See also Van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 203-204. 
27
 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). Hereafter referred to as Mkontwana. 
28
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32.  
29
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 204; Van der Walt AJ 
“Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; 
Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 79-80 for a detailed discussion regarding the 
interpretation of the Court’s statements. 
30
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
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been stated above that one of the purposes of section 25(1) is to assert the police power of the 
state to regulate private property, which is not incompatible with the values of an open and 
democratic society. It seems illogical to restrict the application of section 25(1) only to 
instances of serious restrictions or restrictions that somehow extend beyond what is 
acceptable in open and democratic societies. All instances of regulatory limitation should be 
capable of being assessed against the requirements set by section 25, regardless of their 
severity.
31
  
The confusion created by the Mkontwana decision was evident in Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and 
Another,
32
 where the Court remarked that the Mkontwana judgment “expanded the notion of 
deprivation of property for purposes of section 25”.33 This is clearly not the case, since even 
the most lenient interpretation of the Court’s definition in Mkontwana would still restrict 
deprivations to instances of “extremely serious interferences with property”.34  
The confusion escalated further in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others,
35
 where the Constitutional Court applied the 
FNB definition, but cited Mkontwana as authority for its approach.
36
 The Offit decision 
moved away from defining deprivations in terms of what is normal in an open and 
democratic society and instead focused on whether the regulation had a legally relevant 
                                            
31
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 205-206. 
32
 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). Hereafter referred to as Reflect-All. 
33
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
34
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 205. 
35
 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC). Hereafter referred to as Offit. 
36
 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (1) SA 
293 (CC) para 38. 
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impact on the rights of a property holder, despite professing to follow the Mkontwana 
definition.
37
 
In National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others
38
 the Constitutional Court provided 
greater clarity by holding that any legally significant interference with property amounts to a 
deprivation in terms of section 25(1).
39
 This is indicative of acceptance of the wider approach 
first suggested in the FNB decision. 
In Agri South Africa the Constitutional Court said that “deprivation always takes place 
when property or rights therein are either taken away or significantly interfered with”,40 
which seems to again lean more towards the narrow or strict approach of the Court in the 
Mkontwana decision. However, it is also possible that the wording of the Court was intended 
to refer to its decision in Opperman, where “a legally significant” impact was required. 
Despite the confusion that the Constitutional Court created through its imprecise language, it 
seems fairly certain that a wide definition is preferred, and a litigant will not be precluded 
from bringing a case to test the constitutional validity of a restriction placed on his property 
rights against the requirements of section 25(1).
41
 
Furthermore, in Agri South Africa, the Court alluded to the difference between 
“limitation” and “deprivation” when Mogoeng CJ stated that “[w]hen a determination has to 
be made whether there was deprivation of property, an affirmative answer would necessitate 
a further enquiry into the extent, if any, to which that deprivation limits the section 25(1) 
                                            
37
 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (1) SA 
293 (CC) paras 44-46. Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 208; 263. 
38
 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). Hereafter referred to as Opperman. 
39
 National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 66, referring to Offit Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC) paras 39, 
41. See also Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” (2013) 1 Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.1. 
40
 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 48 (own emphasis added). 
41
 Alexander GS “The potential of the right to property in achieving social transformation in South Africa” 
(2007) 8 ESR Review 2-9 5-6. 
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right”.42 This is an important distinction: if there is a constitutionally valid deprivation, there 
is no limitation of the section 25(1) right, even if the extent of the limitation is quite severe, 
since section 25(1) explicitly makes provision for the limitation of property rights by means 
of deprivation, subject to the requirements listed. In other words, if the requirements are 
complied with, there was a deprivation, but no limitation of the section 25 right.
43
 A 
property’s holder right under section 25(1) is not infringed by the act of deprivation, but by 
unauthorised or arbitrary deprivation. Therefore it is incorrect to regard a valid deprivation 
as a limitation of the right to property in terms of section 25(1), although one can generally 
refer to the effect of regulatory measures as limitations that are imposed on property 
entitlements.  
Whether the wide definition, as proposed in the FNB and Opperman decisions, or the 
narrow interpretation of Mkontwana (and possibly Agri South Africa) is accepted as correct, 
will have an impact on when a rights holder will be able to challenge a regulatory limitation 
in terms of section 25(1). If it is accepted that all instances of legally significant state 
intervention with property qualify as deprivation for purposes of section 25(1), any such 
restriction must meet the requirements for a valid deprivation as set out in section 25(1) and 
any person whose rights are affected by such a regulatory restriction may approach the court 
to test the validity of the deprivation against these requirements, subject to the operation of 
the subsidiarity principles.
44
 On the other hand, if it is accepted that only regulation that 
“goes further” than the “normal restrictions” one can expect in an open and democratic 
                                            
42
 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 49. 
43
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 196. 
44
 I discuss the subsidiarity principles in more detail in Chapter 4.2. Recently, the wide approach was again 
confirmed in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 73-76.  
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society qualify as deprivation, the category of regulatory deprivations that can be challenged 
in terms of section 25(1) will be much smaller.
45
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the case law seems to be a general preference for a 
wide interpretation of the term “deprivation”, which would allow any legally significant (as 
opposed to a de minimis) interference with property rights to be challenged in terms of 
section 25(1).
46
 Throughout this chapter, this is the preferred interpretation attached to the 
term “deprivation”, unless a contrary definition is expressly indicated. 
 
3 3 Regulation of the use of property in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution  
3 3 1 Background 
The constitutional notion of “property” is arguably different from its private law 
interpretation, but cannot stand completely removed from it.
47
 The private law notion and the 
constitutional notion of property differ in scope, but will (and should) influence each other.
48
 
This wider approach will encourage recognition of a variety of interests as “property” for 
                                            
45
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 213. 
46
 Van der Walt AJ “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 80; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 264; Alexander GS “The potential of the right to property in achieving 
social transformation in South Africa” (2007) 8 ESR Review 2-9 5-6. 
47
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 86,114,129; Van Wyk J Planning law (2
nd
 ed 
2012) 211. 
48
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 39-41, 59. Also see Van 
der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 86. 
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constitutional purposes.
49
 Arguably, this lessens the importance that is attached to ownership 
as the “trump-all” in the rights paradigm in private law doctrine, since other property rights 
(and even non-rights) will occasionally trump ownership in the constitutional arena.
50
 It is 
clear that the protection offered in section 25 is not restricted to ownership,
51
 and ownership 
should not be allowed to dominate constitutional property law disputes.
52
 Recently, the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that although a wide notion of “property” might be 
appropriate for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, it should not have the effect of 
making legislative regulation impractical or impossible, thereby inhibiting the transformative 
objectives of the Constitution.
53
 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution declares that “[n]o one may be deprived of property 
except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property”. The Reflect-All decision indicated that the purpose of section 25 is to protect 
property rights against illegitimate and unfair state interference. Naturally this means that 
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legitimate and fair regulatory measures are sanctioned by section 25 of the Constitution, with 
the effect that private property rights are not insulated against state action, but rather 
expressly limited by the possibility of legitimate regulatory action taken by the state. All 
property rights are therefore held and exercised subject to the possibility of legitimate 
deprivation. This enables the state to balance private and public interests and take steps to 
transform existing patterns of property rights.
54
  
In effect, section 25 provides the “parameters of regulation of private property”.55 
Consequently, section 25(1) serves a two-fold purpose.
56
 Firstly, it ensures that property can 
be limited for various purposes, for example to allow the state to fulfil its police power 
function, and secondly it protects property rights against arbitrary or otherwise unlawful 
restrictions.
57
 It therefore sets out the requirements that must be met for a deprivation to be 
constitutionally valid, and it creates a regulatory framework to control the imposition of the 
regulation. Section 25(1) justifies the state’s police power to regulate, and at the same time 
limits the state’s power by setting out the conditions that have to be met for the state action to 
be constitutionally valid. This secondary regulatory function of section 25 is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4.  
Shortly after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, it was debated whether section 25 
protects property, or whether it merely protects a truncated property right.
58
 The notion that a 
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truncated property right is protected means that section 25 only protects property rights 
against deprivations and expropriations that do not meet the criteria set out in section 25 and 
not property as such. While a textual reading of section 25 could support this argument, Van 
der Walt argues that this argument was developed to prevent the immunisation of existing 
property rights against transformation and reform initiatives.
59
 However, because the 
constitutionalisation of property should be seen in the correct interpretative framework, the 
“truncated-right” argument is not necessary to ensure that existing property rights are not 
insulated from regulatory limitation.
60
 Read as a whole, section 25 asserts the nation’s 
commitment to restitution and transformation, and this is indicative of the various interests 
that come into play in the constitutional sphere.  
In the context of analysing the constitutional validity of limitations, it is useful to work 
within the paradigm that views property as a constitutional right.
61
 This ensures that the point 
of departure is not unfairly tilted in favour of the (near absolute) protection of rights, and 
serves as a reminder that property functions within the normative framework of the 
principles, values and goals of the Constitution.
62
 There are several important consequences 
that flow from treating property as a constitutionally-framed right. Firstly, not every 
entitlement (as opposed to right) that is protected in terms of private law will necessarily be 
protected (or protected to the same extent) in the constitutional context.
63
 Secondly, the 
notion of “property” is wider in the constitutional context than in private law, and therefore 
interests that are not regarded or protected as property in private law (although they may be 
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protected in a different way) may be protected as property in terms of section 25.
64
 
Consequently, property cannot be viewed or protected in exactly the same manner as is the 
case in private law.
65
 Thirdly, as a fundamentally regulated right property exists only to the 
extent recognised and protected by the Constitution as a whole. In the constitutional legal 
system there are no pre-legal or pre-social rights that fall outside the ambit of the system. 
The point of working with “property as a constitutional right” is not to insulate private law 
from the Constitution’s reach by adhering to the traditional private/public divide of Roman-
Dutch law and creating two separate (parallel) property systems, but rather to realise that 
rights, including property rights, protected under the Constitution are political rights which do 
not only serve to protect economic value. By taking this broader view of property as a 
constitutional right, the Constitution (and not only section 25) tells us something more about 
the substance of what is protected by the property clause and what the purpose of regulation 
is.
66
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In Reflect-All
67
 the Constitutional Court correctly stated that “property rights under our 
constitutional dispensation cannot be properly understood outside its historical context, 
formulation and social framework”.68 The absolutism of private law doctrine can therefore 
not simply be ignored. Van der Walt points out that the conceptual and logical structures 
within which property disputes are usually decided are dominated by an “abstract view of the 
syllogistic relationship between rights and remedies”.69 In this view a rights holder will be 
entitled to a remedy that will trump the rights or interests of a party with either a weaker right 
or no right. This hierarchy leaves very little room for contextual considerations and the effect 
of vindication is usually disregarded as irrelevant.
70
 In recent decisions there has been 
evidence of a move away from the hierarchical structure that dominated property disputes 
toward a non-hierarchical, contextual approach.
71
 This move is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
3 3 2 The FNB methodology 
3 3 2 1 Background  
The FNB decision provided much-needed guidance and direction on how the property clause 
in the final Constitution ought to be interpreted.
72
 One of the decision’s important 
                                            
67
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
68
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 32. 
69
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 115. 
70
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 116. 
71
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-23, 31; Reflect-All 1025 CC 
and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 
(6) SA 391 (CC) para 53. 
72
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 75; Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 3 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 46-1 – 46-37 at 46-2. 
110 
 
contributions is that it sets out a series of steps or stages that constitute an appropriate 
methodology to approach constitutional property disputes and to determine the constitutional 
validity of a deprivation.
73
  
According to the Constitutional Court the stages of a property clause dispute are evident in 
the following questions.
74
 Firstly, it must be considered whether that which is taken away 
from the right-holder amounts to property, as understood in the context of section 25. 
Secondly, has there been a deprivation of property through state action? If the second 
question is answered in the affirmative, the court must consider whether the deprivation 
complies with the requirements of section 25(1). If the court finds that there is no deprivation, 
the matter ends there. When the court establishes that a deprivation is inconsistent with 
section 25(1), the next question is whether that deprivation can be justified in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution.
75
  
The stages of inquiry then move on to expropriation, where the first question is whether a 
deprivation that either complies with section 25(1) or can be justified in terms of section 36 
amounts to an expropriation for purposes of section 25(2). If the deprivation amounts to an 
expropriation, the court must test the expropriation against the requirements of section 
25(2)(a) and (b) to determine whether the expropriation complies with the constitutional 
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requirements. If it fails to comply with the requirements, the court should consider whether 
the expropriation can be justified under section 36.
76
 
The issues addressed in this chapter mainly fall into the second and third stages of the 
FNB methodology. Roux predicts that various considerations would be usurped into the 
arbitrariness question.
77
 For example, the first step should be to consider whether a property 
interest has been affected by the alleged deprivation and only after this hurdle has been 
cleared should the court consider whether there has been a deprivation of property.
78
 But 
according to Roux, the “vortex effect of the methodology” might cause this “threshold 
question” to be either glossed over or skipped entirely.79 
Section 25(1), as interpreted in the FNB decision, provides a framework for the legitimate 
regulation of property. The requirements that must be met are discussed in more detail in the 
following section, since the interpretation given to these requirements will determine the size 
of the regulatory space within which the legislature is allowed to validly regulate the property 
regime. 
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3 3 2 2 Overview 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution sets out the formal requirements that state action must 
comply with for deprivations imposed on property to be constitutionally valid. According to 
section 25(1), deprivations must be effected in terms of law of general application, which 
may not permit arbitrary deprivations. These two requirements ensure that deprivation is not 
contrary to the due process of the law.
80
 Deprivation can therefore only take place in 
accordance with law of general application, it should affect people equally and it should be 
for a public purpose.
81
 The question of arbitrariness has two components, namely substantive 
arbitrariness and procedural arbitrariness.
82
  
In the FNB decision the Constitutional Court engaged with the interpretation and meaning 
of the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1).
83
 Van der Walt explains that prior to the 
FNB decision it was uncertain how the term “arbitrary” would be interpreted. The options 
were that it could be interpreted to refer to a “thin” rationality test or, alternatively, a “thick”, 
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more substantive, proportionality test.
84
 FNB indicated that a deprivation will be 
substantively arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for the deprivation.
85
 The Court listed 
several factors that should be considered when determining whether there was sufficient 
reason.
86
 The arbitrariness test is contextual and the level of scrutiny (“the thickness of the 
test”) will vary depending on the specific context of each case.87 Each of these requirements 
is discussed in more detail below. 
 
3 3 2 3 Law of general application 
Section 25(1) expressly states that no person may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application. This requirement aims to give effect to the rule of law and the 
general legitimacy principles of the new constitutional dispensation.
88
  
Van der Walt indicates that the phrase “law of general application” (as opposed to “a law 
of general application”) ensures that regulatory deprivation of property is legitimately 
authorised by the common law, customary law or legislation.
89
  A second implication of the 
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absence of the indefinite article in the phrase is that the focus of a constitutional challenge 
falls to the law that authorises the action, instead of the action itself. 
90
 
Because of the wording of this requirement, deprivations can only be effected by the state. 
For section 25 purposes, a private party cannot legitimately deprive another person of their 
property.
91
 However, the interpretation of “law of general application” is wider than merely 
legislation that provides for state regulation, and will also include legislative regulations, 
subordinate legislation, municipal by-laws, rules of court, international conventions, the rules 
of common law and customary law.
92
 Accordingly, a deprivation is the result of law that 
authorises certain conduct or effects.  
This point can be illustrated with reference to Growthpoint Properties Ltd v SA 
Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union.
93
 The case dealt with the question whether 
the disturbance caused by striking workers inside a shopping mall unlawfully infringed the 
property rights of the owner of the mall or of the occupiers of shops in the mall.
94
 The court 
attempted to balance the conflicting constitutional rights by limiting each right in an 
appropriate way.
95
 Van der Walt argues that the focus of the court was erroneously placed on 
the actions of the workers, while it should have focused on whether or not law of general 
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application authorised their actions. The actions of the workers as such could not constitute a 
deprivation; if there was a deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1), it would 
result from authorising law of general application that allows for the infringement of the 
applicants’ property rights (for instance by authorising strikes) and only after that can it be 
determined whether or not the law in question authorised arbitrary deprivation of property.
96
  
Moreover, when the authorising law is considered, the courts must scrutinise whether the 
law in question in fact authorises the specific deprivation.
97
 This question can easily be 
skipped over because of the “arbitrariness vortex” that Roux described, but Van der Walt 
cautions against overlooking the importance of this issue and argues that a reasonably strict 
scrutiny of the authorising law is appropriate.
98
 This means that there must not only be a law, 
it must also provide authority for the outcome.
99
  
Insofar as the law must apply generally, commentators assert that although laws usually 
affect certain people but not others, the criteria for generality are that the law may not single 
out an individual or a select group of individuals in a legally unjustifiable manner.
100
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3 3 2 4 Deprivation must be for a public purpose  
A further requirement for deprivation that is closely related to law of general application is 
that the deprivation must be for a public purpose or in the public interest.
101
 Section 25(1) 
does not expressly state that deprivations must be for a public purpose or in the public interest 
to be valid, but because section 25(1) asserts the police power of the state, and it is generally 
accepted that the police power is aimed at promoting and protecting public health and safety 
and similar police power public goals, this implicit requirement makes sense.
102
 However, the 
public purpose should be tested for and not just assumed.  
Van der Walt is of the opinion that the public purpose requirement can be inferred from 
either one of the explicit requirements, namely that deprivation must be in terms of law of 
general application and non-arbitrary. From case law it is evident that the purpose of the 
deprivation is considered and can affect the standard of review that a court will adopt. In the 
FNB decision, for example, the Court engaged explicitly with the purpose of the law 
authorising the deprivation and concluded that effectively ensuring payment of tax debt was a 
legitimate public purpose and property could be regulated for that purpose.
103
 When the 
purpose is not directly linked to the traditional purpose of police power regulation (namely 
public health and safety), a higher level of scrutiny might be employed by the court to make 
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sure that the deprivation of property is justified.
104
 However, the courts have not implemented 
this strategy uniformly, leaving some doubt as to the precise role of the public purpose 
requirement.
105
  
 
3 3 2 5 Substantive arbitrariness  
Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property, but provides no further guidance to assist with the interpretation of the term 
“arbitrary”. Prior to FNB, academic opinion seems to have equated non-arbitrariness with 
rationality.
106
 Roux explains that many academics looked to the Constitutional Court’s 
approach in S v Lawrence; S v Negal: S v Solberg
107
 and concluded that non-arbitrariness in 
section 25(1) was the equivalent of the rationality requirement in section 9(1) of the 
Constitution.
108
 However, this view was rejected by the Constitutional Court in FNB.
109
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FNB determined that substantive arbitrariness inquiries need not always involve exactly 
the same level of scrutiny.
110
 The appropriate test is located on a continuum between thin 
rationality review and thick proportionality review.
111
 The point of departure is that a 
deprivation will be substantively arbitrary when the law of general application does not 
provide sufficient reason for the deprivation.
112
 Ackerman J listed the considerations for 
evaluating “sufficient reason”:  
 
“(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means employed, namely the 
deprivation in question and ends sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law in 
question. 
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered. 
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the relationship between the 
purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected. 
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation 
and the nature of the property as well as the extent of the deprivation in respect of such 
property. 
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a corporeal 
moveable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law 
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to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation than in the case when the property is 
something different and the property right something less extensive. This judgment is not 
concerned at all with incorporeal property. 
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of 
ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling than when the 
deprivation embraces only some incidents of ownership and those incidents only partially. 
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of the property in 
question and the extent of the deprivation, there may be circumstances when sufficient reason is 
established by, in effect, no more than a mere rational relationship between means and ends; in 
others this might only be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by s 
36(1) of the Constitution. 
(h) Where there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to be decided on all 
the facts of each particular case, always bearing in mind that the enquiry is concerned with 
arbitrary in relation to the deprivation of property under s 25.”
113
 
 
These considerations were applied in subsequent case law, although the outcomes were less 
predictable than one might have expected.
114
 Mkontwana was the first Constitutional Court 
decision to apply the FNB test. At first glance, it seems as though the court opted to apply the 
test exactly as suggested by Ackerman J in the FNB decision, but upon closer inspection the 
“subtle rephrasing” of the steps of the test brought about a shift in emphasis from the 
contextual factors, toward a more pronounced focus on the extent of the deprivation.
115
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Understood this way, the Court in effect established that the appropriate test (on the 
continuum between rationality and a proportionality-type test) is determined by the extent of 
the challenged deprivation. Since FNB it was always to be expected that the level of scrutiny 
might vary from case to case, but because the context in FNB and Mkontwana was very 
similar, the reason for the shift to rationality is not entirely clear.
116
 
In Reflect-All the Constitutional Court again relied heavily on the FNB considerations and 
decided that proportionality-type review of the legislation that imposed significant 
restrictions on land that is affected by road planning legislation (which included determined 
routes as well as preliminary designs) was appropriate.
117
 The question was whether the 
relationship between the legislation in question, its objectives and the impact of the 
restrictions on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of the applicants’ property constitutes 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. After considering the importance of protecting the 
historical plans for road schemes, and the alleged freezing effect that the restrictions had on 
the affected land, the majority of the Court held that proportionality-type review was 
appropriate and therefore the Court had to decide whether the means employed was 
proportionate to the ends.
118
 The majority held that the deprivation was not arbitrary, because 
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the applicants were not deprived of all their entitlements, nor were they entirely deprived of 
the use of their land and the means employed were not disproportionate to the ends.
119
 
Roux argues that the FNB considerations may appear to be a step-by-step guide to 
determine future disputes, but on closer examination it appears that the Court retained for 
itself an almost absolute discretion to decide the outcome of future cases by varying the level 
of scrutiny that a contested deprivation is tested against.
120
 The discretion is not itself a 
problem, especially because of the importance that the context plays in a deprivation dispute, 
but inconsistent exercise of the discretion in similar cases (such as FNB and Mkontwana) is 
problematic. In Mkontwana the Court indicated that certain factors, particularly the fact that 
the services for which the debt was incurred were delivered and enjoyed on the premises, 
established a sufficient nexus between property, debt and security right to justify a shift 
towards rationality. The question remains whether other factors, such as the purpose of the 
deprivation (ensuring payment of debt for municipal services) and the absence of a direct link 
between the owner and the debt should not have weighed heavier (as it did in FNB) to justify 
stricter review. 
 
3 3 2 6 Procedural arbitrariness 
The text of section 25(1) does not draw a distinction between substantive and procedural 
arbitrariness.
121
 However, the Constitutional Court indicated in FNB that a deprivation may 
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also be arbitrary if it is procedurally unfair.
122
 The Court gave no further indication regarding 
when a deprivation will be considered to be procedurally unfair.
123
 The procedural aspect of 
arbitrariness was addressed In Mkontwana, where the Court stated that it had to be 
understood as a flexible concept that cannot be defined or interpreted without reference to the 
relevant circumstances.
124
 Van der Walt suggests that the Mkontwana decision can be seen as 
an indication that the procedural fairness of a deprivation will be evaluated on a similar basis 
as the test for just administrative action.
125
  
In Reflect-All the question of procedural fairness was also addressed, but nothing new was 
added to what was previously decided in the Mkontwana decision.
126
 The Constitutional 
Court also considered the requirements for procedural non-arbitrariness in terms of section 
25(1) in Opperman.
127
 The Court held that “judicial oversight” did not save a statutory 
provision from being procedurally arbitrary if it did not afford a discretion to the court when 
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making its decision.
128
 This point was recently confirmed in Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson 
t/a Wilson’s Transport and Others.129  
Consequently, the independent role and content of procedural non-arbitrariness in terms of 
section 25(1) is questionable, since it seems to correspond exactly with the principles of 
procedural fairness in administrative law to ensure just administrative action.
130
 The courts 
seem to apply administrative law principles to non-administrative action, with very little 
critical discussion of why this is appropriate in the constitutional context. According to Van 
der Walt this is problematic, at least upon first glance, since it seems unclear when, or why, a 
separate role for procedural fairness in terms of section 25(1) exists, especially since section 
25(1) does not expressly mention procedural fairness as a requirement for constitutionally 
valid deprivations.
131
 
The issue as to when the procedural fairness of a deprivation can be challenged in terms of 
section 25(1) and when PAJA must be used can be resolved by reliance on the subsidiarity 
principles.
132
 When the deprivation results from administrative action, PAJA should govern 
the dispute and must be utilised because it is constitutionally enacted legislation that aims to 
give effect to the right in the Bill of Rights that has a direct bearing on administrative justice, 
namely section 33. A litigant may not decide to bypass the provisions of PAJA in favour of 
direct reliance on section 25(1).
133
 Thus, where administrative action brings about a 
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deprivation, and the deprivation is alleged to be procedurally unfair, section 25(1) will have 
no role to play and the litigant must rely on the remedies provided by the appropriate 
legislation, in this case PAJA.
134
 Where a deprivation results directly from law of general 
application and there is no administrative action involved, section 25(1) can be relied on 
directly to challenge the procedural fairness of the deprivation. Section 25(1) can thus only be 
used directly if there was no administrative action and PAJA has no role to play.
135
 
Roux addresses this issue without reference to subsidiarity principles and argues that 
because section 33 of the Constitution deals with administrative action rather than “law” as is 
required in section 25(1), there will generally be no overlap.
136
 When administrative action 
deprives a person of property in a procedurally unfair manner, the matter will be 
challengeable under PAJA and when law provides for a deprivation of property in a 
procedurally unfair manner, section 25(1) will be applicable.
137
 This corresponds with the 
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conclusions drawn by Van der Walt, although Roux does not address the content of the 
procedural fairness requirement in the context of section 25(1). 
Essentially it seems as though the principles to determine procedural fairness will be the 
same whether or not the state action was administrative action, especially since the relevant 
case law has relied heavily on the administrative law principles to evaluate the procedural 
fairness of a deprivation. However, the litigation route will differ and the distinction is 
important to ensure that the matter is correctly pleaded and dealt with on the appropriate 
basis, namely either section 25(1) or the relevant provisions of PAJA. 
  
3 3 2 7 The relevance and role of section 36 of the Constitution 
The Bill of Rights contains a general limitation clause in section 36. Normally, a 
constitutional challenge will involve a two-step process, where the first step is to determine 
whether a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed, and the second step is to determine 
whether the infringement or limitation can be justified in terms of section 36.
138
  
Ackerman J stated in FNB that if a deprivation infringes or limits section 25 and the 
limitation cannot be justified by section 36, the matter is concluded. Thus, the Court did 
foresee that section 36 could possibly have a role to play in constitutional property disputes in 
terms of section 25(1), but did not expressly decide the matter.
139
  
                                            
138
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 75; 286-287. Van der Walt indicates that FNB 
arguably collapsed the first and second stage issues in the arbitrariness test, because the FNB methodology 
ensured that the first stage is already a substantive (as opposed to a formalistic or mechanical) inquiry into the 
validity and justification for the challenged deprivation. Also see Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 3 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 46-1 – 46-37 at 46-2 – 46-
3; Woolman S & Botha H “Limitations” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(CLoSA) vol 2 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 34-1 – 34-136 at 34-3, 34-18. 
139
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 58, 110. 
126 
 
Despite this indication in the FNB decision, there has been speculation by various authors 
regarding the precise role of section 36 with regard to a constitutional property dispute.
140
 
The point has been made that although it is technically possible for a deprivation that does 
not meet the requirements of section 25(1) to be justified in terms of section 36(1), it is 
unlikely because the requirements in terms of section 25(1) and 36(1) are very similar.
141
 A 
deprivation that is not authorised by law of general application will not be justifiable under 
section 36, since section 36(1) also requires a law of general application.
142
 Furthermore, 
section 36(1) requires limitations to be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society, taking into consideration a list of factors that will evaluate whether or not a limitation 
is arbitrary. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a deprivation that fails 
to meet the non-arbitrariness requirement of section 25(1) can be saved by section 36(1).
143
 
An obiter statement by the Land Claims Court addressed a hypothetical situation where 
state action was in conflict with section 25(1) that could be justified in terms of section 
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36(1).
144
 The court considered whether the statutory obligation imposed on a landowner by 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 to allow an occupier to appropriate a 
gravesite on the property without compensation could be reasonable and justifiable in terms 
of section 36 even if it were considered to amount to arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 
25(1). However, because the court found that there was no arbitrary deprivation of property, 
the value of the statement is limited and the issue remains open.
145
 
Section 25(1) is predominately about ensuring that deprivations are lawful, procedurally 
fair and reasonable, which confirms that the exercise of the police power is constitutionally 
valid and justified.
146
 The FNB methodology represents one way of approaching cases 
dealing with deprivation of property.  Although the FNB methodology is subject to criticism 
and has certain shortcomings or potential pitfalls, it offers a framework for testing regulatory 
measures against the constitutional requirements set out in section 25(1).  
 
3 4 An analysis of limitations
147
 
3 4 1 New or extended regulation of vested or exercised rights 
The question of when the act of regulation constitutes a deprivation in terms of section 25(1) 
is considered in more detail in this section. The restrictions that are imposed on property 
through regulatory action such as town planning, development and environmental 
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conservation law offer particularly interesting examples and have led to various constitutional 
challenges in terms of the property clause, which I discuss below.  
The objective of constitutional protection of property rights differs fundamentally from 
private-law protection, insofar as constitutional protection is aimed at achieving an 
appropriate balance between private rights and the public interest in “the regulation of the 
property regime”, rather than only focusing on the protection of individual rights.148 Thus, 
despite the constitutionalisation of property, vested rights are subject to various regulatory 
limitations, some of which may severely affect the rights of the rights holder.
149
 The question 
here is not whether a government has the power to regulate the use of property but rather the 
extent to which the state can regulate vested rights and what the consequences of regulation 
are.
150
 Vesting of rights is an important issue in constitutional law, because traditionally, 
                                            
148
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 91. As mentioned previously, the position seems 
to be that “property” in terms of section 25 will be interpreted more generously than the traditional concept of 
ownership in the context of private law. See for example First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 56-57; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 
2011) 85-86. Despite this generous approach, there are still situations where it is unclear whether a particular 
right will be protected as property in terms of section 25(1). One example is intangible commercial property, 
such as licences or quotas. American literature is valuable in this regard, since much has been written on the 
notion of constitutional property and so-called “new property” and investment-backed expectations. See in this 
regard Michelman FI “Property as a constitutional right” (1981) 38 Washington and Lee Law Review 1097-
1114; Reich C “The new property” (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733-787. In South Africa it might not be 
necessary to venture too deeply into this debate for two reasons: firstly, the Constitutional Court has indicated 
that a generous interpretation of “property” is appropriate and secondly, many of these intangible interests may 
be protected more easily under other provisions in the Bill of Rights. Consider for instance Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). However, liquor licences were accepted as 
property for purposes of section 25(1) in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for 
Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 
June 2015) para 5. 
149
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 91.  
150
 Baron JB “The contested commitments of property” (2010) 61 Hastings Law Journal 917-967 942 indicates 
that within the space demarcated by the limits of constitutional protection, the state is free to exercise its 
regulatory powers legitimately, even if it seemingly infringes individual freedom. 
129 
 
vesting is regarded as “something that prompts the recognition of the right.”151 Vesting is a 
condition for constitutional protection in terms of section 25(1), meaning that only vested 
rights qualify as property for constitutional purposes.
152
 
The favoured position seems to be a general (although vague) acceptance of the theory 
that property rights are inherently limited in the constitutional context, although the exact 
scope of these limitations is not fixed or clear.
153
 The fact of lawful limitation is accepted, but 
the scope or content of the limitation varies and must comply with constitutional 
requirements.  
Agri South Africa is an example of a difficult category of regulation where the regulatory 
measures amount to a regime change that either destroys or reduces existing and vested rights 
substantially.
154
 In Agri South Africa both parties agreed that the new regulatory scheme that 
regulates the mining industry in South Africa amounted to non-arbitrary deprivation of 
property and therefore the antecedent question of whether such a regime change actually 
constitutes a deprivation was not considered in detail by the Court.
155
 However, Agri South 
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Africa illustrates the point that the state may, subject to the requirements for a valid 
deprivation, extinguish or amend existing rights, if the public purpose is sufficiently 
important to justify such an extreme measure.
156
 
Another recent example of this type of regulation is Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member 
of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Eastern Cape and Others.
157
 Interestingly, the Court engaged extensively with the question 
whether Shoprite’s liquor licence constitutes property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution and pointed out that licences do not necessarily fit into the private law 
conception of property. Before the advent of the Constitution, state-granted interests such as 
licences were only recognised once vested, and even then would only be awarded procedural 
protection in terms of administrative law principles.
158
 The majority of the Court held that the 
constitutional notion of property was wide enough to include liquor licences, and focused on 
whether or not the statutory regime change that was introduced by the Eastern Cape Liquor 
Act
159
 arbitrarily deprived the appellant of its property.
160
  
The constitutional protection of property includes protection of use rights in respect of 
land, which includes use rights that have been acquired and exercised lawfully, as well as 
existing uses that are unlawful only in the formal sense and uses which have been acquired 
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but not yet exercised.
161
 Generally, it is accepted that a landowner cannot expect that even 
vested and exercised rights should remain precisely the same or unaffected by regulation 
forever.
162
 However, it is not always clear what the scope and limits of possible future 
regulatory developments are and our view of what a deprivation is and when a deprivation 
occurs might need to adapt according to social, political and economic changes in society.
163
  
The influence of a dynamic regulatory regime on vested or exercised rights can be 
illustrated by using the example of building regulations.
164
 Almost everyone will agree that 
landowners’ right to build on their land is subject to building regulations, thus accepting that 
certain undefined and unspecified limitations are inherent to the right, to the extent that all 
owners must have approved building plans before they may develop their land. However, the 
exact content and scope of the building regulations that can be imposed and the impact or 
retrospective effect of new building regulations might be contested.  
The point of departure is that property is not free from risk, and this includes the risk that 
the value of the property might be affected by future regulatory developments or policy 
changes.
165
 There are often extensive lapses in time between the purchase of land, obtaining 
approval for development and implementation of the approved plans. Oudekraal Estates (Pty) 
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Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others
166
 can serve as an illustration of the complicated 
problems that can arise after the approval of plans by the local authority. The simplified facts 
of Oudekraal (2010) were that plans for the development of a township on the slopes of 
Table Mountain were approved in 1961 (despite omitting or disregarding the presence of 
important Muslim graves on the land), but the property was not developed. Then in 1996, 
engineering plans were submitted to develop the property. The City of Cape Town alleged 
that the 1961 approval had lapsed because the appellant (Oudekraal Estates) failed to submit 
general plans for development on time, and extensive litigation followed.  
In Oudekraal (2010) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that although it could condone the 
delay of the applicant, allowing the decision to grant approval for development to stand 
would have undesirable consequences for the Muslim community as well as threaten an 
environmentally significant area.
167
 The appellant’s entitlement to develop the land was in 
effect limited 50 years later, because of changed circumstances.
168
  
In the Oudekraal (2010) decision, the limitation on the entitlement to develop the property 
was justified by changing circumstances, and considering the long period of time that lapsed 
between the first approval and the subsequent limitation, the amended regulatory scheme 
could seem less controversial. However, a similar limitation can be imposed even shortly 
after property was obtained for development purposes. The US case of Lucas v South 
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Carolina Coastal Council
169
 is such an example from the United States. In the Lucas decision 
a purchaser bought two lots on a barrier island in 1986, at a time when the lots were zoned for 
single-family residential purposes. In 1988, merely two years later, the state enacted 
legislation that prohibited the erection of permanent habitable structures on the lots.
170
 The 
owner argued that the legislation had the effect of a taking because of the “complete 
extinguishment of the value of the property”.171 
Michelman argues that where a regulation is clearly in pursuance of public health or safety 
goals, there is no diminution of property holdings.
172
 This logic applies even when the loss 
caused by regulatory development is severe, such as in Lucas where the amended regulatory 
scheme had the effect of making the land in question economically worthless.
173
 In the Lucas 
case the Supreme Court of the United States indicated its qualified acceptance of the implied 
limitation of the police power principle with regard to land but not insofar as it would allow 
the state to eliminate all economically valuable use of land.
174
 The Court stated that 
confiscatory regulations (regulations that prohibit all economically valuable use of land) are 
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so severe that such a regulation cannot be newly legislated or decreed, unless compensation is 
provided. Where the regulation is not subject to compensation, the Court indicated that the 
limitation had to “inhere in the title itself” in the “background principles” of the state’s law of 
property and nuisance that was already imposed on property.
175
 Upon this construction the 
now expressly unlawful action was always unlawful and the state always had the option to 
make this implied restriction explicit.
176
 
Michelman raises the question whether the background principles that the Court refers to 
are static or evolving, and if they are regarded as evolving, how the content is determined at a 
specific time.
177
 The answers to these questions are not clearly provided in the Lucas 
decision, and the remarks of the majority that the legislature may not deprive an owner of the 
only economic use of his property without compensation unless the background principles so 
dictate, do little to predict the outcome in similar future cases.
178
 The Lucas decision 
illustrates one of the numerous issues that arise when there is regulation of vested rights.
179
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In the Lucas decision, architectural plans had been drawn up, although the plans had not 
been submitted or approved at the time that the dispute commenced. In the Oudekraal (2010) 
decision there were approved plans, but the considerable time lapse and consequent changed 
circumstances justified the amendment of that entitlement. In Colonial Development (Pty) Ltd 
and Others v Outer West Local Council and Others; Bailes and Another v Town and 
Regional Planning Commission and Others
180
 the court was faced with an application for an 
interdict to prevent a Local Council from approving building plans that had already been 
submitted by property developers to obtain permission to build a shopping centre on a piece 
of land.
181
 The attorneys of the developers insisted that the Municipality comply with section 
7(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act, which requires that 
the local authority approve or reject submitted building plans within 60 days.
182
 However, the 
court decided in favour of the applicants to grant the interdict, based on the prejudice that 
would accrue to the applicants if they were not afforded the opportunity to influence the 
modification of the scheme before the building plans were approved.
183
 
In a counter-application, the developers challenged the constitutionality of section 48(1) of 
the Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949, which provides for the modification of the town 
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planning scheme by the Council.
184
 The provision was challenged on the basis of infringing 
the right to just administrative action (section 33) and the right to property (section 25). The 
court found that there was no undue limitation of the right to just administrative action with 
regard to the argument that the developers’ right to be heard was limited by section 48 of the 
Ordinance. Moreover, the court found that the appeal envisioned in section 48 did not 
constitute administrative action, and therefore the constitutional attack on that ground also 
had to fail.
185
 The developers contended that their right to develop the property (in 
accordance with the requirements of the approved town planning scheme in force at that 
time) constitutes a proprietary right of which they would be arbitrarily deprived through the 
mechanism for modification of the scheme that section 48(1) of the Ordinance provided.
186
 
Therefore, the developers challenged the modification on the basis that it constituted an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. The challenge was based on two grounds. Firstly, the 
modification could be ordered without affording them an opportunity to state their case and 
there was no opportunity for appeal against the decision.
187
 Secondly, the developers alleged 
that the provision allows the commission to “remove” rights in property without 
compensation.
188
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The court held that the right to use or develop property is not absolute since it is subject to 
various statutory measures to promote health, safety, order, amenity, convenience and general 
welfare. Furthermore, the court remarked that “the position would have been no different if 
they had bought the property well knowing that it was subject to the provisions of the 
scheme.”189 Thus, the entitlements of the developers were subject to the applicable regulatory 
scheme, which included the further qualification or restriction that their rights might possibly 
be amended in terms of section 48 of the Ordinance.  A regulatory scheme can therefore be 
modified after purchase and even after the submission of plans (but before approval) without 
arbitrarily depriving a person of rights in property.
190
 The decision does not clearly indicate 
whether a modification of the regulatory scheme actually constitutes deprivation in terms of 
section 25(1), as opposed to viewing it as a manifestation of an inherent limitation on the 
right to build. The court merely stated that dominium is generally the most comprehensive 
right of enjoyment or use of the property, but it was never absolute. The court listed some 
examples of the different ways in which ownership is limited, one of which is that the 
development of property is subject to town planning measures. This case shows that in the 
constitutional context, the inherent/external limitation debate is of limited value. If property 
rights are constitutionally framed-rights that are held and exercised within a constitutional 
legal system, regulation of the use of property is inherent to the system (as opposed to 
necessarily being inherent to the individual right), and is in principle constitutionally 
justified. In the constitutional context, the focus falls on the constitutional requirements for 
valid regulation, and on justification for the effects of the regulation, but not on the content 
and scope of the right as a bar to regulatory action.  
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An interesting example of a case that dealt with the effects of regulation came before the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another.
191
 
The Court held that a vertical diversion of a road was the kind of road change that affects 
adjacent landowners, lessees and occupiers in such a way that compensation ought to be paid 
in terms of section 67(4) of the Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939. The purpose of this 
provision is to compensate property owners, lessees or occupiers who suffer pecuniary loss 
(such as the loss of business opportunities) because of changes to an adjacent road. This case 
shows that where the effects of regulatory measures are severe, legislation can provide for 
compensation to be paid to lessen the burden on affected rights holders.
192
 This case also 
shows that the legislature wanted to be able to change road structures when needed and 
would rather pay compensation than allow the right-holder to insist that the previous situation 
be continued or reinstated. Regulation of the use of property is therefore a systemic 
mechanism that the state uses to fulfil its regulatory function. 
The Constitutional Court recently confirmed once again that the checks on regulatory 
deprivation should not make it impossible for the state to fulfil its regulatory functions.
193
 In 
the main judgement in the Shoprite case, Froneman J emphasised that “entitlements of the 
past do not necessarily warrant protection in perpetuity, provided that appropriate and 
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reasonable transitional provisions are made.”194 The state cannot be expected to compensate 
owners for every change in the law simply because an owner suffers a loss because of 
regulatory action. This applies particularly to instances where amended or new regulatory 
schemes affect vested or exercised rights. The point is made clearest in German constitutional 
law insofar as the point of departure is that the state is not forced to either desist or pay 
compensation when fulfilling its regulatory function.
195
 This is so even when the state 
regulates in a way that affects existing rights detrimentally. Having said that, regulatory 
action can be challenged for its unjustifiably unfair effects in the constitutional system. To 
avoid a finding of invalidity the regulatory authority will therefore have to consider strategies 
to ameliorate the negative effect of new or amended regulatory schemes on existing rights, 
which would include measures such as interim measures (exceptions and special 
arrangements), non-retrospective effect of the new or amended scheme or regulatory 
compensation.
196
 
 
3 4 2 The relevance of the source of the limitation 
Limitations on property can be imposed ex lege (through direct, ex lege effect of the 
principles of the common law, legislation or the Constitution) or by acts of the 
administration, the executive or the judiciary. The source of the limitation might be relevant 
for two reasons. Firstly, depending on the source of the regulation, the regulation itself is 
regulated on the basis of the Constitution, legislation or the common law and this secondary 
regulatory process can take place in administrative law or constitutional property law. 
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Secondly, the source of the limitation (and the corresponding field of law) can influence the 
level of scrutiny that a court will employ to test the validity of the regulation.
197
 
Blaauw-Wolf and Wolf distinguish between various categories of limitations that can 
legitimately be imposed on fundamental rights.
198
 Firstly, property rights are limited by the 
rights and interests of third parties, which is referred to as limitation on a horizontal level.
199
 
However, since the rights and interests of third parties are acknowledged and enforced 
through state recognition of their validity (therefore in effect adding a public law element to 
these instances of “horizontal” limitation) limitation is never a purely private law matter.200 
Furthermore, it is inaccurate to say that the rights or interests of third parties can directly 
cause a deprivation (whether constitutionally valid or otherwise) in the constitutional sense. 
Constitutionally valid deprivations can only be effected through law of general application.  
Property rights are limited by the state through regulatory measures imposed by 
legislation. This is an instance of vertical limitation, and the exercise of this power of the 
state is often referred as its “police power”. Many of these regulatory limitations are imposed 
by administrative action – the area of overlap between property and the right to just 
administrative action is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. However, some 
regulatory measures and subsequent deprivations are imposed directly by legislation, without 
the involvement of an administrator. In these cases the statutory provision brings about a 
deprivation directly or by operation of law, usually after the occurrence of a trigger event 
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provided for in the legislation.
201
 These are the cases that presumably stand to be adjudicated 
under section 25(1) of the Constitution, because administrative law will not be applicable to 
these cases.
202
 
Property rights can also be limited directly by other fundamental rights that are protected 
in the Bill of Rights.
203
 Limitations that are imposed because of the fundamental rights of 
other persons are especially important in South Africa’s constitutional context. There has 
been considerable engagement with what the new constitutional framework means for 
purposes of accommodating competing rights and interests, which has the effect of limiting 
property rights. The courts have engaged quite extensively with the relationship between 
property rights and other constitutionally protected rights in the housing and eviction 
context.
204
 In post-apartheid South Africa, the right of an owner to evict persons from her 
property can no longer be seen as an absolute entitlement. Section 26(3) of the Constitution 
and anti-eviction legislation enacted to give effect to it specifically aim to curtail the power of 
owners by limiting the circumstances in which an eviction order can be obtained, in order to 
give effect to the non-property fundamental rights of occupiers.
205
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However, housing-rights for purposes of section 26 of the Constitution are mediated by 
legislation enacted to give effect to the relevant right, which means that it is not a true 
example of direct constitutional limitation. Arguably, the only valid examples are the right to 
life and dignity, both exemplified in how the court construed the beggars’ rights in Victoria & 
Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others 
(Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae).
206
 The court held that the right to life includes 
the right to livelihood, and that “[t]he issue of begging frequently raises a direct tension 
between the right to life and property rights. In that event, the property rights must give way 
to some extent.”207  
The question arises whether the level of scrutiny will differ depending on the source of the 
limitation.
208
 The answer, at least in South African law, is not yet entirely clear. It is possible 
that courts will show a greater level of deference to a limitation that is imposed directly by 
other constitutionally protected non-property rights or when the democratically-elected 
legislature imposed a regulatory limitation through legislation, than they will afford 
limitations resulting from the common law or administrative law, and consequently employ a 
lower level of scrutiny.
209
 In the case of direct constitutional limitation (by the right to life or 
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dignity) there is arguably no deprivation and thus no section 25(1) test. In cases where there 
is legislation giving effect to other constitutional rights, rationality review is arguably very 
likely because of the purpose of the deprivation to fulfil a direct constitutional obligation.
210
 
 
3 4 3 The relevance of the extent of the limitation 
The relevance of the extent of limitations is discussed in case law, although a uniform 
approach is not consistently followed. For example, Mkontwana applied a slightly adapted 
version of the FNB arbitrariness test when the Court focused its attention on the extent of the 
deprivation, instead of the interrelated factors that were introduced in FNB to determine 
arbitrariness.
211
 According to the Court, whether or not there has been a deprivation will 
depend on the extent of the interference with or limitation of the use, enjoyment or 
exploitation of the property.
212
  
The Court indicated that the right to alienate property is an important incident of 
ownership and that the effect of the legislative restrictions was that the property could not be 
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transferred until all consumption charges due to the Municipality had been paid.
213
 The Court 
held that this could have serious implications and therefore the restriction or interference did 
“give rise” to a deprivation of property.214 Thus, the extent of the regulatory measure is 
important to establish whether a deprivation has occurred and if so, to determine the 
appropriate level of scrutiny that is required.
215
 
In the Reflect-All decision the Constitutional Court reiterated that the extent of the 
regulatory limitation is important to determine whether there was a deprivation and that the 
extent of the deprivation will influence the level of scrutiny to determine whether “sufficient 
reason” exists for the deprivation.216 Where the deprivation is marginal, rationality will often 
be the appropriate level of scrutiny, as opposed to instances where the deprivation is severe or 
extensive, in which case proportionality-type review might be necessary.
217
 The extent of the 
limitation is therefore closely connected to the justification that is required for the effects of 
the limitation.  
The extent of the effects of the regulation might also be relevant in a less obvious way. 
The FNB decision indicated that expropriation is a subsection of deprivation, meaning that 
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deprivation is the broader category that encompasses expropriation. In this sense, 
expropriation is a specific type of deprivation that must meet additional requirements. Roux 
points out that, conceptually, expropriation is the most severe form of deprivation.
218
 
Accordingly, expropriation is a specific type of state limitation that can be imposed on 
property, which must meet certain requirements to be valid. The fact that compensation is 
(usually) required for expropriation is indicative of an acknowledgement that where the 
restriction imposed on property is very extensive (as is the case with expropriation) it is 
reasonable to compensate the owner for the loss.
219
 This does not mean that property is not 
subject to the inherent risk of possible expropriation, but rather that the inherent limitation 
includes the expectation that where the risk of expropriation realises, it will be accompanied 
by payment of compensation.
220
 
An interesting question regarding the effect of continuing threats of and unsuccessful 
attempts at expropriation on the rights of a property holder was considered in Offit 
Enterprises. The Constitutional Court held that section 25(1) had a role to play where there 
was a “substantial interference”, a benchmark that is context specific.221 The Court indicated 
that physical or direct interference is not necessarily required and that when a determination 
must be made, courts should pay attention to the extent to which the use, enjoyment and 
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exploitation of the property is curtailed or diminished.
222
 On the facts of the particular case, 
the Constitutional Court found that there was no deprivation of property, because although 
the actions of the respondents inconvenienced the applicants, they did not “amount to a 
substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use 
and enjoyment”.223 The Court’s words indicate that some restrictions or limitations on the use 
and enjoyment of property must be accepted, without thereby constituting a deprivation of 
property within the meaning of section 25(1). This is very close to the arguments in favour of 
the Immanenztheorie in German law, to support the view that rights are inherently limited in 
the constitutional context. While the Immanenztheorie is in line with constitutional 
jurisprudence, it does not address all the issues that arise from property and regulation, and it 
is more useful to view the limitations as an inherent part of the system, as opposed to the 
right. I return to this argument below.  
An analysis of limitations in the constitutional context highlights problematic aspects of 
the regulation of the use of property that have not been conclusively addressed in South 
African law. Although the emphasis on the importance of the extent of the limitation has not 
been uniform, the case law indicates that extent will play a role to determine whether the 
action amounts to a deprivation,
224
 and if it does, to assess its constitutional validity.
225
 In 
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certain cases, where the effect of the deprivation is particularly severe, the regulatory 
authority will have to make use of certain strategies to alleviate the negative effect of the 
regulation to avoid a declaration of invalidity. In the constitutional system the role of 
limitations (resulting from regulation) is viewed as a mechanism to promote constitutional 
aims and objectives and to minimise negative effects of the property system. The focus 
therefore moves away from the inherent/external limitations debate toward a systemic view 
of how property and regulation fit into the greater (constitutional) legal system. 
 
3 5 The approach to regulation under the Constitution 
Many concerns were raised when the constitutionalisation of property was first considered 
because of the possibility that this would entrench existing property rights and inhibit reform 
initiatives.
226
 The focus has since shifted to developing principles that will ensure that the 
constitutionalisation of property does not have this inhibiting effect. The courts have 
embraced and reiterated the view that constitutionalisation should not and does not insulate 
existing property rights against regulation.
227
 Moreover, affording equal protection to 
property rights is an important step away from the apartheid regime’s approach of arbitrarily 
infringing upon the rights of black rights holders. Property is a right that was denied to a 
majority of the South African society under the apartheid regime.
228
 Seen in this way, the 
equal protection of property is a reform in itself which serves the objectives of the new 
constitutional dispensation. However, despite references to the non-absoluteness of property 
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rights in the constitutional context, there is very little or no in-depth engagement with what is 
meant by such a statement.
229
 In itself it is superfluous to merely assert that property rights 
can be limited, since this is in no way a departure from the position in doctrinal thinking. 
Property rights, even ownership, are subject to limitations in doctrinal thinking as well and 
merely re-asserting that all property rights can be limited does not assist the theoretical 
alignment that is required.  
In Chapter 2 the approach to regulation in private law doctrine was set out to show that 
property is sometimes conceptualised as a fundamentally absolute, unregulated right. This is 
at odds with the notion of property as a constitutionally-framed, fundamentally regulated 
right.
230
 Van der Walt states that the “articulation between these two apparently conflicting 
views of property is of great importance for constitutional property law because it determines 
the legitimacy and effects of police power regulation of the use and exploitation of 
property”.231 What is required is a straightening out and alignment of conceptual traditions 
and customs in the constitutional context because what used to be a private law debate now 
has to be reassessed in light of the Constitution.
232
  
The function of property in the constitutional context has been described as dichotomous. 
On the one hand, the institution of private property is vehemently defended for its role in 
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promoting individual freedom. In a free market system, private property also serves as an 
incentive for private initiative. On the other hand, there is a societal interest in private 
property that strongly rejects the idea of allowing rights-holders to use and exploit their 
property as they wish without due regard for the effects of such use on society or the 
environment.
233
 The parameters for protection of property are determined by the values of the 
property clause as well as the values of other socio-economic rights in the entire normative 
framework of the Constitution.
234
 
It seems that one of the problems is identifying the parameters of property rights. Van der 
Walt explains this problem with reference to the approach of the Appellate Division (as it 
was then) in the case of Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners Association & Another v 
Administrator, Transvaal,
235
 where the Court accepted that the onus was on the state to 
justify the interference with property rights.
236
 Van der Walt points out that perhaps the point 
of departure should have been to consider whether the “interference” was an infringement to 
begin with and to critically question whether risks such as increased criminal activity, 
pollution or an expected drop in property values was inherent to property rights.
237
 It is 
necessary to determine whether these risks are part of the property right or not, since the 
occurrence or realisation of inherent risks should not be seen as having a diminishing effect 
on the property that was subject to constitutional protection, or alternatively, taking the view 
that the risk was never part of the content of the property that was protected.  
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This approach is comparable to the approach of the US Supreme Court in the Lucas 
decision,
238
 in which the Court held that the first question (“is the affected entitlement 
included in the protected right?”) must be answered with reference to the “background law” 
that determines the content of property. Only thereafter can the second question (“is the 
limitation justifiable?”) be answered.239 However, in Lucas this serves a conservative agenda 
of confirming that the existing law recognises full rights and the law (the applicable 
legislation) imposes new limitations that require justification and perhaps compensation.
240
 
Despite these indications of reliance on the Immanenztheorie and the view that property is 
inherently limited in the constitutional context, I argue that the more appropriate approach to 
the regulation of the use of property is a systemic constitutional approach, because the 
question is not whether limitations are inherent to the right but whether they are inherent to 
the system in which the right functions. In the constitutional context, there has been an 
increased focus on the overall property system (as opposed to a primary focus on the 
protection of existing, individual entitlements).
241
 This approach is in line with the “single-
system-of-law” principle that was set out by the Constitutional Court in Ex Parte President of 
the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa,
242
 which makes it clear that all law is subject to the Constitution.
243
 The absolutist 
approach is at odds with the single-system-of-law principle because it conceptualises 
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property as being fundamentally or systemically unrestricted, in the sense that property’s 
abstract completeness precedes the constitutional legal system. 
When a property system is viewed from the perspective of an individual property 
entitlement, every regulation looks like an exceptional imposition that is suspect and must be 
justified.
244
 From a systemic perspective the result is quite different, since regulation is an 
intrinsic, inevitable part of the system.
245
 Regulation of the use of property is then regarded as 
a mechanism through which constitutional goals and objectives are promoted and unwanted 
systemic effects are minimised.
246
  Moreover, regulation is constitutive of rights to the extent 
that the scope and content of property entitlements are determined in part by regulation.  
In the systemic constitutional approach, rights and limitations form part of a single 
property system, based on constitutional supremacy. This approach takes a so-called “big 
picture” view of the property system, and focuses on how property fits into the constitutional 
legal system. This means that regulation is a sub-component of the property system but it is 
not restricted to section 25(1) of the Constitution. The regulatory process involves, or is 
connected to, various other fields of law, which all function together within the normative 
framework of the Constitution. Rights and limitation both originate from the system; rights 
are held and exercised in a system that always includes the possibility of legitimate 
regulation. An important feature of the systemic constitutional approach is that the legal 
system provides for constitutional controls to govern the imposition and effects of 
limitations.
247
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In the following section, the constitutional protection and regulation of property is 
considered from the perspective of German law. Several of the issues dealt with thus far have 
been addressed in German law, which can provide insight to how these problems can 
possibly be addressed in South African law. The notion of inherent or “immanent” limitations 
stems from the influential Immanenztheorie, discussed in Chapter 2, and several issues 
pertaining to the regulation of property and limitation of vested rights enjoyed attention in 
case law and academic writing. I specifically consider the possibility that article 14 of the 
Basic Law of the German Federal Republic represents an example of the systemic 
constitutional approach to support the argument in favour of this approach in the South 
African constitutional context.  
 
3 6 A comparative perspective: German law 
3 6 1 Overview
248
 
Article 14(1) and (2) of the German Basic Law of 1949 provides as follow: 
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(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their substance and limits shall 
be determined by law. 
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use should also serve the public interest.249 
 
The German property clause is characterised by the tension created by two seemingly 
opposing views of property, namely the liberal notion of private property as an fundamentally 
absolute right justified in terms of natural law on the one hand, and the social view of 
property that focuses on the social function of property, where “property rights are created 
and restricted by the social context” on the other hand.250 This explicit tension exists because 
of the positive guarantee in article 14.1.1, contrasted with the qualifications in article 14.1.2 
and 14.2.  
In Chapter 2, the influence of the German Pandectists is discussed in some detail. Under 
the Pandectist construction of ownership the characteristics of absoluteness and abstractness 
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were heavily emphasised, and this view is still influential in German private law. Because of 
the particular theoretical development of property rights in Germany, property is regarded as 
a unitary right and not as a so-called bundle of entitlements.
251
 Consequently, the individual 
protection of specific entitlements is conceptually more difficult than in other jurisdictions 
where various entitlements are protected separately.
252
  
The view that the regulation of the limits of property in terms of the property clause does 
not actually restrict property or ownership as such still exists. In this view, what is restricted 
by regulation is its use in a specific case, which allows property to remain a fundamentally 
unregulated right.
253
 A further distinction is drawn between having property and using or 
exploiting property rights and it is argued that the effect of regulation relates to the use and 
exploitation, and not to the owning or “having” component of property rights.254 Van der 
Walt explains that this construction explains the occurrence of limitations imposed on private 
property rights without threatening the traditional doctrinal perception of ownership as a 
fundamentally abstract and unlimited right in principle.
255
 
The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassingsgericht) saw the necessity to view 
ownership and property differently in the constitutional context, since the private law notion 
of ownership conflicts with the nature and function of the German property clause, namely to 
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balance the interests of the individual with the interests of society.
256
 Thus, property in the 
constitutional context is different from its private-law counterpart.
257
 Although it is not 
completely removed from the private law concept and includes all the traditional property 
interests, it has been extended to create a wider concept of property for purposes of article 
14.
258
 The private law view of property must function within the framework created by the 
Basic Law. 
In German constitutional law, an owner derives his entitlements from the legal system as a 
whole, rather than from only one single section in the Basic Law that explicitly protects 
property.
259
 This is in line with a systemic constitutional view of property and regulation. 
Protection is deduced from the entire constitutional context and not only the principles of 
private law or the provisions of the Civil Code.
260
 Furthermore, the protection of property 
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should be viewed in terms of article 14 as a whole, and not merely in terms of article 14.1.1. 
The systemic view makes it possible to understand how both the existence of rights and their 
limitations originate from the legal system (and the values it espouses) as a whole. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court acknowledges that article 14 strives to balance 
private interests and the public interest and characterises it as a tension that exists between 
“personal freedom and the social function of property”.261  Furthermore, the Court has 
indicated that the Basic Law’s point of departure is not to view man as an egocentric 
individual who may ignore public needs, but rather as a person who is part of, and dependent 
on, society.
262
 In German constitutional law, all aspects of the property guarantee, including 
its limitation, must be understood in terms of the function or fundamental purpose of the 
guarantee.
263
 The fundamental purpose of the property guarantee is to ensure or secure an 
area of personal liberty for individuals in the patrimonial sphere, where individuals can take 
responsibility for the organisation and development of their lives, in a social and legal 
context, as part of a larger community.
264
 This is the leading motive for protecting rights as 
property as a constitutional right. Van der Walt explains that “[t]he limitation of property 
rights by way of regulation and expropriation must also be understood in their relation to the 
fundamental purpose of the property guarantee and the distinction between the institutional 
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guarantee and the individual guarantee”.265 Ultimately, because of the systemic view, the 
constitutional protection of property is not regarded as an end in itself, since various 
constitutional interests are served by the constitutional protection of property.
266
 Protection is 
granted as part of the system of fundamental rights that are guaranteed by the Basic Law and 
it is the objectives of the Basic Law as a whole that must be served by both the protection and 
the regulation of private property.
267
 The requirements for and justification of constitutionally 
valid limitations are applied systemically, in pursuance of constitutional norms and 
objectives.  
 
3 6 2 Regulation of property in the German constitutional context 
In German constitutional law the regulation of property derives from legislation that 
determines the content as well as the limits of property rights.
268
 The German property clause 
indicates that the content and limits of property rights are determined and demarcated by the 
law as it stands at a specific time, because it allows for the substantive amendment of the 
content of property rights through legislative determination. This is an interesting approach to 
regulation of the use of property for several reasons. Firstly, it leaves no question that 
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property is a fundamentally regulated right. Secondly, the content and limits of property are 
not fixed, and are determined with reference to existing law, which includes private law and 
public law. Thirdly, the social function of property is made explicit. The central issue is not 
whether limitations are inherent or external but rather asking questions about the form that 
the limitation takes in legislation or other law, because the form of a limitation can change 
and the change can be seen as deprivation of property that must comply with article 14. 
Consequently, it is not necessary to categorise the limitation as inherent or external to the 
right.
269
  
When the legislature sets out to determine the content of property rights (Inhalt), the focus 
is on either the preservation of existing property institutions or, alternatively, on the 
development or establishment of new property institutions.
270
 The determination of the limits 
of property (Schranken), on the other hand, is concerned with individual property rights. The 
limits of property must be determined with due regard to the constitutional mandate placed on 
the legislature to protect and respect existing individual property rights.
271
 However, article 
14.1.2 and 14.2 subject individual property rights to social limitations (Sozialbindung).
272
 
Badura indicates that the social obligation or duty of property (Sozialgebundenheit des 
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Eigentums) is a term used for a variety of changes or amendments to the content or limits of 
property.
273
 The social obligation binds both the legislator in determining the content and 
limits of property and the rights holder in exercising her rights.  
The German Basic Law 1949 does not include a general limitation provision comparable 
to section 36 of the South African Constitution.
274
 Nevertheless, the German approach to 
limitation has been characterised as limitational as opposed to definitional, which 
corresponds to the approach in South African law.
275
 A limitational approach focuses on the 
individual and contextual justification of a specific limitation of property, whereas with the 
definitional approach the focus is on whether or not a specific right is property and falls 
within the protection of the guarantee.
276
  
The individual guarantee (Bestandsgarantie or Individualgarantie) guarantees the 
eligibility to be the holder of property and is aimed at protecting individual property owners 
against specific instances of state interference with their property.
277
 The protection that is 
offered to concrete, individual rights does not mean that these rights may not be interfered 
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with at all, but it sets out the requirements that the legislature must adhere to when 
determining the limits (Schranken) of property in terms of article 14.1.2.
278
   
Article 14 does not only protect concrete individual entitlements, but also protects the 
institution of private property.
279
 This is the institutional guarantee (Institutionsgarantie or 
Einrichtungsgarantie) and it concerns the entire system or framework of private property.
280
 
A network of legal rules, norms and principles that sets out the essence of property is upheld 
by the institutional guarantee, which ensures that the essence of the institution of private 
property is not abolished by legislation and prescribes the fundamental values of the existing 
social and legal order.
281
 However, neither the individual guarantee nor the institutional 
guarantee insulates the system of private property against regulatory interference,
282
 although 
                                            
278
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 128, 131-132; Kleyn DG 
“The constitutional protection of property: A comparison between the German and the South African approach” 
(1996) 11 South African Public Law 402-445 413. 
279
 Leisner W “Eigentum” in Isensee J & Kirchhof P (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (1989) 1023-1097 1029 para 12. 
280
 Wendt R “Artikel 14” in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4th ed 2007) 582-639 587 para 10; Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 129. Also see Badura P Staatsrecht: 
Systematische Erläuterung des Grundgesetzes (3
rd
 ed 2003)217; Schmidt R Grundrechte (5
th
 ed 2004) 393. 
281
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 129; Lubens R “The social 
obligation of property ownership: A comparison of German and US law” (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 389-449 407.  
282
 Badura P Staatsrecht: Systematische Erläuterung des Grundgesetzes (3
rd
 ed 2003) 220; Weber RH 
“Eigentum als Rechtsinstitut. Beurteilungsstand und Entwicklungstendenzen” (1978) Zeitschrift für 
Schweizerisches Recht 161-191 177. See for example the discussion by Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 130-131 where the institutional guarantee is analysed. It is 
accepted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht that certain categories of property may be removed from the sphere 
of private ownership, but the removal must be constitutionally justified. In BVerfGE 24, 367 1968 (the 
Deichordnung case) the removal of dike land from the sphere of private rights through legislation was held to be 
constitutionally sound. The importance of effective flood control justified the removal of this type of property 
from the personal sphere, and it is not contrary to the institutional guarantee.  
161 
 
the guarantees aim to prohibit the state from unduly reducing the sphere of personal liberty, 
in line with the fundamental purpose of the property clause.
283
 
The constitutional protection of property is closely associated with personhood and 
individual liberty. Personal property that is connected to these values will not be subject to 
the same range of legitimate limitations, while property rights more closely associated with 
the social interest might be limited more extensively.
284
 This is the so-called “grading” or 
“scaling” of social limitations of property according to the relation of the property to the 
holder of the rights and secondly, its social function.
285
 This approach is often explained with 
reference to the example of regulation of the family home, contrasted with the regulation of 
the use and exploitation of limited natural resources such as land, which may be subject to 
much stricter regulatory measures.
286
 The type or extent of a lawful regulation is connected to 
the function of the property.
287
 The grading or scaling of social limitations makes sense in 
German constitutional law because the approach is that property is protected to secure a 
sphere of personal freedom for the individual, and therefore property that is closely 
associated with personal freedom will be subject to less extensive regulatory measures. 
Accordingly, if the function of property is regarded as important to the social interest, the 
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legislature is at greater liberty to determine the content and limits of rights in that property.
288
 
The social obligation also depends on situation-based factors and is therefore closely related 
to the Situationsgebundenheit principle.
289
 An owner is presumed to know, based on the 
location and nature of the property, that the property cannot be used in certain ways, even if 
the particular use is not expressly prohibited.
290
 
The Situationsgebundenheit principle is especially important in the context of the 
regulation of the use of property, because it is often central to zoning and planning law 
disputes, as well as the protection of historical sites and other conservation issues.
291
 The 
Federal Administrative Court formulated the Situationsgebundenheit principle as follows:  
 
“A certain use of a property is only protected by the constitutional guarantee if the user can 
reasonably rely on the permanent continuation of that use, and that cannot be the case if she 
reasonably should have foreseen, when using the property in that way at first, that the nature of 
the area, or the natural or probable development of the area does or will make that use 
unreasonable in that it does or will constitute a nuisance.”292 
 
Van der Walt states that the physical situation and context of land will determine the nature, 
content, and limits of property rights in the specific land in four ways. Firstly, beneficial 
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characteristics of the situation of the land can, generally speaking, not be relied on as of right. 
Secondly, beneficial characteristics do not form an inherent part of the property if the 
reasonable user would not have exercised them or relied on their permanence or continuation. 
Thirdly, and this follows from the previous points, beneficial characteristics only provide the 
land user with a right if reliance on the characteristic in question was reasonable and 
justifiable. Fourthly, unfavourable characteristics only constitute limitations on the use right 
if the reasonable user would have regarded them as such.
293
 These principles explain why an 
owner or occupier would very rarely (only in exceptional circumstances) be allowed to claim 
that a previously favourable situation should continue.
294
 Thus, the situation or location of the 
property will affect the extent to which the state can lawfully or legitimately regulate the 
property.
295
  
Some of the issues regarding limitation of vested or exercised rights have been addressed 
in German constitutional law, and it is accepted that article 14 does not guarantee that 
existing rights will be upheld unchanged for ever.
296
 In the German context, this issue has 
repeatedly come up with regard to transitional provisions where new legislation affects 
existing rights with the effect that those rights are severely restricted or even removed 
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entirely from the private sphere.
297
 The accepted position is that the legislature is allowed to 
impose a new regime on existing rights that will either restrict or abolish those rights, without 
violating the property guarantee.
298
 The legislature is not constitutionally obliged to either 
leave existing rights intact, or to expropriate those rights (against payment of 
compensation).
299
 However, the legislature is bound to certain requirements in order for a 
regime change to be valid, namely that the Rechtsstaatprinzip (rule-of-law principle) must be 
respected, and the regulatory measures must be justified by considerations of public interest 
and their effects must be in accordance with the proportionality principle.
300
 
Article 14 does not protect the mere expectation of future earnings or profit that an owner 
expects to acquire based on nothing more than an existing favourable situation, such as a lack 
of pre-existing regulation or a general zoning designation of one's parcel of land before a 
building permit has been applied for.
301
 Reliance on an existing legal situation will not 
always offer grounds for protection.
302
 However, that which has been acquired through labour 
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or investment is generally constitutionally protected, and there is less scope for 
interference.
303
 
The limits of property are dynamic and capable of adapting to changed social or economic 
circumstances.
304
 Changed circumstances can serve as justification for imposing stricter 
regulations on property, or for removing restrictions that have become overly strict, 
effectively changing the “extent” of previously-held individual rights.305 Dolzer asserts that 
the vested rights of the owner must prevail if a building was legal at the time of construction, 
but at a later stage became unlawful due to changed circumstances.
306
 However, this is 
probably not a nuanced enough position, because it is accepted that an existing situation 
cannot be expected to last forever or to remain unchanged.  
The difficult question of amending or prohibiting previously lawful uses in the building or 
planning context is dealt with in legislation in German law. For example, section 42 of the 
Baugesetzbuch (“BauGB”) provides guidelines to establish when compensation is payable to 
an owner for the amendment or prohibition of a previously lawful use of his property 
(Entschädigung bei Änderung oder Aufhebung einer zulässigen Nutzung).
307
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The issue regarding the regulatory limitation of vested rights and the situational 
commitment of property is addressed in German law in the context of the Anliegerrecht und 
Anliegergebrauch (the right to use roads adjacent to land) which is protected as inherent to 
the property right.
308
 The resultant limitations on the property also form an inherent part of it, 
since both the right and the limitation “derive from the nature and situation of the property 
itself”.309 The rights-holder has the right to use adjoining pavement and roads, but must bear 
the burden brought about by public regulation and public use of these areas, as well as the 
accompanying noise, traffic, pollution or road works.
310
 Temporary limitations on the right to 
use adjacent roads or public spaces, such as building renovations or road repairs, must usually 
be endured by the owner or occupier.
311
 However, this general rule is qualified by a proviso, 
namely that if the nature or use of the road is changed for the benefit of the public in general 
and the new burden is disproportionate, it would be unreasonable to expect the rights holder 
to bear the “new” burden.312 
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3 6 3 An example from German constitutional case law: BVerfGE 58, 300 
(Naßauskiesung) 
The systemic approach to the regulation of property can better be explained with reference to 
practical problems and their resolution in German case law.  In the Naßauskiesung
313
 decision 
the Federal Constitutional Court held that the constitutional notion of property is different 
from its private law counterpart and that the protection is also different. In this case the 
plaintiff was denied a permit to use groundwater occurring on his land and he argued that the 
denial of his right to use the water in a specific way amounted to an expropriation without 
compensation.
314
 The German Civil Code provides a landowner with the entitlement to 
exercise and exploit any and every conceivable and economically sensible use of the land, but 
the Federal Constitutional Court held that a literal interpretation of this provision would not 
be in line with article 14.1 and 14.2 of the Basic Law.
315
  
Judged systemically, ownership is limited because of the way article 14 is formulated. 
However, specific limitations may vary and if they increase, that is seen as a limitation, but 
that does not detract from the fact that ownership (of for example the right to use water) is an 
inherently limited right in the constitutional context. The nature and purpose of the limitation 
determines its validity in terms of proportionality, but before that it is necessary to determine 
whether there was a limitation that needs to be justified. 
One of the objectives of the Basic Law is a property system that balances the rights and 
interests of the individual and society. The approach in private law, in accordance with the 
Civil Code, can thus not be followed without considering whether the appropriate balance is 
struck for the constitutional context. Moreover, the Court indicated that the entitlements of a 
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property holder must be determined with reference to all relevant statutory principles in force 
at that time, and in determining the content and limits of property private-law principles 
should not carry more weight than public-law principles.
316
 Importantly, the Court stated that 
the constitutional notion of property ought to be derived from the Basic Law itself. It held 
that constitutional property is not based on or derived from “legal norms” that are lower in 
rank than the Basic Law, nor is the protection offered by the Basic Law determined only by 
private-law regulations.
317
 
The Court acknowledged that the regulation had an impact on the individual guarantee 
(Bestandsgarantie) because a permit was now required to use groundwater, while no permit 
was previously required to exercise this entitlement. However, the limitation and its effects 
could be justified. Moreover, the Court considered the vital importance of protecting limited 
public resources and held that this was a “property-content regulation” and not an 
expropriation.
318
 The owner does not have the unfettered right to the groundwater under his 
property, and therefore there was no right taken from him. The owner’s right to the 
groundwater was always held subject to the possibility of legitimate limitation.
319
  
This final point is a crucial part of what makes this aspect of German law suitable for 
comparison with (and potential development of) South African law. It indicates that although 
German doctrine probably subscribes to the idea of inherently limited rights, the important 
question in the constitutional context is whether the manifestations of the limitation and its 
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effects can be justified. The justification of a limitation is considered, apart from its authority, 
with reference to the proportionality principle. The proportionality principle forms an 
important part of constitutional property law because it concerns the justifiability of 
restrictions or limitations that are imposed on property. The Basic Law does not explicitly 
refer to the proportionality principle (Verhältnismäßigkeit), but it is regarded as an essential 
component of the formal concept of the Rechtsstaat as well as a fundamental part of 
constitutional interpretation.
320
 The proportionality principle requires a legitimate purpose for 
limiting a fundamental right (in this case the right to property); that the purpose be served by 
the appropriate and necessary means; and that the means be proportionate (not excessive) in 
relation to the ends which the limitation aims to achieve.
321
 A limitation is excessive if it is 
more far-reaching or extensive than necessary or if less invasive means would serve the same 
purpose.
322
  
 
3 6 4 Concluding remarks: Property and regulation in German constitutional law 
The wording of article 14 of the Basic Law, especially the explicit reference to determination 
of the content and limits of rights in article 14.1.2, indicates that property is not a pre-
constitutional, fundamentally unregulated right. Property is constitutionally entrenched to 
secure a sphere of personal liberty for individuals to organise their lives, and it is interpreted, 
regulated and protected in a manner that is in line with and that supports broader 
constitutional commitments. Courts therefore consider the systemic constitutional effects of 
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property, and regulation is recognised as a way of minimising negative systemic effects and 
promoting constitutional goals.   
The wording of article 14 and the focus of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the role and 
purpose of property in the constitutional legal system paves the way for a systemic 
constitutional approach to the regulation of the property, although systemic terminology is 
not expressly used in German case law or literature. In South African law more work needs to 
be done to create the foundation for a systemic constitutional approach, because the 
formulation of section 25 does not clearly prescribe a systemic view of property, and 
regulatory disputes have thus far largely been approached in a modular fashion. In South 
Africa’s constitutional property context, the focus has mostly been on the parameters of 
protection for property rights and the role of regulation in the context of section 25. The role 
and function of regulation of the use of property as part of the larger constitutional legal 
system has not fully been worked out yet. In contrast to German constitutional law, South 
African law is still in the process of determining what the desirable features of a 
constitutional property system are and how the property system fits into the normative 
framework of the Constitution.  
However, in Shoprite the South African Constitutional Court referred specifically to the 
Naßauskiesung decision as an example of how a constitutional notion of property should be 
derived from the provisions of the Constitution itself. It cannot be derived from legal norms 
lower in rank than the Constitution. According to the Court, a similar approach ought to be 
adopted in South African law, especially in light of the supremacy clause in section 2 of the 
Constitution.
323
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3 7 Conclusion 
The Constitution challenges the existing property system, and presents an opportunity to 
critically reconsider the legal landscape in South Africa. One of the core difficulties with the 
constitutional protection of property (including the constitutional adjudication of 
constitutional property disputes) is “the collision of the idea of property with the idea of 
change.”324 This chapter aims to show that this statement aptly describes the situation in 
South Africa where the doctrinal view of ownership and property must be reconciled with the 
general idea of change that was introduced by the Constitution. The point of departure in the 
constitutional setting is that “[a]ll property is subject to the law and regulation by the law.”325 
This chapter focuses specifically on the question of how property is protected and limited 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. I argue that from a constitutional perspective, 
the restrictions placed on property rights should not be viewed as undermining the protection 
of private property rights or entitlements. The constitutional protection of property is not 
primarily aimed at the protection of pre-existing individual property rights. The aim of the 
property clause in the Bill of Rights is to find an appropriate balance between the interests of 
the individual and the interests of society. Therefore, section 25(1) allows deprivations of 
property under certain circumstances to ensure that state regulation of the use, exploitation 
and enjoyment of property is possible and legitimate to further constitutional objectives, 
whilst also affording adequate protection to property holders against arbitrary 
infringements.
326
 This means that disputes regarding the protection of property entitlements 
cannot be determined or adjudicated without reference to the constitutional objectives of the 
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Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) para 60.  
326
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 142. 
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system as a whole. Ultimately, within the systemic view of regulation, space is created to 
reconcile the idea of property with the idea of change to ensure that both the protective and 
the transformative objectives of section 25(1) are reached. 
The PE Municipality decision is a celebrated milestone insofar as it created awareness of 
the broad constitutional matrix that should inform how property rights (and therefore also the 
regulation of property and disputes pertaining thereto) should be dealt with. This decision 
emphasises the importance of protecting property rights to avoid a situation where there is no 
certainty or security in property rights, while simultaneously highlighting the need for an 
opening-up or restoration of property rights by subjecting existing entitlements to new or 
more extensive regulation.
327
 
While the inherently-limited nature of property rights makes it doctrinally easier to accept 
the constitutional justification of regulatory limitations of property, it is still hampered by its 
private law, doctrinal origins, and fails to envision the facilitative role that regulation of the 
use of property can play in achieving constitutional objectives.
328
 The analysis in this chapter 
emphasises that in the constitutional context, the question of inherent or external limitations 
are less important ( and in fact becomes irrelevant) because one can recognise the existence 
of an inherent limitation, but still ask questions about the time-and-place specific shape that 
the limitation takes in legislation or other law that creates it. The limitation can change and 
the change can be seen as deprivation of property that must comply with section 25(1), 
regardless of whether or not the limitation is classified as inherent to the right or not. It is 
                                            
327
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 15. Van der Walt AJ The law of 
neighbours (2010) 9 describes this as “a useful approach, a kind of analytic rhythm, for reform- or 
transformation-oriented analysis and evaluation of existing law”.  
328
 See Chapter 2.3.5 and 2.3.7 for a discussion on the limits of the inherent limitation approach in private law 
doctrine. A conceptualisation of property as an inherently limited right remains focused on individual rights, 
which is fundamentally inconsistent with a systemic constitutional approach. I expand on this point in Chapter 
5.3 and 5.4. 
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therefore more useful to focus on the requirements for a constitutionally valid limitation, and 
to consider whether the effects of the limitation can be constitutionally justified, while 
assuming that the existence of the limitation as such is systemically justified by the 
constitutional legal system.  
In a similar vein, the question of when a limitation constitutes a deprivation of property 
becomes less important. The case law thus far indicates that the debate in constitutional 
property law will be less focused on the content of property, and subsequently also less 
concerned with the nature (inherent or exceptional) of limitations,  and more focused on the 
requirements for and justification of the effects of limitations.
329
 The analysis in this chapter 
shows that the property system under the Constitution is fundamentally a regulated system 
which does not view property as a natural, pre-social right that merely tolerates restrictions. 
Property is therefore both recognised and circumscribed within this inherently regulated 
system.
330
 Despite the fact that a systemic view might appear less obviously appropriate than 
is the case in German constitutional law, it nevertheless seems to offer advantages that South 
African legal development might benefit from for two reasons. Firstly, German constitutional 
law shows that when property is protected and regulated in a manner that is in line with the 
value system of the broader constitutional context, it is easier to find an appropriate balance 
between the individual and the public interest in a structured, principled manner. This allows 
for more consistency when dealing with regulatory disputes. Secondly, a systemic view 
supports the development of a single system of law, where all law fits into the constitutional 
system, with no unjustified parallel development. The features and advantages of the 
                                            
329
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 84. This approach was confirmed in Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015). 
330
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 29. 
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systemic constitutional approach in the context of overlap areas of law are explored in more 
detail in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The regulation of property and the right to just administrative 
action 
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4 1 Introduction 
 
“[I]ndividual welfare is shaped less and less by common law rules, more and more by 
legislative and administrative action.”1 
 
The regulation of the use of property is an integral part of modern society to ensure that 
private property is used in a manner that is reconcilable with the public interest and the aims 
and objectives of the Constitution. The use, enjoyment and exploitation of property are 
shaped not only by other areas of law, but also by various social, economic and political 
factors. There has been a great expansion of public power into what has previously been 
regarded as areas of private life, and public or state action (in the form of administrative, 
executive or legislative action) significantly affects property and individual welfare.
2
 It is 
therefore necessary to develop a clear picture of the role and function that property ought to 
fulfil in society and to ensure that regulatory measures imposed on property support the ideal, 
instead of undermining it, irrespective of which field of the law is applicable to control or 
scrutinise the regulation. The quote above shows the importance of coming to terms with how 
especially administrative and legislative measures impact substantially on “individual 
welfare” and it is necessary to critically analyse the areas of the property system where 
legislative, executive and administrative action overlap with property law rules and 
principles. 
                                            
1
 Stewart RB & Sunstein CR “Public programs and private rights” (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 1193-1322 
1204. See Walsh R “The evolving relationship between property and participation in English planning law” in 
Hopkins N (ed) Modern studies in property law: Volume 7 (2013) 263. 
2
 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 10-11 comments on the expansion of public power 
from the 20
th
 century onward. 
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In Chapter 4, I take a step back from section 25 of the Constitution to consider how 
property and regulation fit into the bigger constitutional legal system, and consider the role 
and relevance of the right to just administrative action in the context of the regulation of the 
use of property. The regulatory limitation of property rights is often brought about by 
administrative action and the constitutional protection of property is thus closely connected to 
the constitutional right to just administrative action in section 33 of the Constitution, together 
with the Promotion to Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).
3
 Section 33 of the 
Constitution reads as follows: 
 
“(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must –  
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration.” 
 
                                            
3
 PAJA was specifically enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution, as mandated by section 33(3) 
and should thus regulate disputes relating to the right to just administrative action. See Klaaren J & Penfold G 
“Just administrative action” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 4 
(2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 63-1 – 63-128 at 63-5; 63-7. The provisions of PAJA should apply to a dispute of a general 
administrative nature, but where specialised legislation exists, that legislation is applicable to the dispute. See 
for example Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) paras 80, 89 
where the Constitutional Court held that the matter was reviewable under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
(LRA) and not under PAJA, because the LRA was specialised legislation that dealt with administrative law 
specifically in the labour law context. Also see Hoexter C “Clearing the intersection? Administrative law and 
labour law in the Constitutional Court” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 209-234 212; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 268; Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 40. 
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The problem that this chapter highlights is that a large part of regulation of the use of 
property is brought about by administrative action, but there are also instances where there is 
no administrative action involved. Effectively, this means that there are at least two potential 
regulatory systems that can regulate the regulation itself, depending on the source and 
authority for the regulation, and furthermore, that a decision has to be made as to which set of 
controls applies to a specific case. In the systemic constitutional approach, each of these 
systems must have a demarcated field of application, because of the prohibition against the 
creation of parallel legal systems.   
In Chapter 4, I set out the area of overlap between sections 25(1) and 33 of the 
Constitution and consider why it is important to have an appropriate way of addressing the 
area of overlap in light of the “single-system-of-law” principle.4 This includes an analysis of 
the role and function of subsidiarity principles as well as a brief description of the principles 
of constitutional property law and administrative law that have an impact on the regulation of 
the use of property. I also explore various developments in so-called “overlap” and “non-
overlap” cases that can impact on the regulation of the use of property to determine the 
implications of these developments in light of the single-system-of-law principle.
5
 The two 
areas in which the developments fall primarily deal with procedural fairness vis-à-vis 
procedural non-arbitrariness and reasonableness vis-à-vis substantive non-arbitrariness. These 
                                            
4
 The principle was formulated in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In 
re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44 and is 
discussed in more detail in the following section. 
5
 I borrow the terms “overlap” and “non-overlap cases” from Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: 
Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” 
(2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 641 but I use it in the context of property law and administrative 
law. “Overlap” cases refer to cases where both property law and administrative law are applicable, while “non-
overlap” cases refer specifically to cases where either the principles of property law or administrative law are 
used to reach a decision, but not both. It does not fall within the scope of this study to critically engage with 
similar problems that arise in the socio-economic rights context, although socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
is cited occasionally in support of a particular argument. 
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two areas provide substantial scope for considering in more detail what a constructive 
alliance between sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution would look like.
6
 They also give 
some indication as to why it is important to consider what the relationship between the 
regulatory systems is once a decision about applicability has been made.  
 Therefore, the aim of this chapter is firstly to show that there are two regulatory systems 
potentially applicable to certain categories of regulatory disputes and to determine how the 
choice between the systems is made. Secondly, the goal is to consider the relationship 
between the two regulatory systems, once the choice has been made. The relationship 
between the two regulatory systems is important, because the analysis in this chapter shows 
that even after the choice has been made, the systems continue to influence each other. I 
argue that if control of the regulation falls within the ambit of section 25, the principles of 
administrative law still influence the constitutional review process, primarily because of the 
way procedural non-arbitrariness is interpreted.
7
 Conversely, if control of the regulation falls 
within the province of administrative law, the principles of constitutional property will 
influence the normative context of reasonableness review in terms of PAJA.
8
 Parallel 
development in the constitutional legal system is often the result of failing to recognise either 
the existence of an area of overlap between the regulatory systems or overlooking the 
relevance of a similar development in the system that was not selected. Parallel developments 
are discussed in more detail below. 
 
                                            
6
 Quinot G “An administrative law perspective on ‘bad building’ evictions in the Johannesburg inner city” 
(2007) 8 ESR Review 25-28 28. 
7
 This argument is made in section 4.6.3 below. 
8
 See sections 4.4 and 4.6.6 below. 
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4 2 The system of the Constitution
9
 
4 2 1 The supremacy of the Constitution 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of South Africa.
10
 With the advent of a 
new democratic regime, parliamentary sovereignty was abandoned and the Bill of Rights now 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
11
 Although the 
Constitution is the supreme law, existing laws of the Republic of South Africa remain in 
force.
12
 However, section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution mandates the courts to declare any 
law that is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. 
Therefore, no part of the law is exempt from constitutional scrutiny, despite the point of 
departure that pre-constitutional law is valid and remains in force.
13
 The single-system-of-law 
principle was expressed by Chaskalson P in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others.
14
 The court held that: 
 
                                            
9
 The title of this section is taken from Vermeule A The system of the constitution (2011). 
10
 See sections 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution. Hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”. Also see Klaaren J & 
Penfold G “Just administrative action” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(CLoSA) vol 4 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 63-1 – 63-128 at 63-2. Michelman FI “The rule of law, legality and the 
supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman S & Bishop M Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 1 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2 2005) 11-1 – 11-44 at 11-35 – 11-36 argues that the Constitution is the supreme law in what he 
calls the “trumping sense”, meaning that insofar as another source of law conflicts with the Constitution, that 
law will be unconstitutional and therefore invalid. However, Michelman suggests that constitutional supremacy 
is also a value (or “desired condition”). Constitutional supremacy in the “trumping sense” is therefore a rule that 
aims to achieve the desired condition. 
11
 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. 
12
 Sections 2 and 39(3) of the Constitution.  
13
 See Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 20, where it is explained in more detail that legislation 
and the common law do not exist separately or independently from the Constitution.  
14
 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
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“There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme 
law and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is 
subject to constitutional control.”15 
 
At the core of the principle of a single system of law lies the prohibition against creating (or 
allowing) parallel systems of law, either in an attempt to shield certain areas from the 
influence of the Constitution, or alternatively when different sources of law are potentially 
applicable and different litigation “routes” are created for litigants to obtain some advantage, 
or because it is unclear to a court what the appropriate source of law is.
16
 Parallel systems are 
created through the relationship between sources of law (the Constitution vis-à-vis legislation, 
the Constitution or legislation vis-à-vis the common law) or through the relationship between 
different areas of law (such as property law and administrative law).  
Michelman identifies a link between the value of constitutional supremacy and what he 
refers to as the “unity of the legal system”.17 The single-system-of-law principle (together 
with the notion of constitutional supremacy) effectively blurs the dividing line between 
private law and public law; a conceptual divide traditionally adhered to in South African 
law.
18
 This divide stems from 19
th
 century liberal thinking and the subsequent interpretation 
                                            
15
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
16
 These scenarios are discussed in more depth in section 4.2.2 to explain the reason for and the application of 
“subsidiarity principles”. 
17
 Michelman FI “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman S & Bishop M 
Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 1 (2
nd
 ed OS 2 2005) 11-1 – 11-44 at  11-36. Generally, see 
Luhmann N “The unity of the legal system” in Teubner G (ed) Autopoietic law: A new approach to law and 
society (1988) 12-35.   
18
 Gobetti D “Humankind as a system: Private and public agency at the origins of modern liberalism” in 
Weintraub J & Kumar K (eds) Public and private in thought and practice: Perspectives on a grand dichotomy 
(1997) 103-132. Also see Michelman FI “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in 
Woolman S & Bishop M Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 1 (2
nd
 ed OS 2 2005) 11-1 – 11-44 at 
11-5; Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 59. 
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of Roman-Dutch law. A central premise of the liberal viewpoint is that the private sphere is 
pre-political and that state interference should be kept to a minimum.
19
  
This is no longer a tenable position in South Africa, since section 8 of the Constitution 
makes provision for the horizontal application of fundamental rights and poses a clear 
challenge to the status quo.
20
 Other sections, such as section 39 of the Constitution, also have 
implications for the private/public dichotomy, although the courts have been hesitant to 
undertake large-scale reform of common-law institutions on this basis.
21
  
Continued adherence to a strict divide between private law and public law could insulate 
existing social and economic relationships against change and protect private law rules or 
institutions from constitutional scrutiny.
22
 Existing rights or common law institutions cannot 
be protected if it would be in conflict with the aims and objectives of the Constitution and 
                                                                                                                                       
Although the divide still exists in South African law, the boundaries are becoming less and less clear in certain 
areas of law. However, see for example Van Wyk J Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 65-74 for a discussion of the 
private/public law divide in the context of planning law and its usefulness as a tool to identify the correct source 
of law. 
19
 Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 61, 317-335; 
Van der Walt AJ “Tradition on trial: A critical analysis of the civil-law tradition in South African property law” 
(1995) South African Journal on Human Rights 169-206 180-181. 
20
 The horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is controversial and the role and scope of section 8 have been 
debated by courts and academics alike. The debate falls outside the scope of this study, but see the discussion by 
Van der Walt JWG “Perspectives on horizontal application: Du Plessis v De Klerk revisited” (1997) 12 South 
African Public Law 1-31; Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative 
constitution (2010) 335-376 for a general overview.  
21
 Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 62, 335-376 is 
mostly critical of this hesitant approach taken by the courts, but Fagan A “The secondary role of the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the common law’s development” (2010) 127 South African Law 
Journal 611-627 argues that the influence of the Constitution on common law is limited. For a general 
discussion of this line of thought in the property law context, see Van der Walt AJ “Tradition on trial: A critical 
analysis of the civil-law tradition in South African property law” (1995) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 169-206 185. For a critical response to Fagan, see Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 92-
97. 
22
 Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 60.  
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specifically the Bill of Rights.
23
 There is only one system of law, and the Constitution 
provides the foundation and framework of that system.  
In Chapter 3 it became clear that regulatory restrictions placed on property rights should 
not be viewed as undermining the protection of private property rights because the 
constitutional protection of property is not only aimed at the protection of individual property 
rights. As was indicated in Chapter 3, the German understanding of the role and function of 
the constitutional protection of property might prove useful in the South African context.
24
 In 
German constitutional law, the constitutional protection of property is not regarded as an end 
in itself because a variety of interests are served by protecting property as a fundamental 
right.
25
 Protection is granted as part of the system of fundamental rights that are guaranteed 
by the Basic Law and it is the objectives of the Basic Law as a whole that must be served by 
the protection and regulation of private property.
26
  
Although such a systemic approach to the regulation of property is not as well-established 
in South African law as in German law, there is support for it in the literature and dicta of 
especially the Constitutional Court are in line with this view.
27
 To my mind, it provides the 
clearest direction for the development of a systemic regulatory regime that actively promotes 
                                            
23
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 21. 
24
 Consider for example Froneman J’s reference to German constitutional property law in Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 52-56. 
25
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 42-43; Alexander GS “Property as a fundamental 
constitutional right? The German example” (2002-2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733-778 738. This point is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
26
 Kimminich O “Property rights” in Starck C (ed) Rights, institutions and impact of international law according 
to the German Basic Law (1987) 75-91 79. 
27
 Consider for example Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-17. 
Also see Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 20-24, 130; Mostert H The constitutional protection 
and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and land ownership in South Africa 
and Germany (2002) 578-580.  
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the norms and values of the Constitution. The systemic constitutional approach means that 
the constitutional protection of entitlements is derived from and circumscribed by the entire 
Constitution, and special considerations might have to be taken into account when the subject 
matter of regulation is property – regardless of the field of law where the regulatory measure 
originates. Additionally, it requires the area of application of each field of law (and for 
purposes of this dissertation, each secondary regulatory framework) to be clearly set out so 
that there are no unnecessary or unjustified parallels or overlaps in the constitutional legal 
system. 
One of the aims of the property clause in the Bill of Rights is to find an appropriate 
balance between the interests of the individual and the interests of society. Section 25(1) 
allows non-arbitrary deprivations of property to ensure that state regulation of the use, 
exploitation and enjoyment of property is possible and legitimate to further constitutional 
objectives, whilst also affording adequate protection to property holders against arbitrary 
infringements.
28
 The relationship between property and regulation must be aligned across 
different areas of the law, to ensure that the same underlying approach is followed, regardless 
of whether regulatory measures are challenged in terms of PAJA or section 25(1). In the 
following section the subsidiarity principles are considered to determine how they can ensure 
that the overlap between section 25 and 33 of the Constitution is addressed in a non-arbitrary 
manner.  
 
                                            
28
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 142. 
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4 2 2 Subsidiarity principles 
Constitutional supremacy and the single-system-of-law principle necessarily impact on how 
the various sources of law are dealt with in South African law.
29
 Van der Walt argues that the 
Constitutional Court developed “a set of guidelines” to determine which source of law 
applies to a dispute and that these guidelines can be further developed.
30
 Elaboration of these 
guidelines is necessary to ensure that the source of law that is most likely to promote the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights is selected.
31
 Stated differently, subsidiarity 
principles provide guidance when dealing with more than one potentially applicable source of 
law and ensure selection of the source that will contribute to the development of a single 
system of law that exhibits the desired characteristics envisioned by the Constitution.
32
  
The first subsidiarity principle states that if a litigant avers the infringement of a 
constitutional right and legislation has been specifically enacted to give effect to that right, 
the litigant must base his claim on the legislation and cannot rely on the constitutional 
provision directly.
33
 In terms of the second subsidiarity principle, a litigant may not choose to 
                                            
29
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 23, 26. The Constitution recognises the common law, 
legislation, customary law and international law as possible sources of law. 
30
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 23-24 refers to this as “the development algorithm of post-
apartheid South African law”. Also see in general Van der Walt AJ “Normative pluralism and anarchy: 
Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 77-128. 
31
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 35. Also see Du Plessis L “‘Subsidiarity’: What’s in the 
name for constitutional interpretation and adjudication?” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 207-231 209 for 
an explanation of the different kinds of subsidiarity (institutional subsidiarity and strategic subsidiarity) which 
impact on adjudicative subsidiarity. 
32
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 35; Van der Walt AJ “Tradition on trial: A critical analysis 
of the civil-law tradition in South African property law” (1995) South African Journal on Human Rights 169-
206 203-205. 
33
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 36. This principle is derived from South African National 
Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52; Minister of Health NO v New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) paras 
93-96. 
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rely on the common law where legislation has been specifically enacted to protect the right in 
question.
34
 
This seems relatively clear and uncomplicated. However, each principle is subject to a 
proviso. The first principle does not apply if the litigant wishes to challenge the specifically 
enacted legislation for being “unconstitutional or inadequate in protecting the right”, which 
means that in this case a litigant may rely on the constitutional provision directly.
35
 An 
inferred proviso to the second principle is that a litigant may rely on the common law if the 
legislation was not intended to cover a particular aspect of the law, or if it was intended to 
cover an entire field, but in fact does not cover a particular aspect of the common law. 
However, the common law can only be applied insofar as the common law does not conflict 
with the constitutional provision or negate the aims and objectives of the relevant legislative 
scheme.
36
 
As mentioned above, PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution. In 
terms of the subsidiarity principles, this would mean that a litigant in a case involving 
administrative action is precluded from relying on section 33 directly, and must instead make 
use of the applicable provision(s) in PAJA,
37
 unless the litigant wishes to challenge the 
                                            
34
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 36 refers to several important Constitutional Court 
decisions where these principles were formulated, including Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 25 and Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 96. Both 
decisions are discussed in more detail below.  
35
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 36 formulates this proviso with reference to the following 
cases: South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) para 52; Minister of 
Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae) 
2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 437; Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others 2008 (2) SA 24 
(CC) para 249; Engelbrecht v Road Accident Fund 2007 (6) SA 96 (CC) para 15. 
36
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 36.  
37
 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 119, 134. 
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constitutionality of the provision(s) in PAJA.
38
 In the latter case the litigant would rely 
directly on section 33 of the Constitution.
39
  
However, it must be borne in mind that PAJA was not enacted to give effect to section 25 
and therefore the first subsidiarity principle does not provide an answer in disputes regarding 
the appropriate path or source of law where property is regulated through administrative 
action.
40
 It is thus not always clear whether a litigant can argue that, under certain 
circumstances, section 25 would offer wider protection to her constitutionally protected rights 
than the applicable provisions of PAJA, and that she should therefore be at liberty to choose 
to rely on section 25 directly.
41
  
                                            
38
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 36; Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 
2012) 119. Also see the discussion by Hoexter C “Clearing the intersection? Administrative law and labour law 
in the Constitutional Court” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 209-234 regarding the selection of sources 
and the creation of multiple pathways of review, particularly in the context of administrative law and labour law. 
39
 The post-PAJA role of section 33, for anything other than challenging the provisions of PAJA, is unclear. 
Klaaren and Penfold argue that section 33 continues to fulfil a meaningful role in the development of 
administrative law and that a “free-standing right to just administrative action still exists”. See Klaaren J & 
Penfold G “Just administrative action” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(CLoSA) vol 4 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 63-1 – 63-128 at 63-10, who explain that, if this approach is accepted, three 
possible applications of section 33 are possible: firstly, section 33 can play a role in interpreting the provisions 
of PAJA where more than one interpretation is possible. Secondly, section 33 can form the basis on which to 
challenge the constitutionality of the provisions in PAJA and, thirdly, as a ground on which to challenge the 
constitutionality of other legislation or to assist with the interpretation of other legislation that impacts on the 
right to just administrative action. Also see Hoexter C “Just administrative action” in Currie I & De Waal J (eds) 
The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 643-690 649-651.  
40
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 67. There is also no single, comprehensive piece 
of legislation intended to give effect to section 25 of the Constitution, such as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 which was promulgated to give effect to section 23 of the Constitution. There is no “purpose-built 
(legislative) framework” for property matters, and therefore issues regarding subsidiarity are more complicated 
when the subject-matter of regulation is property. For a discussion of what amounts to subsidiarity in the context 
of administrative action in the labour context, see Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) para 
41. 
41
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 43-44; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 
2011) 66-69. 
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Another complicating factor when dealing with section 25 and section 33 and the 
application of the subsidiarity principles, is that the case law and academic literature do not 
always clearly distinguish between direct statutory deprivation (where no administrative 
decision is necessary, because the deprivation is a direct result of the legislation)
42
 and 
situations where there is authorising legislation but no deprivation results automatically 
because a decision by an administrator is necessary to cause the deprivation.
43
 This issue is 
considered in more detail below.  
 
4 2 3 The regulation of regulation: The problem of more than one potential 
regulatory system 
In Chapter 3, I refer to some of the features of the constitutional legal system, with reference 
to property and regulation as sub-components of the system. The constitutional analysis 
showed that the constitutional legal system provides for secondary regulatory control of the 
imposition of limitations (‘the regulation of regulation”), to ensure that limitations on 
                                            
42
 For example in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 
(1) SA 530 (CC); National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). This is referred to as 
ex lege deprivation.  
43
 For example Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2011 (1) SA 293 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 267. 
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property meet the prescribed requirements and that the effects of the limitations can be 
justified.
44
  
Regulation of the use of property in the constitutional setting gives rise to a problem that 
has thus far remained largely unanalysed. The problem is that the use of property is 
sometimes regulated by administrative action, but not always. Regulatory limitations can also 
be imposed directly on property by operation of law (with no administrative action) through 
the common law, legislation or the Constitution, or by acts of the judiciary or the executive. 
This means that not all instances of regulation can be challenged or reviewed in the same 
way, or on the same basis. It is therefore necessary to determine when a regulation dispute 
will be adjudicated in terms of PAJA, and when a litigant can (or should) rely directly on 
section 25 of the Constitution. 
In South African constitutional law, this secondary regulatory function can be carried out 
within the regulatory framework provided for by section 25 of the Constitution, or 
alternatively, within the framework created by section 33 of the Constitution together with 
PAJA. In the systemic constitutional approach, it must be accepted that both these systems 
fulfil some distinct purpose, in a way that does not allow for the creation of parallel 
systems.
45
 Given the subsidiarity principles, the regulation of regulation should primarily be 
an issue of administrative law, unless the source or authority of the primary regulation (the 
regulation of the use of property) excludes that option. In such a case, the next option is direct 
reliance on constitutional principles, which include but are not limited to the constitutional 
property principles of section 25.  
                                            
44
 The notion of the “regulation of regulation” stems from administrative law. See Farina CR “Administrative 
law as regulation: The paradox of attempting to control and to inspire the use of public power” (2004) 19 South 
African Public Law 489-512 490. 
45
 The notions of parallel legal development and parallel systems are discussed in section 4.5 below.  
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In the systemic constitutional approach there is a further step, namely to consider the 
relationship (if any) between the secondary regulatory systems after the appropriate system 
has been selected. This chapter shows that because of the interconnectedness of the sub-
components of the constitutional legal system, there is often direct and indirect interaction 
between the regulatory systems, even after the decision regarding application has been made. 
Before I discuss this interaction, the next section provides background information on the 
relevant administrative law rules and principles applicable to the regulation of property. The 
aim of the following section is not to restate elementary administrative law, but rather to 
create the appropriate context within which to further explore the link (or lack thereof) 
between property and the right to just administrative action. 
 
4 3 The right to just administrative action in the property law context 
4 3 1 Reconsidering the relationship between property law and administrative 
law in light of the Constitution  
Section 33 of the Constitution represents an important milestone in the development of South 
African administrative law, insofar as it entrenches the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. South Africa is therefore in the process of 
developing its common law heritage to create constitutional administrative law which reflects 
the constitutional commitment to justification, transparency and efficiency.
46
 There are many 
new developments in administrative law which aim to promote these objectives and transcend 
its common law heritage, but for purposes of this dissertation it will suffice to consider how 
                                            
46
 See for example sections 1(d), 33(3)(c), 41(c) and 195 of the Constitution.  
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reasonableness and procedural fairness have developed under PAJA and section 33, and 
determine how these developmental trends have impacted on property.  
Traditionally, property law and administrative law have a strained relationship, because of 
each area of law’s perceived function in terms of the common law. From a liberal (and 
absolutist) perspective, administrative law should preferably be largely absent from the 
sphere of property law insofar as it represents an intrusion of the public sphere on the private 
sphere. However, property and administrative justice are both fundamental rights in the Bill 
of Rights and therefore it is necessary to reconceive the relationship between private property 
and the administration, and for administrative law to adopt a more facilitative role in the 
context of the regulation of the use of property. This is particularly important in the systemic 
constitutional approach because regulation is a systemic device that can promote a variety of 
constitutional objectives. The principles of administrative law can assist with this task. 
Administrative law, as the sphere of law to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution, 
cannot be left under-theorised or under-developed in the constitutional context. However, 
because this dissertation is centred on the regulation of the use of property, these issues 
cannot be addressed in detail. Instead, I discuss the potential for development in the area of 
overlap between section 25(1) and section 33, and merely highlight some of the potential 
implications for non-overlap areas and parallel developments in the broader context of the 
single-system-of-law principle.
47
 
 
                                            
47
 The systemic perspective that is central to this study in the context of the regulation of property is also of 
considerable importance to the reconceptualisation and development of the role of administrative law under the 
Constitution; there are important consequences to viewing administrative law as a system of regulation, 
although the implications are not fully worked out in this dissertation. See Farina CR “Administrative law as 
regulation: The paradox of attempting to control and to inspire the use of public power” (2004) 19 South African 
Public Law 489-512 490. 
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4 3 2 Administrative law principles impacting on the regulation of property 
In the constitutional paradigm, administrative law as the regulation of regulation has an 
important role to play in the regulation of property.
48
 However, its precise role and function 
in the constitutional framework and its role vis-à-vis section 25 of the Constitution have 
arguably not been considered in enough detail. In this section, general administrative law 
principles that impact on property are set out and discussed as a point of departure, to briefly 
set out what the regulatory controls of the administrative law framework look like.  
 “Administrative action” is a term of particular significance for the right to administrative 
justice entrenched in section 33 of the Constitution.
49
 Both section 33 of the Constitution and 
PAJA expressly refer to administrative action, with the effect that judicial review in terms of 
PAJA can only take place if the offending exercise of public power meets the “requirements” 
of an administrative action.
50
 Certain academics, such as Hoexter and Quinot, argue that 
administrative justice should be used as a central or systemic concept around which to build 
this new body of law.
51
 Unfortunately, the focus up to now has fallen on what qualifies as 
                                            
48
 Farina CR “Administrative law as regulation: The paradox of attempting to control and to inspire the use of 
public power” (2004) 19 South African Public Law 489-512 490; Van der Walt AJ “Procedurally arbitrary 
deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 88-94 94.  
49
 Section 33 of the Constitution. Klaaren J & Penfold G “Just administrative action” in Woolman S & Bishop 
M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 4 (2
nd
 ed RS 5 2013) 63-1 – 63-128 at 63-20 describe it 
as the “crucial threshold concept” to administrative law review. Also see Hoexter C Administrative law in South 
Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 172. 
50
 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 173. 
51
 See in general Quinot G "The right to reasons for administrative action as key ingredient of a culture of 
justification" (2011) 25 Speculum Iuris 32-47 32-33; Quinot G “Substantive reasoning in administrative law 
adjudication” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 111-139 115-117; Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing 
the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South 
Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 641; Hoexter C “Judicial policy revisited: Transformative 
adjudication in administrative law” (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 281-299 286-288. Also 
see Henrico R “Re-visiting the rule of law and the principle of legality: Judicial nuisance or licence?” 2014 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 742-759 753. 
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“administrative action” and the burdensome conceptualisation of this term has led to 
unfortunate consequences, which are discussed in more detail below. 
Administrative action is defined in section 1 of PAJA and has been discussed extensively 
in case law and academic literature.
52
 While it is important to identify whether an action 
qualifies as administrative action, especially in relation to the determination of the applicable 
source of law, an in-depth analysis of the interpretation of the term is not necessary for this 
dissertation.
53
 In Joseph and Others v The City of Johannesburg and Others
54
 it was decided 
that a broad and purposive interpretation of administrative action is preferable, to include as 
many public actions as possible within the ambit of judicial review in terms of PAJA.
55
 
However, given the highly complex nature of the definition of “administrative action” in 
section 1 of PAJA, it is possible that certain public acts that affect property will not 
technically qualify as administrative action, and therefore will not be subject to scrutiny 
under PAJA, which means that they will be dealt with under section 25(1) directly.
56
   
                                            
52
 See Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others 2005 (6) SA 313 
(SCA) para 21, where the definition is described as “cumbersome”. See also Klaaren J & Penfold G “Just 
administrative action” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 4 (2nd 
ed RS 5 2013) 63-1 – 63-128 at 63-20 – 63-25, 63-59 – 63-76.  
53
 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 134 argues that the first step in any administrative 
law case ought to be to determine whether there was administrative action to decide whether PAJA is applicable 
or not. This view is not necessarily always embraced by the courts. See for instance Albutt v Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) paras 80-81 where the application of PAJA was 
viewed as a difficult question that need not be decided in every case. See further Murcott M “Procedural fairness 
as a component of legality: Is a reconciliation between Albutt and Masetlha possible?” (2013) 130 South African 
Law Journal 260-274 265-267. 
54
 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). Hereafter referred to as Joseph. 
55
 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) paras 27-28. This approach was 
first formulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of 
Public Works and Others 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
56
 One possible example in this category is the Constitutional Court’s decision in Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) 
SA 391 (CC), where it was held that the publication of notices did not amount to administrative action.  
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One further aspect of the definition of “administrative action” in section 1 of PAJA is of 
significance to this chapter, namely that administrative action is a decision (or a failure to 
take a decision) that adversely affects the rights of any person. This is closely connected to 
the terminology in sections 3 and 4 of PAJA, which require that any administrative action 
which materially and adversely affects the rights of a person or the public, or the legitimate 
expectations of a person, must be procedurally fair.
57
 
It is important to establish when the regulation of property materially and adversely affects 
the rights or legitimate expectations of any person or the rights of the public, as required by 
sections 3 and 4 of PAJA, respectively, to determine whether the interpretation of the phrase 
“materially and adversely affect” corresponds with the jurisprudence on section 25 and the 
definition of deprivation developed there.
58
 
The interpretation of the verb “affect” is not a simple matter and two different 
interpretations (with vastly different consequences) have been suggested.
59
 One option is to 
interpret the phrase “adversely affect” to refer to an action that determines the rights of a 
person.
60
 This is referred to as the determination theory, a term coined by Mureinik.
61
 It is 
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 Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 
para 23. The confusing reference to “material” effects in sections 3 and 4 of PAJA (with no corresponding 
requirement in section 1) was clarified by Skweyiya J in Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 
2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 31. It is now understood to mean that the adverse effect must not be of a trivial 
nature. See Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 398. 
58
 To review a decision under PAJA the decision or failure to take a decision must adversely affect the rights of 
a person. Sections 3 and 4 of PAJA specify that administrative action that materially and adversely impacts on 
the rights or legitimate expectations of a person or the rights of the public must be procedurally fair. Access to 
these “procedural fairness provisions” is thus contingent upon proving that rights (or legitimate expectations in 
the case of section 3) were materially and adversely affected and will hinge on the interpretation assigned to that 
phrase. 
59
 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 221.  
60
 Mureinik E “Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability” 1993 Acta Juridica 35-46 36. Also see 
Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 221. 
61
 Mureinik E “Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability” 1993 Acta Juridica 35-46 36. 
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based on a generous interpretation of the requirement, since any “decision which decides 
what a person’s legal rights are” would then fall within the ambit of “affecting” those rights.62 
The second interpretation is much stricter or narrower and requires the taking away or 
abolition of rights.
63
 In other words, a decision will only affect rights if the decision in 
question deprives a person “of a prior legal right”.64 While the wording of PAJA does not 
clearly indicate which approach is preferable, Hoexter argues convincingly that the rights in 
section 33 of the Constitution are not qualified in the same manner as in PAJA and that 
adherence to the deprivation theory would actually render PAJA unconstitutional, because it 
fails to properly give effect to section 33.
65
  
The phrase “material and adverse impact”, especially if interpreted according to the 
stricter deprivation theory, echoes a concern raised in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, namely 
that the language of post-1994 legal instruments, such as PAJA in this case, creates the 
perception that the regulation of the use of property is an exceptional imposition that 
diminishes the abstract completeness of a right previously held, in line with the absolutist 
approach to regulation. While this may not be problematic for a number of rights affected by 
administrative action, an absolutist approach to the administrative regulation of the use of 
property is potentially problematic because it arguably supports an interpretation of property 
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 Mureinik E “Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability” 1993 Acta Juridica 35-46 36. 
63
 This is the deprivation theory. See Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 221, 403, 
where she argues that the Constitutional Court’s adjudicative approach in Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (6) 
SA 129 (CC) can be read in support of the deprivation theory. Also see Govender K “An assessment of section 4 
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 as a means of advancing participatory democracy in South 
Africa” (2003) 18 South African Public Law 403-429 413, who is of the opinion that a burden or prejudice must 
be imposed to satisfy the requirement for an adverse effect on rights. 
64
 Mureinik E “Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability” 1993 Acta Juridica 35-46 36. 
65
 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 221. In the case law there has also been a 
preference for the determination theory. See for example Scalabrino Centre Cape Town v Minister of Home 
Affairs [2012] ZAWCHC 147 (25 July 2012); Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) 
SA 55 (CC). 
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that is not compatible with the way in which “deprivation” is interpreted in section 25 of the 
Constitution. It shifts the focus to the justification of the existence of limitations, instead of 
focusing on the requirements for valid regulation and justification for its effects. The latter 
focus is more appropriate in the constitutional setting, because the point of departure is that 
all rights are constitutionally-framed and therefore held subject to the inherent possibility of 
regulation. The language in PAJA highlights the importance of adopting a systemic approach 
to the regulation of the use of property in the constitutional context, since regulation is a 
constitutional device that fulfils a variety of functions in the constitutional system, and the 
underlying theoretical approach should be consistent across the system.   
When considering the case law dealing with the interpretation of “material and adverse 
effect”, it seems as though the requirement is easily met.66 In the property law context, this 
could mean any regulatory action that amounts to deprivation of property will also materially 
and adversely affect the rights of a person or the public, since in effect any change or even 
the mere capacity to affect rights in future would suffice to satisfy the requirements.
67
 Van 
der Walt raises the possibility that the courts might require a litigant to prove that her section 
25(1) right had been materially and adversely affected in order to gain access to PAJA’s 
                                            
66
 See for example Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) para 
23, where it was held that the adverse effect on rights required by the definition of administrative action was not 
only an immediate or immediately threatening impact resulting from a decision, but referred also to conduct that 
only had the capacity to affect rights in future. This obiter statement by the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
confirmed in Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 37 and Allpay Consolidated Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 
(1) SA 604 (CC) para 60. Also see the remarks by Chaskalson P in Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) para 101 where the “tentative” view is expressed that 
procedural fairness might be a requirement for administrative decisions affecting “a material interest short of an 
enforceable or prospective right”. But see Hoexter C “The principle of legality in South African administrative 
law” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 165-185 179 where it is pointed out that these remarks by Chaskalson P 
was made without specific reference to PAJA. 
67
 Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 
para 23. 
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procedural fairness provisions, which would make it necessary to prove that she had been 
arbitrarily deprived of property in terms of section 25(1) and, if that can be proven, recourse 
to PAJA might not be necessary.
68
 While this may be true where a claim is based on a 
litigant’s section 25(1) right, PAJA’s scope is potentially much broader and could also be 
applicable where a property right (as understood in the private law context) or a legitimate 
expectation had been affected by administrative action.
69
 
The protection of expectations is a complicated (and to a certain extent controversial) 
theme in both property law and administrative law. The principles of property law offer 
substantive protection for what is sometimes referred to as the reliance interest in property.
70
 
However, not every expectation is recognised as property in terms of section 25(1),
71
 nor is 
every expectation protected as a legitimate expectation in administrative law.
72
 The 
expectations that can be protected through property law are not the same as the “legitimate 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 267-268; Van der Walt AJ “Procedurally arbitrary 
deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 88-94 92. 
69
 See Govender K “An assessment of section 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 as a means 
of advancing participatory democracy in South Africa” (2003) 18 South African Public Law 403-429 414, where 
it is explained that all “pre-existing” rights, such as contractual, delictual and property rights will qualify as 
rights under PAJA. In Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) a generous 
interpretation of rights was clearly preferred, since the Constitutional Court did not require a contractual right 
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 Singer JW “The reliance interest in property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611-751 622; Davidson NM 
“Property’s morale” (2011) 110 Michigan Law Review 437-488 439; Lovett JA “Property and radically changed 
circumstances” (2007) 74 Tennessee Law Review 463-566 475-476. 
71
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 119, 123. As far as so-called “new property” is 
concerned (an area where legitimate expectations feature), both German and US law only recognise and protect 
certain expectations in property law, for instance an expectation that is somehow supported by own investment. 
However, even where the expectation includes “own investment”, it would only entitle the holder to due process 
protection in US law. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 167; Van der Walt AJ 
“Protecting social participation rights within the property paradigm: A critical reappraisal” in Cook E (ed) 
Modern studies in property law: Volume 7 (2003) 27-41 28.  
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 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 421. 
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expectations” as understood in terms of section 3 of PAJA,73 although the underlying 
justification for a measure of protection may be similar.
74
 In terms of PAJA, legitimate 
expectations can be protected, but an applicant is usually only entitled to procedural relief.
75
 
One final aspect worth mentioning is that of remedies. Section 8 of PAJA sets out a list of 
the possible remedies that are available in judicial review proceedings. Although the list is 
extensive, the essence of review proceedings remain focused on procedural aspects and not 
on substantive relief. In this sense there may be a significant difference in outcome, 
depending on the source of law that is applied to a matter. In the next section the common 
features of both fields of law in relation to the regulation of property are set out.  
 
4 4 Overlap and non-overlap cases 
Within a complex system, such as the legal system, there are many sub-components and 
interdependencies between sub-systems.
76
 It is also to be expected that there would be some 
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 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 421 is of the opinion that the interpretation of 
legitimate expectations in section 3 of PAJA is informed by case law that was decided on the topic before PAJA 
came into force and that “pre-PAJA” case law still inform the development of legitimate expectations in South 
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 Possible reasons for protection include reliance, accountability and rationality. See Premier, Mpumalanga v 
Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) paras 63-65. 
Also see Brand D & Murcott M “Administrative law” (2013) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review 2.3.4. 
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 However, in KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 2013 (4) SA 262 
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Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 
(CC).  
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areas of overlap in a system, but for a system to be efficient, sustainable and to develop 
holistically, the areas of overlap should be justifiable, and not the result of careless 
development. The dangers of parallel development within the system are addressed below, 
but it is necessary to first set out here the area of overlap that forms the focus of this chapter, 
namely the overlap between the regulation of property and the right to just administrative 
action. However, case law shows that it is not enough to set out the potential overlap, because 
the overlap might not be readily identifiable. Case law also shows that even in non-overlap 
cases, there is a relationship between property and administrative justice, with the principles 
of administrative law being applied to non-administrative action cases. Therefore I also 
explore the importance of developments in non-overlap areas for two reasons: firstly to 
determine whether similar constitutional values are pursued in non-overlap areas, and 
secondly to establish what the advantages are of keeping developments in both overlap and 
non-overlap cases linked in some way.  
The idea of overlap and non-overlap cases was first raised by Quinot and Liebenberg. 
They were specifically interested in reasonableness as a constitutional notion that features in 
two constitutional contexts, namely as a standard of review in socio-economic rights and in 
administrative justice jurisprudence.
77
 Quinot and Liebenberg note that the relationship 
between the development of reasonableness in these two areas of law was largely left 
unanalysed and viewed as two distinct legal developments. The authors argue that 
reasonableness, properly understood, represents a single, coherent model of review that can 
potentially give substantive content to socio-economic rights. Their analysis shows the extent 
to which substantive considerations can be taken into account in judicial review, and 
highlights the importance of developing “a truly post-constitutional conception of 
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 Refer to Chapter 5 for a brief discussion of general systems theory.  
77
 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 639-641.  
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administrative-law review”, to reflect a constitutional understanding of the role of 
administrative-law review “as part of administrative justice within a justiciable bill of 
rights.”78 
I discuss “overlap” and “non-overlap” cases in this chapter specifically in the context of 
property law and administrative law. “Overlap” cases refer to cases where both property law 
and administrative law are applicable, in other words cases involving review of 
administrative action that impact on property,
79
  while “non-overlap” cases refer specifically 
to cases where the matter falls within the ambit of either property law or administrative law, 
but not both. For purposes of this dissertation, non-overlap cases would typically be cases 
where the regulation of the use of property involves no administrative action, but it can also 
refer to cases that do not focus on property as such, but that can still have an impact on the 
approach to the regulation of property indirectly. Overlap cases, as well as related 
developments in non-overlap cases, present opportunities to align the development of 
constitutional notions such as reasonableness and non-arbitrariness, and to consider the 
(possible) justification for existing parallel developments. The rest of this chapter therefore 
attempts a similar undertaking as that of Quinot and Liebenberg, with reference to 
developments in section 25(1) and administrative justice jurisprudence.  
In overlap cases (cases where administrative action has an impact on property) the 
subsidiarity principles indicate that the applicable regulatory framework is that of PAJA. 
Property law principles will have some role to play in these cases, but the interaction between 
the regulatory systems is usually not problematic, since administrative law almost always 
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 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 641.  
79
 The overlap between sections 25 and 33 occurs in various areas of law, including for instance expropriation 
law, planning law and environmental law. 
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works with a “substantive regulatory program”.80 The nature of administrative law is to 
regulate “the process by which regulation occurs”.81 However, the relationship between the 
substantive content of the property-related regulation and the regulatory framework of PAJA 
is not the focus of this chapter.  
Another dimension of interaction refers to Quinot and Lienbenberg’s argument regarding 
the normative content of reasonableness review under PAJA. In the context of the regulation 
of the use of property, property law principles can influence the normative content of the 
administrative-law review, although section 25(1) does not function as the constitutional 
framework of control over the regulation itself. This means that both section 25 and 33 of the 
Constitution can be applicable to a dispute where regulation is brought about by 
administrative action, but PAJA is the framework that fulfils the secondary regulatory 
function.  
Where PAJA is applicable, litigants should not be permitted to sidestep its provisions and 
rely directly on section 25 (to obtain some advantage or because of practical difficulties with 
basing their cause of action on PAJA) since this can have unintended systemic consequences. 
This point can be illustrated with reference to Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town.
82
 In Chapter 1, I explain how the facts of the APD case show how difficult it is 
to determine the appropriate framework to fulfil the secondary regulatory function.
83
 The 
Constitutional Court briefly considered the possibility of adjudicating APD with reference to 
the provisions of PAJA, but concluded that the developer would face “a legion of obstacles” 
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 Consider Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) as an example of this interaction. Also see 
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public power” (2004) 19 South African Public Law 489-512 490.  
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203 
 
with administrative judicial review, and opted to rely on the framework of section 25(2) 
instead. These obstacles included the 180-day time bar in PAJA, difficulty with finding a 
decision to impugn and the possible review grounds in PAJA. The Court also referred to the 
question of whether Arun was obliged to first seek review or to exhaust other possible 
remedies before seeking compensation.
84
 It is questionable whether the Court’s reasoning 
regarding the practical difficulties with bringing a case for judicial review is convincing, 
especially given its previous statement in MEC for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v 
Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd
85
 that practical difficulties with PAJA do not justify side 
stepping its provisions.
86
 The confusion that APD left in its wake regarding the existence of a 
doctrine of constructive expropriation and the status of ex lege expropriation shows that it 
might have been preferable if the Court had faced the practical difficulties of applying PAJA 
head-on. Because of Arun’s interest in claiming compensation for the ex lege transfer of 
excess land, they framed their case as an expropriation challenge with reference to section 
25(2) of the Constitution. The single-system-of-law principle, together with the subsidiarity 
principles, indicates that this preference should not necessarily be allowed. Systemically, 
there are good reasons for limiting litigants’ choice of cause of action to avoid the 
(unjustifiable) creation of parallel paths of litigation.
87
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 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) paras 11-12, 24-28, 66. 
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In non-overlap, non-administrative action cases (where the use of property is regulated ex 
lege by the common law, legislation or the Constitution, or through acts of the executive) 
PAJA is not applicable and a different regulatory system should “regulate the regulation”. 
The most obvious option is the regulatory framework of section 25 of the Constitution, and 
with reference to acts of the executive, the principle of legality.
88
 However, the complicating 
factor in these typical non-overlap cases is that the principles of administrative law are often 
still applied indirectly, despite the lack of administrative action.
89
 I return to this point below. 
A recent example that highlights the importance of engaging with the area of overlap 
between regulation and administrative justice is Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the 
Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern 
Cape and Others.
90
 In the Shoprite case an existing regulatory regime was amended by the 
Eastern Cape Liquor Act,
91
 with the consequence that certain categories of rights under the 
previous regime were abolished. What was challenged was “a legislative change to the 
regulatory framework for the sale of liquor, not its administrative enforcement.”92 However, 
the role of administrative law was potentially relevant in a different context, as appears from 
Moseneke DCJ’s judgment. Moseneke DCJ points out that not all interests need protection as 
“property” for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, because of South Africa’s 
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 The role and relevance of the principle of legality is discussed in section 4.6.2 below.  
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 See for example Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government 
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Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 255.  
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 10 of 2003. 
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 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) para 30.  
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expansive Bill of Rights, especially the expansive administrative justice protections.
93
 Here 
we see the interplay between constitutional property law and administrative justice, not to 
determine the appropriate regulatory framework to review the regulation of the use of 
property, but as an antecedent question to determine whether an interest ought to be 
recognised as property at all.  
The implications of the tendency to not explicitly address and engage with the area of 
overlap between the regulation of the use of property and administrative justice are discussed 
in more detail below. Ultimately, the area of overlap should not be seen in a negative light. 
Quinot argues in favour of a “constructive alliance” between provisions in the Constitution 
and explains that in order for such an alliance to develop the courts must engage with the 
possible overlaps, and consciously and meticulously develop the law to create a coherent 
system that reflects the “desired characteristics” envisioned by the Constitution.94 In the next 
section, the problem of unjustified parallel developments in the constitutional legal system is 
set out in more detail. 
 
4 5 Parallel development 
The idea of a unified constitutional legal system (as opposed to a fragmented legal system) is 
a central theme of this chapter, where I consider a variety of legal developments and the 
extent to which they are judicially developed or extended, to the point where overlaps or 
parallels exist within the system.  
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 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) para 115.  
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 Quinot G “An administrative law perspective on ‘bad building’ evictions in the Johannesburg inner city” 
(2007) 8 ESR Review 25-28 28. See Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 26-34 for a discussion of 
the “desired characteristics” of the property law system in particular. 
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A number of potential parallel systems come to mind in the context of the regulation of the 
use of property. Firstly, there is the risk of two distinct systems developing on the basis of the 
Constitution and legislation, respectively. This is a parallel system in respect of the sources of 
law. Similarly, it is possible that parallel systems develop based on either the Constitution or 
legislation on the one hand, and the principles of the common law on the other.
95
  
The second potential parallel system is between fields of law, where the scope of 
application of two fields with reference to the applicability of the other area of law is not 
worked out properly. This can lead to so-called cherry-picking by litigants, which can result 
in similar cases having (unjustifiably) different outcomes. The obvious example for purposes 
of this dissertation is the regulatory frameworks created by section 25 and section 33 of the 
Constitution.  
Closely related to this issue of parallel systems based on two fields of law, is the notion of 
parallel legal developments of constitutional notions. These parallel notions create problems 
for the single-system-of-law principle in the constitutional sphere, unless their existence can 
be justified. One example of this kind of parallel development is the notion of “meaningful 
engagement”. Meaningful engagement was arguably developed instead of building on 
existing principles of administrative law in the housing context. In section 4.6.4 below I 
consider the systemic implications of creating a parallel constitutional notion to function in a 
specific constitutional space, such as housing.  
Below, I analyse the development of the following constitutional notions, namely legality, 
procedural fairness, procedural arbitrariness, procedural rationality, meaningful engagement, 
substantive arbitrariness, and reasonableness. The purpose of the discussion is to analyse the 
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 Consider the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach of creating a constitutional remedy instead of developing 
the common law in Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 (6) 
SA 511 (SCA). Also see Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 86.  
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content, application, similarities and differences between these notions, and also to consider 
the constitutional objective or value that is pursued by each of these constitutional notions. 
The most obvious advantage of linking developments across fields of law is the opportunity 
to further develop the single system of law under the Constitution.  Toward the end of this 
chapter, I consider whether the principle of legality can provide the necessary “linking 
device” to align constitutional notions on a normative level. 
As mentioned above, there are considerable advantages to be had by keeping 
developments in distinct fields somehow linked, although it is necessary to also consider 
whether there is something unique to the property context which would justify some extent of 
parallel development. Even a coherent system might offer different routes to get to the same 
place (or to reach the same objectives) and therefore the focus of the discussion below is to 
determine when the existence of alternative routes is problematic. Not all parallel 
developments are problematic, because there may be cases where parallel development is 
justified. One possible justification is development within a specific context as opposed to a 
more generic context, where specialised developments pursue constitutional commitments in 
different ways, with the result that the development is therefore not truly parallel, although it 
might appear parallel to existing mechanisms or principles at first. Considering property’s 
function in society and its close connection to other rights such as autonomy, dignity and 
equality, it is possible that there are instances where this justification might feature.
 96
 Giving 
special consideration (in the form of an alternative litigation route or special legal 
development) to cases where the subject-matter of regulation is property might be necessary 
in certain cases to combat the presumptive power of property and the weight of common 
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law.
97
  However, despite property’s social and economic value, it remains a right that is 
subject to limitation and the importance of property should therefore not be inflated for the 
wrong reasons.
98
 Moseneke DCJ recently alluded to the “special” nature of property (albeit in 
a different context) when he stated that:  
 
“[i]f a liquor licence is seen as ‘property’ then a strong entitlement is created in the hands of 
the licence holder. This would tip the scales and arguably diminish the ability of the Legislature 
to effectively regulate an industry where regulation is of paramount importance.”99 
 
Although Moseneke DCJ’s reasoning in this regard was aimed at the question of whether an 
interest (a liquor licence) ought to be recognised as property for purposes of section 25(1), it 
underlines the importance of how the relationship between property and regulation is 
conceptualised in light of the Constitution. Protection of an interest as property in terms of 
section 25(1) should not have the effect of insulating the interest from social control, in the 
form of statutory regulation. The view that a property right is fundamentally unregulated and 
protected to the extent of making regulation almost impossible is not in line with the notion 
of property as a constitutionally-framed right, which derives protection from the Constitution 
only to the extent which the system allows. This means that the level of protection awarded 
must be determined with reference to the rights in and normative framework of the 
Constitution as a whole.  
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What makes the Shoprite case particularly interesting for purposes of this dissertation is 
that both Froneman J and Moseneke DCJ’s judgments indicate the necessity of engaging with 
the role that property and regulation should play in the legal system and in society. Both 
judgments arguably include some systemic considerations, insofar as Froneman J finds in 
favour of a constitutional conception of property, and Moseneke DCJ considers what other 
(constitutional) mechanisms are available to protect the interest in question, without having to 
protect it as “constitutional property”.100 In this regard, Moseneke DCJ mentions South 
Africa’s expansive notion of administrative justice, and its potential for addressing executive 
excess.  
Parallel developments arguably arise when either the existence of an area of overlap 
between the regulatory systems is not recognised or when the relevance of a similar 
constitutional notion is overlooked. Cilliers (a proponent of complexity theory) explains that 
if a complex system is not properly structured, it can lead to random behaviour.
101
 When the 
area of overlap between areas of law or sources of law is not properly worked out, there is 
arguably too little structure (“too many degrees of freedom”) which can lead to 
inconsistency.
102
 Therefore, the design of the structure of the system is of utmost importance. 
Van der Walt describes the desirable characteristics for a constitutional property system, and 
his work on the development of subsidiarity principles is arguably an attempt to create a 
suitable structure for the system to function in a non-arbitrary way.
103
 The systemic 
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constitutional approach proposes a methodology to address the area of overlap between 
property and administrative justice to incorporate greater structure into the constitutional 
property system, as a way of avoiding the arbitrary creation of parallel systems. 
 
4 6 Developments in overlap and non-overlap cases 
4 6 1 Background 
The golden thread in the relevant case law is the acknowledgement that in constitutional 
disputes valid considerations and arguments are often put forth by both parties and what is 
needed is not necessarily a determination of entitlements, but rather a reconciliation or 
accommodation of competing values and interests.
104
 This is a theme in administrative law, 
socio-economic rights and property law jurisprudence. However, it is clear from the 
haphazard development of certain principles, mechanisms and remedies that the courts 
respond to this challenge inconsistently and often without adequate consideration regarding 
the impact that the decision in a given case could have on the rest of the system of law.  
There are two regulatory systems that regulate the imposition of limitations on property. 
The one framework is based on section 25 and property law principles; the other is based on 
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 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
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section 33 of the Constitution, together with PAJA. Although these two frameworks fulfil 
different functions, they remain interconnected and should ideally function and develop as a 
coherent whole, as sub-components of the system of regulation of the use of property in a 
constitutional legal system.
105
  
Quinot and Liebenberg explore similar issues in relation to the area of overlap between the 
right to just administrative action and various socio-economic rights. They explain that if 
administrative action impacts on a socio-economic right, that right determines (or at least 
influences) the normative context of reasonableness review.
106
 This should arguably also be 
true for property, which is a fundamental right, albeit not a socio-economic right.
107
  It is 
easier to see the connection and influence of developments in cases where there is an overlap 
between two areas of law, such as administrative law impacting on socio-economic rights, or 
in the context of this dissertation, where regulatory measures are imposed on the use of 
property by administrative action.
108
  The link between two fields of law in non-overlap cases 
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is less obvious, but within the systemic approach it is important to consider the constitutional 
legal system in its totality. In the following sections, I argue that the developments in overlap 
as well as non-overlap cases are relevant with regard to the regulation of the use of property. 
The argument is based on descriptive and normative considerations, which are set out in more 
detail below. 
In this section developments in overlap and non-overlap cases are analysed to identify the 
implications (if any) of these developments for the single-system-of-law principle. I discuss 
the following developments because of their apparent (but largely unanalysed) similarities or 
discrepancies. I limit the analysis to legality, procedural fairness, meaningful engagement, 
arbitrariness and reasonableness. The history and controversial aspects of each development 
are discussed only insofar as necessary to illustrate the possible links to and relationship with 
developments in other areas of the law, since an in-depth engagement with each concept is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
4 6 2 The role and function of the principle of legality  
The role of the principle of legality has been the topic of much debate. In this section I take a 
closer look at the content and function of this principle and consider its role in the 
constitutional legal system to determine how it functions in relation to the regulation of the 
use of property. 
Legality serves two distinct purposes in South African law, firstly as an overarching and 
informing value that influences the interpretation and application of law,
109
 and secondly as a 
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 ed OS 2 2005) 11-1 – 11-44 at 11-3 explains that legality 
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free-floating basis to assess or review public conduct.
110
 All public power ought to be 
exercised in accordance with the principle of legality.
111
 References to “legality” or “the 
principle of legality” abound in case law and academic texts, but different, although related, 
meanings are often attached to the term. For instance, legality is used in the context of 
assessing whether conduct is legal, referring to the lawfulness of the conduct. This type of 
reference is prevalent in planning law cases, for example, where the legality of building plans 
is often disputed.
112
 But, as Price explains, legality refers to more than authority or lawfulness 
and can also serve as a ground for review of public actions (other than administrative actions) 
on the basis of their rationality.
113
 Rationality, as the substantive component of legality, is a 
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variable standard, much like reasonableness and arbitrariness, and can even include 
considerations of a procedural nature. This is sometimes referred to as “procedural 
rationality”.114 The decision of the appropriate intensity of constitutional rationality review is 
informed by two principles, namely the democratic principle and institutional competence.
115
 
Case law shows that two aspects of the principle of legality are problematic; both are 
discussed in more detail below. The primary concern is that the content of legality is unclear. 
For example, several important court decisions reached different conclusions on whether or 
not legality includes a procedural fairness component. The second problematic aspect is 
determining the realm of application, or when litigants are allowed to rely on the principle of 
legality. Application of this principle has not been uniform, and the possibility exists that the 
principle of legality is used to circumvent the provisions of PAJA in conflict with the single-
system-of-law principle. 
Initially, legality was understood to mean that public power must be exercised in 
accordance with law, since the principle of legality was based on the rule of law.
116
 The 
content of the principle was expanded through case law, for example in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, where the Constitutional Court held that it included a component of 
rationality.
117
 “[A]n expansive notion of legality” was introduced by Sachs J in his minority 
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judgment in the New Clicks (CC) decision.
118
 This broad notion of legality includes a 
substantive reasonableness component as well as a procedural fairness component and 
expands the initial understanding of the principle of legality.
119
 However, in Masetlha v 
President of the Republic of South Africa
120
 the Constitutional Court declined to extend the 
principle of legality to include a procedural fairness component.
121
 In light of the remarks by 
the majority in Masetlha it seems as though the content of the principle of legality can be 
regarded as settled, namely that it does not include a procedural fairness requirement.
122
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 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa & Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 77. However, 
Ngcobo J (with Madala J concurring) dissented, stating that the principle of legality did provide a legal basis for 
a right to procedural fairness. Interestingly, Ngcobo J referred to the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
term “arbitrary” to include a procedural component in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) and argued that FNB illustrates the point that procedural fairness is a 
part of the normative framework introduced by the Constitution. See especially paras 181-187 of Ngcobo J’s 
minority judgment in Masetlha. Also see the discussion by Klaaren J & Penfold G “Just administrative action” 
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 See Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa & Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) paras 77-81 
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Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court revisited the issue of a procedural fairness element as 
part of the principle of legality in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation.
123
 In this case, participation was linked to the requirements for rationality 
instead of procedural fairness.
124
 Moreover, Ngcobo CJ expressly emphasised the specific 
context of the particular case and the decision should therefore not be regarded as authority to 
include procedural fairness in the principle of legality generally.
125
  
As was mentioned previously, the application of the principle of legality is somewhat 
controversial. The principle of legality is a ground for review in circumstances where PAJA 
is not applicable to a matter, since all public power is subject to the rule of law.
126
 However, 
recent case law suggests that litigants and judges are tempted to avoid PAJA, even where it is 
applicable, in favour of the more flexible principle of legality.
127
 For purposes of this 
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 ed 2012) 419-420.  
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 New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang NO 2005 (2) SA 530 (C). Also see Hoexter C 
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 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2
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may be used to circumvent the time-restraints in PAJA, which sets a six month time limit to institute review 
proceedings. Hoexter also explains that the more onerous procedural rules for judicial review under PAJA might 
make review in terms of legality even more attractive. See Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review of 
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dissertation, the question whether legality has any role to play in property regulation disputes 
is worthwhile to consider.  
On the assumption that the principle of legality is only permissible as the basis for a claim 
when PAJA is not applicable, two scenarios come to mind regarding the regulation of 
property where legality could be relevant. Firstly, the principle of legality can be used as an 
independent cause of action to review executive action that has an impact on the use of 
property. Furthermore, because of the highly technical nature of the definition of 
administrative action in section 1 of PAJA, it is possible that certain actions that closely 
resemble administrative action might fail to meet the criteria for administrative action in 
terms of PAJA.
128
 Consequently, the provisions of PAJA will not apply to the dispute and a 
litigant may decide to base her claim on the principle of legality instead of relying directly on 
section 25(1), although the advantage(s) of doing so are unclear. Secondly, the principle of 
legality in the narrower sense of authorisation can play a role in informing the “law of general 
application” requirement of section 25(1).  
Perhaps a more likely scenario is the case alluded to above, namely that the provisions of 
PAJA are applicable to a dispute, but a litigant chooses to rely on the (arguably) more 
flexible principle of legality to attack the offensive administrative measure. Alternatively, in a 
case where PAJA ought to have been applied but that option is no longer available to a 
litigant because of the time-restraints in PAJA the litigant may opt to rely on the principle of 
legality.
129
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 Section 7 of PAJA sets a time limit within which an application for review must be brought, but section 9 
provides for a variation of that time frame under certain circumstances. The time constraints in PAJA was 
briefly mentioned in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC) para 66 
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Although legality could perhaps theoretically form the basis of a claim for review in these 
circumstances, the principle of legality has a very limited scope of application in cases where 
the property clause is applicable, because the wording of section 25 covers everything that 
would generally be covered by legality. The Constitutional Court interpreted section 25(1) in 
a wide and generous manner, and made provision for the possibility of thin rationality review 
or thick proportionality review under the substantive non-arbitrariness requirement. Section 
25(1) accordingly requires lawfulness, reasonableness (in the form non-arbitrariness that goes 
further than the principle of legality) and even procedural fairness. Therefore, there is no need 
to resort to direct reliance on the principle of legality. However, where litigants rely directly 
on section 25, implicit reliance on legality via the constitutional provision might still be 
possible.  
A contrary position is adopted by Roux, who argues that section 25 should only ever be 
relied on directly as a last resort and that reliance on the principle of legality in these 
scenarios would be preferable to direct reliance on section 25(1).
130
 Referring to the example 
of executive action that effects a deprivation of property, Roux argues that the executive 
action in question would be reviewable both under section 25(1) and in terms of the principle 
of legality, but indicates that the preferred approach is to test the executive action as a 
possible violation of the principle of legality and not as an arbitrary deprivation of property 
under the property clause. Roux’s example arguably illustrates the point that regulatory 
measures brought about by executive action could be dealt with differently than, for example, 
direct statutory deprivation or common law regulation, although it is not completely clear 
why legality would be preferred to section 25(1). 
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 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) 
vol 3 (2
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 ed RS 5 2013) 46-1 – 46-37 at 46-26. 
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Another indication that the assumption referred to above might not be correct, is the 
decision in Aboobaker NO and Others v Serengeti Rise Body Corporate and Another,
131
 
which seems to support the idea that legality can apply alongside the provisions of PAJA.
132
 
In this case, the principle of legality is not an independent cause of action, but rather a 
constitutional notion that supplements the review proceedings.
133
 However, the High Court 
does not engage with the interaction between the principle of legality and the provision of 
PAJA in detail, but it will be interesting to see if this approach is adopted in subsequent 
cases.  
Insofar as the principle of legality operates as a safety net to control exercises of public 
power (which fall outside of administrative action), it can be used as an independent ground 
of review. However, the framework of section 25(1) is more context-specific and should 
arguably be relied on where possible, instead of opting for the more general principle of 
legality. By adopting a uniform approach, the legal system is safeguarded from unjustified 
parallel development. However, indirect reliance on the principle of legality, as a normative 
notion to assist with the interpretation or application of law, is arguably still possible.  
The principle of legality clearly has a role to play as a basis for judicial review of non-
administrative actions.
134
 However, insofar as it is seen or utilised as a way of circumventing 
the application of provisions of PAJA, it is a regrettable development, especially in light of 
the single-system-of-law principle. The effect of allowing the principle of legality to subsume 
PAJA’s functions is to allow the creation of parallel routes to challenge administrative 
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action.
135
 It does not create parallel systems when legality is relied on to challenge executive 
action (as opposed to administrative action) because the action does not fall within the ambit 
of PAJA. However, if the executive action can be challenged on the basis of either section 
25(1) of the Constitution or the principle of legality, section 25(1) as the more specific 
provision, should be used to protect the affected right. The necessary deference can be shown 
to the executive by employing a lower level of scrutiny of the action within the framework of 
section 25(1), instead of relying on the principle of legality.    
In the following section, the notion of procedural fairness in terms of section 33 of the 
Constitution and sections 3 and 4 of PAJA is compared to the notion of procedural non-
arbitrariness as understood in terms of the jurisprudence on section 25(1). 
 
4 6 3 Procedural fairness 
Section 33 of the Constitution guarantees the right to just administrative action that is, 
amongst other things, procedurally fair. Sections 3 and 4 of PAJA aim to give effect to this 
aspect of the right by setting out what is considered to be procedurally fair administrative 
action, whilst leaving scope for an administrator to consider contextual factors and depart 
from the suggested procedure. Procedural fairness is therefore essentially a flexible and 
contextual concept.
136
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 See the criticism levelled against the approach of the Constitutional Court in Albutt by Murcott M 
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Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC) paras 113-114. 
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Because of the inherent flexibility of procedural fairness, it has the potential to promote a 
rich conception of administrative justice. Quinot emphasises the importance of procedural 
fairness in various contexts where administrative law principles are applicable and argues that 
it has the potential to help realise socio-economic rights, if interpreted and developed 
correctly.
137
 Procedural fairness has an important role to play in realising a variety of 
constitutional objectives and to improve administrative decision-making in general. Firstly, it 
has the potential to ensure that all relevant considerations are brought to the attention of the 
administrator before a decision is made.
138
 This aspect of procedural fairness could be 
particularly significant in the property context, where considerations other than the rights of 
the property owner could influence the decision.
139
 Secondly, having proper regard for the 
link between procedural fairness, especially participation, and the dignity of persons who 
stand to be affected by the decision can encourage the development of a rich conception of 
procedural fairness in the hope of realising the ideal of administrative justice and supporting 
other constitutional rights and values.
140
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This argument carries significant weight in housing and eviction cases, since the 
Constitutional Court explicitly stated that “people in need of housing are not, and must not be 
regarded as a disempowered mass”.141 More generally, this argument is linked to ongoing 
debates in administrative justice jurisprudence regarding the intrinsic value of procedural 
fairness.
142
 Both these aspects of procedural fairness are closely linked to the development of 
meaningful engagement (as a requirement and as a remedy) which is discussed in more detail 
below.  
A possible obstacle to a rich conception of procedural fairness is the terminology and 
requirements set out in PAJA, such as the requirement that administrative action must have 
an adverse as well as a direct, external legal effect, which could mean that preliminary 
decisions or investigations are excluded from PAJA’s scope. Essentially, this means that 
procedural fairness need only be observed during the final stage of decision making.
143
 
Despite this potentially limiting effect of PAJA, courts have on occasion recognised that even 
preliminary decisions may have severe consequences and that the procedural fairness 
provisions ought to be applicable to them.
144
 Section 33 itself does not contain a similar 
limitation on the right to procedurally fair administrative action and that the argument may 
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thus be made that PAJA may be unconstitutional in introducing these limitations or may have 
to be read expansively to avoid such a restrictive finding (as the Court in Joseph has arguably 
done).
145
   
However, in the housing context (where preliminary inquiries could ultimately have 
extremely serious consequences for occupiers) this restriction is one factor that has arguably 
contributed to the development of an alternative mechanism outside of the framework of 
PAJA to ensure participation. Meaningful engagement is essentially a judicial creation 
intended to address the need for inclusive and participatory decision-making in the housing-
context. It is the focus of the following section.  
The interpretation and development of procedural fairness in administrative law is 
potentially relevant for the approach to similar concepts in other areas of the law. For 
instance, procedural fairness is not explicitly required by section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
but the reference to arbitrariness was judicially interpreted to include both a substantive and a 
procedural component.
146
 This notion was accepted in subsequent case law and from these 
decisions it seems clear that procedural fairness in the context of section 25(1) corresponds 
closely (if not exactly) with what administrative law jurisprudence considers to constitute 
procedural fairness.
147
 The emphasis on the flexibility of the concept and the importance of 
determining fairness in a particular context echoes the content of sections 3 and 4 of PAJA.
148
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The procedural aspect of arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) was addressed in 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng,
149
 where the Constitutional Court held that 
procedural arbitrariness is a flexible concept that cannot be defined or interpreted without 
reference to the relevant circumstances. Van der Walt suggests that the Mkontwana decision 
can be seen as an indication that the procedural fairness of a deprivation will be evaluated on 
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a similar basis as the test for procedural fairness in the context of just administrative action.
150
 
Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government
151
 confirmed what was said in Mkontwana regarding the nature and 
content of the test for procedural arbitrariness.
152
 
In National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others
153
 and Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport and Others154 the Constitutional Court further engaged with 
the notion of procedural arbitrariness and held that a statutory provision which leaves no 
discretion to the court to make an order under the section in question would be procedurally 
arbitrary.
155
 Both Opperman and Chevron are examples of direct statutory deprivation, where 
there is no administrative action involved, and are therefore dealt with exclusively in the 
domain of section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
Procedural arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) seems to correspond closely to 
procedural fairness in the administrative law context, which means that procedural 
arbitrariness must be adjudicated according to administrative justice principles, but under 
section 25(1).
156
 This shows how important it is to determine whether developments of 
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procedural fairness in administrative law will continue to influence the test for procedural 
arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) and vice versa. The normative content of the right to 
procedural fairness could, for example, have been influenced or developed by the courts’ rich 
conceptualisation of a type of procedural protection in the form of meaningful engagement in 
the housing context. 
. 
4 6 4 Meaningful engagement 
Meaningful engagement is a fairly recent development in South African law that was 
introduced by courts in the housing and eviction context.
157
 In this section the development of 
this concept is scrutinised to determine whether there is unjustifiable duplication between 
meaningful engagement and procedural fairness.
158
 
The conceptualisation of “meaningful engagement” was not uncontroversial, and 
uncertainties regarding its scope and application remain.
159
 For example, meaningful 
engagement has been framed as a requirement for reasonable government policy in some 
cases but it has also been employed in the remedial phase of disputes, where courts ordered 
parties to engage meaningfully.
160
 Interestingly, neither section 26 of the Constitution, nor the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) 
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explicitly requires anything that resembles meaningful engagement and therefore neither of 
these instruments can easily be identified as the foundation for the development of this 
concept.
161
 In fact, the basis of meaningful engagement remains unclear. In Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg
162
 
meaningful engagement was linked not only to administrative justice and the value of dignity, 
but it was also said to be grounded in section 26(2) of the Constitution.
163
 In Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes
164
 O’Regan J based the duty to engage 
meaningfully on section 33 of the Constitution. Despite the lack of clarity about the basis of 
meaningful engagement, it seems to now form part of South African law, especially in the 
context of housing, although the concept has been used in other contexts as well.
165
   
Van der Berg argues that meaningful engagement should not be seen as a watering down 
or proceduralisation of socio-economic rights, but rather as a means of informing the content 
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of procedural fairness with normative considerations.
166
 Viewed in this way, meaningful 
engagement “represents an ideal platform on which the interaction between administrative 
justice and socio-economic rights can be further expanded”.167 
However, Quinot argues in favour of a rich conception of procedural fairness to best serve 
the ideal of administrative justice, which would make judicial creations like meaningful 
engagement largely redundant.
168
 The Joseph decision, for example, is indicative of a 
willingness to develop a rich conception of procedural fairness,
169
 but a decision such as 
Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
170
 creates the impression that courts 
might opt for a more formalistic approach, which effectively avoids developing or “fleshing 
out” what administrative justice requires of public action to be considered procedurally 
fair.
171
 The aims and objectives of meaningful engagement are no doubt laudable and yet the 
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same objectives could arguably be reached through the application of procedural fairness, 
which now ought to be characterised by its contextual and flexible nature.
172
  
If the administrative law notion of procedural fairness is developed in the way suggested 
by Quinot, it is possible to argue that procedural non-arbitrariness, as understood in terms of 
section 25(1), ought to be developed in the same manner. As mentioned above, procedural 
non-arbitrariness is based on procedural fairness in administrative law and it therefore seems 
logical that procedural non-arbitrariness should reflect this development.
173
 A 
counterargument for the extension of the procedural fairness provisions in PAJA often runs 
along the lines of being mindful of not over-burdening the administration, because doing so 
would arguably make the administration less efficient. This is a valid concern, but the flexible 
nature of procedural fairness and the provisions in PAJA that allow for a significant measure 
of variability lessen the possibility of paralysing the administration.
174
 
The Constitutional Court remarked that a regulatory approach which includes structured 
engagement before policy decisions are taken is preferable to a situation where engagement is 
mandated by the courts after the government has already committed to a policy.
175
 If this is 
interpreted broadly, it could mean that the obligation to engage meaningfully is not only a 
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duty before a final decision is taken (as would be the case in terms of PAJA), but can and 
should also be observed when preliminary decisions are made, if the impact of the 
preliminary decision is sufficiently serious.  
Meaningful engagement could thus potentially be valuable to persons who do not 
presently qualify for procedural protection in terms of PAJA, presumably in cases where their 
interest does not amount to a right or legitimate expectation or because the offensive action is 
not administrative action.
176
 Despite its possible value, it is not justifiable for courts to rely on 
meaningful engagement when PAJA is applicable to a matter, at the very least not without 
clearly and explicitly addressing the issue and explaining why meaningful engagement is 
preferred. Furthermore, one must consider what the effect of creating a distinct concept to 
facilitate participation is on further development of administrative law under the Constitution, 
which ideally ought to develop away from the formalistic notions of audi alteram partem 
under common law to a more transformative and facilitative concept of participation under 
section 33. Parallel developments pose the real risk of freezing existing law by insulating it 
against the transformative influence of the Constitution, in ways that are simply not 
justifiable and not logical. For instance, if meaningful engagement involves participation in a 
broader range of public action than would be the case under administrative law (for instance 
earlier in the process as well as after a decision has been taken), the question emerges why 
someone should have more participatory entitlements when public action is taken in a form 
other than administrative action than when the public action is taken in terms of 
administrative action. In other words, a person affected by public action amounting to 
executive action will have more opportunity for participation than in the case of public action 
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amounting to administrative action. The exact opposite seems more appropriate from a 
democratic legitimacy point of view. Therefore, even though a specialised context might be 
present, it is not necessarily enough to justify parallel legal development, especially when it 
can have the effect of stultifying much-needed legal development in the potentially applicable 
area of law. Systemically, it is also difficult to explain how meaningful engagement can apply 
to cases where subsidiarity principles indicate that the matter should be resolved in terms of 
PAJA. 
Meaningful engagement emphasises the important role that participation plays in the 
constitutional setting. The development of meaningful engagement (as a form of 
participation) is linked to the discussion regarding the intrinsic value of participation in 
establishing a fair procedure. Recently, this has become quite an important point in case law, 
especially in ongoing debates between the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court.
177
 In the Allpay matter this debate emerges in the question whether action should be 
reviewed for procedural unfairness even though a fair procedure would have made no 
difference to the eventual (substantive) decision of the administrator, which is the view 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal, relying on the concept of the materiality of the 
irregularity.
178
 This approach is rejected by the Constitutional Court, partially based on the 
intrinsic value of procedural fairness.
179
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The notion of participation (and the related considerations of the intrinsic value of 
participation) is also of importance in the property context. For instance, Walsh offers an 
interesting perspective on what she refers to as “the relationship between property and 
participation” in her analysis of trends in English planning law.180 Stated briefly, Walsh 
argues that a central aspect of modern-day English planning law is the statutory rules which 
give owners and interest-holders “a voice” in decision-making processes that affect their 
property. By guaranteeing some kind of role for affected parties, the decision-making process 
is not necessarily focused on either possessory value or exchange value. Through the 
prioritisation of “voice over value”, decision-makers are forced to consider possible 
competing claims to the entitlement and decide what regulatory measure would strike the 
appropriate balance between the private and the public interest.
181
  In the process, these 
participation rights become a source of potential protection for property rights as well as 
other property interests.
182
 
In South African law, property rights are no longer shaped only by the rules of the 
common law. Administrative law plays a significant role in determining how property may be 
used and is also central to ensuring that the property system reflects the proper balance 
between public and private interests in property, as envisioned by the Constitution. It is 
therefore interesting to consider Walsh’s argument, not only as an explanation for what seems 
factually to be the case, namely that property rights are extensively regulated by 
administrative action, but also to consider whether there are any benefits in opting to replace 
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so-called “property rules”, “liability rules” or “inalienability rules” with “participation rules” 
in certain cases.
183
 By prioritising the opportunity to be involved (in some way) in the 
decision-making process, instead of automatically focusing on either the protection of 
possession or value, parties who do not have a traditional property right or interest would 
receive the opportunity to be involved in some way in regulatory decisions affecting their 
interests, which might be of particular social importance, for instance in the housing context. 
Another rationale for participation rules can be inferred from Davidson’s argument that 
people can be motivated to engage with property when they know that even though the 
system can change, the legal system will be responsive and make provision for fair 
adjustment and inclusion.
184
 Participation rules is one way through which inclusivity (and 
arguably also a measure of responsiveness and fairness) in the legal system can be ensured.  
The notion of participation rules does not necessarily have to correspond exactly with the 
procedural fairness requirements that are set out in PAJA, nor should it be understood to refer 
only to direct participation (for example the right to be heard or to make written 
submissions). Instead, it can include any procedure where an interested party is allowed to 
make the decision-maker aware of his interest, even if the interest is not strictly a right or 
legitimate expectation, as would be required in terms of PAJA. Participation rules would 
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mainly be useful in situations where the property interest does not qualify as a right or 
legitimate interest that is protected by certain provisions in PAJA, or when the regulatory 
action is not administrative action. Participation rules, when used appropriately, could ensure 
that deprivations are not arbitrary and therefore not in conflict with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
In a sense, the idea of participation rules links with and reinforces the constitutional values 
of consultation and participatory democracy,
185
 and it is therefore an intriguing notion to 
protect property through participation rules in the South African context.
186
 It is a viable form 
of protection that already exists, for example in planning law,
187
 and can be used in other 
contexts as well. It is a form of property protection that is in line with the constitutional 
emphasis on consultation and participation, and aligns with both the protective and the 
transformative objective of section 25(1). 
Property rules and liability rules will always form part of the property system, but the 
development of participation rules can go some way in guarding against over-inflated or one-
sided protection of property rights. Participation rules have much in common with, for 
example, meaningful engagement, but by linking it to the procedural non-arbitrariness 
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requirement in section 25(1), it gives context to what procedural fairness means in the 
property context without creating a new way of facilitating participation. 
Utilising or developing participation rules to give content to what procedural fairness or 
procedural non-arbitrariness means in the property context is not the same thing as creating a 
distinctly new concept to facilitate participation, such as meaningful engagement. In the case 
of participation rules there would be more certainty regarding its foundation, scope and 
application, and it could be developed in a more structured manner. It represents the same 
opportunity (as meaningful engagement) to go beyond the doctrinal heritage when it comes to 
the regulation of property, and engage with innovative ways to reconceptualise the way in 
which the law protects property. Moreover, it can facilitate a better understanding of the 
function of the regulation of the use of property in a constitutional legal system differently.  
Ultimately, the role and value of participation in the property law context has potential for 
supporting a new regulatory framework for property that exhibits constitutionally desirable 
characteristics. It shows that administrative law principles that develop in non-overlap cases 
can influence the approach to the regulation of the use of property in subsequent overlap and 
non-overlap cases and align the regulatory systems on a normative level. This outcome is in 
line with the objectives of the systemic constitutional approach, namely that it contributes to 
the creation of a single system of law with sub-components that are interrelated and based on 
the same normative framework. 
Thus far, this section sets out the close links between the principle of legality (with a 
possible procedural fairness component), procedural fairness in the administrative law 
context, procedural non-arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) and meaningful engagement 
(as a requirement for just public action, or alternatively as a solution to a dispute in the 
remedial phase of proceedings). Without clear guidelines on the scope and application of 
each of these concepts, there is a very real risk of creating parallel paths of litigation, which 
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would be irreconcilable with the single-system-of-law principle. Furthermore, the discussion 
shows that where related developments in non-overlap cases are ignored there can be 
discrepancies in the way public action is scrutinised, which leads to uncertainty. The systemic 
constitutional approach shows how important it is to choose the appropriate regulatory 
framework. Moreover, it shows that constitutional notions such as legality, procedural 
fairness and meaningful engagement serve similar purposes (albeit in different contexts) and 
should be seen as interconnected mechanisms that promote similar constitutional values. In 
the following section a similar type of development is analysed with reference to substantive 
arbitrariness (required by section 25(1)) and reasonableness (required by section 33 and 
PAJA). 
 
4 6 5 Arbitrariness and reasonableness 
The constitutional protection of property is discussed in depth in Chapter 3. In this section, 
the test for substantive arbitrariness is revisited to highlight some of the commonalities with 
the test for reasonableness in administrative-law review.  
Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property. Because the term “arbitrary” is not defined in the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court had to give content to what “arbitrariness” would entail where the constitutional 
validity of a regulatory measure is challenged in terms of section 25(1). The reference to 
arbitrariness was interpreted to include both a substantive and a procedural element, but only 
the substantive component of arbitrariness is discussed in this section.
188
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The FNB decision focused on the interpretation of section 25(1) and established that 
substantive non-arbitrariness should in certain cases require more than mere rationality.
189
 
FNB determined that substantive arbitrariness inquiries need not always involve exactly the 
same level of scrutiny.
190
 The appropriate test is located on a continuum between thin 
rationality review and thick proportionality review.
191
 However, the point of departure is that 
a deprivation will be substantively arbitrary when the authorising law of general application 
does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation.
192
 Ackermann J, who wrote the 
unanimous judgment, indicated that several factors will be considered to determine whether 
there is “sufficient reason” for a deprivation, so as to render it substantively non-arbitrary.193 
He listed several considerations for evaluating “sufficient reason”, which include the 
relationship between the means used and the ends sought to be achieved, the relationship 
between the aim(s) of the deprivation and the right holder affected by the deprivation, and the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and the extent 
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of the deprivation.
194
 The reason for the deprivation will be tested with reference to a variety 
of contextual factors and these factors will be used to determine the appropriate standard of 
review.
195
 
A similar approach to assess the reasonableness of administrative action was adopted in 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others,
196
 where the 
Court provided a list of factors to assist with the determination of the appropriate standard of 
review on a continuum that ranges from rationality to proportionality.
197
  
However, reasonableness review was not always understood in this way. In the 
administrative law context, where much emphasis is placed on judicial review, the question 
of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a decision can require a consideration of the 
merits of the administrator’s decision, a substantive question which is traditionally not dealt 
with as part of the review process.
198
 Therefore, reasonableness has been one of the most 
challenging requirements for just administrative action as set out in section 33, and the 
content of reasonableness is not objectively clear or uncontroversial.
199
 Hoexter states that 
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reasonableness does not have one single (and uncontested) meaning and argues that at most 
one can safely say that the first element of reasonableness is rationality.
200
  
Section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA provides guidance by stating that an action is reviewable by a 
court or tribunal if it is not rationally connected to either of the following elements: the 
purpose for which it was taken; the purpose of the authorising legislation; the information 
placed before the decision-maker; or the reasons given by the administrator. This formulation 
is broad enough to constitute a “thorough and searching ground of review”.201 However, 
despite the broad formulation of reasonableness in PAJA, Hoexter argues that it covers the 
same ground as many common law grounds of review and is therefore not particularly novel 
or controversial.
202
 Moreover, in terms of the provisions of PAJA, rationality and 
reasonableness cannot be equated with one another because PAJA lists them as two separate 
grounds of review.
203
 Furthermore, reasonableness under section 33 means something 
different from justifiability under section 24 of the Interim Constitution (which meant only 
rationality) and thus reasonableness refers to something more than mere rationality.
204
 This 
provides further support for the argument that reasonableness must extend beyond rationality 
in the constitutional context and although the content of reasonableness is still somewhat 
controversial, it includes a second element, namely proportionality.
205
 Proportionality 
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requires an administrator to consider the effect of a decision, since an imbalance between the 
means and the ends would render the decision disproportionate.
206
 
As was mentioned above, the interpretation of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA was considered in 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others.
207
 The 
Constitutional Court held that what is considered a reasonable decision will depend on the 
facts and circumstances of each case, although there are certain factors that are relevant to 
assess the reasonableness of the decision. These factors include:  
 
“[T]he nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of 
factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing 
interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those 
affected.”208 
 
The list of factors is a useful aid to understand and interpret the reasonableness requirement 
and,
209
 most importantly, the factors confirmed the “inherent variability of 
reasonableness”.210 The level of scrutiny to assess the reasonableness of a decision is thus 
located on a continuum, ranging from rationality-type review to a proportionality-like 
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inquiry.
211
 The element of proportionality is introduced and supported by the last two factors, 
namely that competing interests and the impact of the decision must be considered.
212
  
The idea of a variable standard of review seems to be in line with recent developments in 
English administrative law, but also echoes the approach followed in FNB, where the 
Constitutional Court had to interpret the term “arbitrariness” in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.
213
 However, in Bato Star the Constitutional Court does not refer to its previous 
decision in FNB where a variable standard of review for arbitrariness was introduced.
214
 This 
is not necessarily problematic when the different contexts of the cases are considered, but it is 
interesting to note that the approach to reasonableness review under PAJA and the test for 
substantive arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) are similar, despite the fact that the initial 
formulation and the subsequent development of each are kept separate in case law. 
Quinot and Liebenberg explore the idea that developments regarding reasonableness 
review in administrative law and socio-economic rights are connected to some extent in both 
overlap and non-overlap cases. They argue that a relationship exists between the development 
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of reasonableness in the administrative law context and in the socio-economic rights context 
but that the development of reasonableness in each area has been kept separate.
215
 However, 
there are two characteristics of reasonableness that are the same in administrative law and in 
socio-economic rights.
216
 The one common denominator is the acknowledgement that more 
than one route is available to the state that would pass the standard of reasonableness.
217
 The 
second common denominator is that in both contexts reasonableness is understood as a 
contextual enquiry, meaning that not only the standard of review will differ depending on the 
circumstances, but even the factors taken into consideration to determine that standard will 
vary from case to case.
218
  
The Constitution, especially the rights in the Bill of Rights, is of particular relevance and 
should influence the normative context of reasonableness review.
219
 This means that when 
administrative action impacts on property, section 25 ought to influence the normative 
context of contextual reasonableness in administrative law. This approach would ensure that 
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 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 639. 
216
 Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264-284 277.  
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 Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264-284 277 explains that this means that “appropriate 
leeway” is given to the public entity, thereby acknowledging that it is not up to the courts to decide what the 
“best” way is. Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2nd ed 2012) 347 argues that reasonableness 
ensures an area of “legitimate diversity” in terms of which more than one possible reasonable choice is possible. 
See further Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 645-646. 
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 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 645-646. See Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 45; Khosa v 
Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 44. See 
also Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264-284 277-278. 
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 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 647. 
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the same substantive considerations are considered on review that would be considered if the 
case was decided under section 25, not to pronounce on the correctness of the administrator’s 
decision, but to assess whether the decision falls within a “band” of reasonable decisions on 
the merits.
220
 
Accepting that a close link exists (in some areas) between the regulation of property and 
the right to just administrative action, it may be useful to keep the similarities between these 
two tests in mind. The link between these two fields of law exists on two levels, namely in 
areas of actual overlap (where administrative action has an impact on property) and secondly, 
on a normative level in both overlap and non-overlap cases. Normatively, the purpose and 
role of these two tests serve a very similar function, namely to constrain public power. The 
content of these two tests, especially where the subject matter is the same, should be in line 
with the constitutional framework and produce results which exhibit constitutionally 
desirable characteristics to enable efficient state regulation.
221
 
 
4 6 6 The role of legality reconsidered 
In this section, I explore the possibility whether the principle of legality is a “systemic 
device” to align developments across diverse fields of law to achieve a degree of coherence 
within the constitutional legal system. Ensuring at least some level of coherence, especially in 
non-overlap cases, but also in overlap cases where the overlap is not explicitly recognised, is 
important for systemic legal development. 
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 Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663 646-648, 661 show 
that the normative context is fundamentally important to define the band of reasonable options. 
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  Quinot G & Liebenberg S “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663. 
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Because of the scope of this question, I primarily focus on the role that the principle of 
legality can play within the area of this dissertation, namely in the context of the regulation of 
the use property. The role and function of the principle of legality in the context of section 
25(1) of the Constitution still need to be worked out in more detail, especially with reference 
to the “law of general application requirement” and the general neglect of the authorisation 
question in section 25 cases. Despite the narrow focus here, I recognise the value of 
determining the principle of legality’s importance on a wider normative level. What follows 
are brief remarks regarding the reconciliation between legality’s normative function and the 
trend in case law to use it as an independent cause of action.
222
 
As was explained above, the principle of legality fulfils two different functions in South 
African law. Firstly, it functions as a type of “safety net” to exercise a measure of control 
over conduct that is not administrative action.
223
 Secondly, legality fulfils a normative 
purpose, namely to inform the interpretation and application of other provisions. In this 
section, this second function of legality is considered more closely.  
Constitutional notions of reasonableness, arbitrariness and procedural fairness signal 
commitment to a certain type of society, based on the rule of law. The principle of legality 
arguably presents the opportunity to align these concepts on a higher normative level. The 
principle of legality potentially provides the mechanism for allowing other fields of law to 
influence the normative content and context in non-overlap cases, instead of functioning as an 
independent cause of action. 
                                            
222
 Refer to section 4.6.2 above.  
223
 Du Plessis M & Scott S “The variable standard of rationality review: Suggestions for improved legality 
jurisprudence” (2013) 130 South African Law Journal 597-620 598 argue that the safety net created by the 
principle of legality should cover situations where there is neither administrative action nor an infringement of a 
right in the Bill of Rights. This seems like a sensible position in terms of subsidiarity, although legality is used 
more widely at present. 
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There is a need for conceptual alignment between these constitutional notions, as well as a 
need for greater clarity on how these notions ought to be understood, interpreted, developed 
and applied with reference to each other and to higher level constitutional commitments. 
Insofar as the courts have shown a degree of willingness to engage with the principle of 
legality, it seems a viable mechanism for aligning further development and to create greater 
coherency, if approached not as a same-level alternative to reliance on other grounds, but as a 
higher-level linking device.  
Clearer development and direction on the application of the principle of legality would 
lead to two improvements in this area of the law: firstly, there would be a higher degree of 
certainty.
224
 Secondly, clearer guidelines for legality jurisprudence could then be scrutinised 
by lawyers, academics and courts, to ensure a well-reasoned and principled approach to the 
development of the application of the principle of legality and the variable standard of review 
that goes with it.
225
 
Undeniably there are also problems with this view of the principle of legality, and the 
objectives of achieving and maintaining higher level constitutional commitments could 
possibly be reached through reliance on other constitutional norms as well. Ultimately, the 
tentative suggestions put forth in this chapter can only amount to first steps in a much larger 
debate.   
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4 7 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter makes it possible to draw two primary conclusions in relation to 
overlap and non-overlap cases. Firstly, since administrative law always functions with 
another area of law and the interaction between the two areas of law is usually unproblematic, 
the point of departure is that overlap cases do not present major difficulties. However, case 
law shows that the overlap is not always readily identifiable, and that litigants may want to 
frame their case in such a way that it is adjudicated as a non-overlap case so as to give them a 
choice between two causes of action.
226
  In a constitutional legal system, litigants should not 
be allowed to side-step applicable national legislation. Allowing litigants the unrestricted 
freedom to vindicate their rights in the way that suits them best can result in outcomes that 
are unstructured, unprincipled and inconsistent, with judgments that are difficult to make 
sense of doctrinally.  
Through an extension of the subsidiarity principles, together with the single-system-of-law 
principle, I argue that when the use of property is regulated through administrative action, the 
provisions of PAJA form the applicable framework to fulfil the secondary regulatory 
function. However, both sections 25 and 33 still have important roles to play where property 
is regulated through administrative action, not only to ensure adequate protection of the 
allegedly infringed right, but also to ensure that the appropriate balance between the 
individual interest and the public interest is struck. The principles of administrative law 
should not be applied to property disputes in a way that disrupts the balance that section 25 
aims to create, even if the dispute is adjudicated outside the realm of direct application of 
section 25, and therefore section 25 can inform the normative content of, for example, 
reasonableness review under PAJA. 
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Secondly, non-overlap cases for purposes of this dissertation are described as either 
constitutional property law or administrative law cases, where the cause of action is founded 
on either section 25(1) or (2), or the provisions of PAJA. However, the analysis in this 
chapter shows that administrative law principles are sometimes used in property cases where 
there is no administrative action present, which means that administrative justice principles 
have an impact beyond direct application. This is most notable in cases dealing with 
procedural non-arbitrariness and the principle of legality. This conclusion underscores the 
importance of aligning constitutional notions that fulfil similar functions in different contexts.   
This chapter aims to show that there are connections and relationships between seemingly 
isolated constitutional notions. The development of many of the identified notions is rife with 
problems, for a variety of reasons. Case law on these issues shows that judicial creation or 
extension of mechanisms and principles is not always desirable, even when it leads to a fair 
and presumably correct outcome in one specific case.
227
 The most important point of 
criticism is the uncertainty that follows such a creation or extension. It becomes more 
difficult for litigants to predict potential outcomes, and it adversely impacts on effective and 
efficient administration, because it would not be prospectively clear to an administrator what 
is expected. Moreover, the scope of application is uncertain. This can lead to parallel legal 
development, which is at odds with the single-system-of-law principle.  
Judicial development of constitutional notions such as meaningful engagement is arguably 
a consequence of an overly formalistic approach to legal interpretation or failure to recognise 
that an already existing mechanism exists to fulfil the same purpose, which leads to parallel 
legal developments. Section 33 of the Constitution moved away from the conceptualism of 
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 Consider for example the uncertainty that exists after KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for 
Education, KwaZulu-Natal 2013 (4) SA 262 (CC) and Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, 
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administrative common law as well as the conceptualism that was evident in section 24 of the 
Interim Constitution.
228
 However, certain provisions of PAJA, and especially the definition of 
“administrative action” in section 1, reintroduce the conceptualism that section 33 tried to 
avoid.
229
 Hoexter argues that this “judicial misdirection” places the courts’ focus on whether 
or not a decision is an administrative action, to the detriment of more substantive 
considerations that should be engaged with as well as a move away from what ought to be the 
central question, namely what the requirements for administrative justice in a particular 
dispute are.
230
 A new paradigm for administrative law, beyond what was envisioned in terms 
of the common law and the interim Constitution, can impact on efficient public 
administration in various ways besides the courts’ approach to dispute resolution.  
The focus on conceptual questions, for example whether an action constitutes 
administrative action, arguably reintroduces formalistic legal reasoning into disputes and is 
arguably out of step with the constitutional commitment to a culture of justification.
231
 
Overly-technical judicial reasoning can have an inhibiting effect when it comes to developing 
administrative law, and can even go so far as to encourage courts to develop completely new 
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mechanisms, such as meaningful engagement or by expanding the content of the principle of 
legality to achieve transformative objectives, instead of relying on or developing existing 
mechanisms.  
A further conclusion that this chapter draws is that the language used in PAJA illustrates 
the importance of alignment between two fields as closely connected as that of property and 
administrative law. In the hope of creating a much desired constructive alliance between 
property and the right to just administrative action, and for administrative law to play a 
facilitative role in the new framework for the regulation of property, the provisions of PAJA 
must be interpreted in line with constitutional goals and objectives. This means that the 
provisions of PAJA are not neutral or separate from the subject matter which it regulates, 
since it is clear that the language and concepts used can have a significant impact on 
outcomes. However, the question of when regulation constitutes deprivation or a “material 
and adverse effect” is less problematic in the constitutional context than expected, because 
the systemic constitutional approach accounts for the effects of regulation of the use of 
property in the system. The fact that the regulation of the use of property is itself subject to 
regulation through statutory or constitutional measures, shifts the focus away from the nature 
of the limitation toward its effect, which can always be subject to constitutional scrutiny.  
Furthermore, this chapter finds that the role and application of the principle of legality in 
the constitutional property law sphere is largely undeveloped and unanalysed. Roux is of the 
opinion that section 25 should be relied on only as last resort, with legality taking a more 
prominent role, but the comment is made in passing and not well-substantiated.
232
 As was 
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 Although not precisely Roux’s point, the Constitutional Court recently had the opportunity to consider 
whether a matter should be adjudicated with reference to either section 25(1) of the Constitution or based on 
rationality (which is based on the principle of legality). The majority of the Court held that a liquor license 
constituted property for constitutional purposes and a challenge to legislation which regulates the use of the 
property must be dealt with in terms of section 25(1). Moseneke DCJ wrote a separate (but ultimately 
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mentioned above, it is difficult to conceive what advantages there might be to rely on the 
principle of legality instead of section 25(1), since section 25(1) is specifically developed to 
resolve property disputes and sets out more requirements for a valid deprivation than the 
principle of legality, which is not a context specific ground of review. If the principle of 
legality forms the basis of review of a regulatory measure in future, the courts should take 
care to indicate what its scope is vis-à-vis direct reliance on section 25(1).  
The systemic constitutional approach is a useful way of approaching areas of overlap in a 
constitutional legal system. It shows that the design and structure of the system (and the 
interaction or relationship between sub-components) are of utmost importance for the system 
to function effectively, without unjustifiable parallel developments which leads to 
randomness in outcomes. In the following chapter, I consider the theoretical foundation of the 
systemic constitutional approach and discuss the systemic characteristics of the suggested 
approach in further detail. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
concurring) judgment where he held that the interest in question does not have to (or should not) be protected as 
property for constitutional purposes, because there were other constitutional measures available, including 
rationality review and administrative justice principles. The approach of the majority to endorse a wide notion of 
property, and testing the validity of the regulatory measures in the framework of section 25(1) can arguably be 
seen as a preference for choosing direct reliance on a specific constitutional provision where possible, instead of 
opting for the more general framework of rationality review based on the principle of legality. See Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 33, 70, 94, 115, 124, 128-129. 
251 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Theoretical perspectives on the systemic constitutional 
approach 
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5 1 Introduction 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa
1
 the single-system-of-law principle was expressly 
introduced into South African constitutional jurisprudence. The idea of one system of law has 
been influential in academic writing,
2
 but its practical implications are still in the process of 
being worked out.
3
 
A theoretical perspective offers deeper insight into the reasons why certain aspects of the 
regulation of the use of property are problematic and highlights the universality of many of 
these problems. I have selected key opposing theories, which make certain “systemic” claims 
in distinct (and seemingly incompatible) ways.
4
 The reason for my focus on theoretical 
perspectives with systemic elements is two-fold. Firstly, I want to show that an approach like 
absolutism which denies the complexity of the reality within which regulation occurs, is 
problematic. It views property as an individual right in terms of law which stands removed 
                                            
1
 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44.  
2
 See for example Michelman FI “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman 
S & Bishop M Constitutional law of South Africa (CLoSA) vol 1 (2
nd
 ed OS 2 2005) 11-1 – 11-44 11-35 – 11-
36; Davis DM & Klare K “Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law” (2010) 26 
South African Journal on Human Rights 403-509 430; Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 19-20.  
3
 In the property context, a lot of this work has been done in Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 
19-91. 
4
 The two main theoretical perspectives that are analysed from a systemic point of view are some of Smith’s 
work, as a proponent of information theory, and some of the work of Singer, Van der Walt and Gerhart, as 
examples of alternatives to the utilitarian or information theory perspectives. Unlike Singer and Van der Walt, 
Gerhart does not belong to the progressive property group, but his theory has more in common with the work of 
progressive scholars, and aligns more with their stated objectives than with information theory. For a discussion 
of the classification of Smith’s work as forming part of information theory, and how this diverges from the work 
of progressive property scholars, see Baron J “The contested commitments of property” (2010) 61 Hastings Law 
Journal 917-968 924-929.  
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from the context in which it operates.
5
 The aim of this chapter is therefore to argue that 
property law in contemporary society is part of a complex system and that it is problematic to 
describe regulation as something that occurs outside of the system instead of within it. 
Secondly, this chapter offers an overview of systems theory and complexity theory, to 
analyse the systemic elements in several key property theories. By taking a closer look at the 
origins and development of systems theory and complexity theory, it soon becomes apparent 
that systems-terminology is not used uniformly and that there are several important 
differences between classic system theory and the systemic elements in recent property 
theory. I discuss these property theories (with systemic elements) to consider the theoretical 
underpinnings and implications of the systemic constitutional approach to the regulation of 
property. However, it is apparent from the discussion in section 5.5.5 below that property 
theories with systemic elements are not based on classic systems theory and are not a 
continuation of or new version of classic systems theory.  
In earlier chapters, I consider the potential advantages of viewing property, and 
specifically the approach to the regulation of the use of property, as a system for organising 
social relationships in line with the Constitution.
6
 Within this view, the regulation (and 
protection against arbitrary regulation) of individual entitlements is but one aspect of the 
system, and regulation of the system aims to promote a variety of democratic values, such as 
liberty, dignity and participation, whilst trying to avoid an undue concentration of power.
7
 
Greater awareness of the systemic effects of the regulation of property is a challenge to 
                                            
5
 See for instance the argument by Malan Y & Cilliers P “Deconstruction and the difference between law and 
justice” (2001) 12 Stellenbosch Law Review 439-449 446 that law can only become more attentive to difference 
by reconsidering the boundaries and categories that are established in different fields of law. Malan and Cilliers 
are of the opinion that this “reconsideration” cannot happen without an acknowledgement of the complexity of 
the social conditions in which law operates.  
6
 Singer JW Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 142.  
7
 Singer JW Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 141.  
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dominant mainstream ideas regarding the absolute freedom of owners to do as they wish with 
their property and the dominant view that property law is primarily concerned with individual 
entitlements.
8
 However, as this chapter shows, it is not enough to adopt a “systemic 
approach” to the regulation of property, since this has been done to some extent by both 
information theorists and progressive property theorists, to serve opposing ends. It is 
therefore important to consider what the foundations of the systemic constitutional approach 
are.  
 
5 2 General systems theory and complexity theory 
Systems theory is not predominately a legal theory, but less mainstream theoretical 
perspectives, such as systems or complexity theory, seem to offer scope for looking further 
than the stated doctrinal content of property.
9
 The previous chapters show how important it is 
to look for solutions to contemporary legal problems outside of the four corners of existing 
legal doctrine. Furthermore, because of the Constitutional Court’s indication in the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case of the importance of viewing and developing the law as 
a single system, it seems useful to consider in more detail what has been developed in 
systems theory, in an attempt to better understand what a single system of law might look 
like. This section does not purport to give a comprehensive overview of systems theory or 
complexity theory, but instead highlights some aspects of what systems theory looks like in 
the legal context. Furthermore, it is important to note that the enthusiasm for classic systems 
                                            
8
 Singer JW Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 7-9; Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins 
(2009) 27-41; Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 113-122. 
9
 Underkuffler LS “A theoretical approach: The lens of progressive property” 2013 Property Law Review 152-
159 152; Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 35; Van der Walt AJ “Tradition on trial: A critical 
analysis of the civil-law tradition in South African property law” (1995) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 169-206 203-205.  
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theory (along with complexity theory and chaos theory) has abated to some extent. Most 
importantly, an overview of the classic theories shows that the theoretical approach that this 
dissertation proposes is not based on classic systems theory, although some of the 
terminology remains influential.  
Systems theory is a term used to describe “a loosely related family of approaches”, and is 
broadly understood as the interdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of 
elucidating principles that can be applied to all types of systems at all nesting levels and in all 
fields of research.
10
 General systems theory has been described as “a discipline that develops, 
tests, and demonstrates laws that apply equally to a variety of fields” and there were high 
hopes for the adaption of the theory to a variety of other disciplines.
11
  
Complexity theory is closely related to systems theory that originated in mathematics and 
as the name implies, it consists of the study of complex systems.
12
 The distinction between 
the notions “complex” and “complicated” is central to complexity theory. A system is 
complicated if it can fully be described in terms of its constituent parts. A system is complex 
if it cannot be completely understood by merely analysing its components. The interaction 
between the components is not fixed and can lead to novel features, called “emergent 
properties”.13 Law, as a nested system, has a complex nature, the system being more than the 
                                            
10
 Von Bertalanffy L General system theory. Foundations, development, applications (1968) 88; Lilienfeld R 
The rise of systems theory – An ideological analysis (1978) 25; Vermeule A The system of the constitution 
(2011) 8.  
11
 Lilienfeld R The rise of systems theory – An ideological analysis (1978) 25.  
12
 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928 851-865; Hornstein 
DT “Complexity theory, adaption, and administrative law” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913-960 917-918; 
Luhmann N Law as a social system (2004; transl Ziegert KA) 6, 98-104. 
13
 Cilliers P Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems (1998) iii-iv, 2-5. 
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sum of its parts.
14
 It seems necessary to consider certain aspects that traditionally form part of 
complexity theory, if only to recognise how difficult it is to assess the impact of parallel 
judicial creations on a complex system such as the legal system.
15
  
Ruhl develops systems theory specifically in the administrative law context, and his 
approach offers valuable insights into the application of general systems theory (understood 
to include components of complexity theory) in the legal context.
16
 Ruhl offers various 
arguments in support of complexity theory as a paradigm for law and society as a dynamical 
system.
17
 What might make the application of Ruhl’s approach troublesome is his insistence 
that one should work on developments in the sphere of the common law, because it is the area 
of law most responsive to changed circumstances, and therefore enhances the adaptability of 
the system.
18
  Ruhl argues that because changes to the dynamics at lower system levels affect 
                                            
14
 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928 854-856, 916 
characterises the interaction between law and society as a non-linear dynamical system and uses complexity 
theory as paradigm for reforming the “modern American law-and-society system”.  
15
 In this regard, chaos theory also adds value to this perspective, but falls outside the ambit of this dissertation 
due to its highly specialised nature. Chaos theory studies the behaviour of dynamical systems that are highly 
sensitive to initial conditions – a response popularly referred to as the butterfly effect. The butterfly effect, 
simply put, describes the phenomenon that small differences in initial conditions yield widely diverging 
outcomes for dynamical systems, rendering long-term prediction generally impossible. See Ruhl JB 
“Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928 875-893; Hornstein 
DT “Complexity theory, adaption, and administrative law” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913-960 924-928. For 
a contrary view regarding the importance of chaos theory to study complex systems, see Cilliers P Complexity 
and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems (1998) ix. According to Cilliers, sensitivity to initial 
conditions are not that important, because it is the robust nature of complex systems that allows them to function 
consistently under different circumstances, which makes them sustainable.  
16
 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928.  
17
 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928. 
18
 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928 919-920. 
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emergent properties which manifest at higher system levels, systemic changes should be 
introduced at lower system levels.
19
 In light of the views adopted in this dissertation 
regarding the subsidiarity principles and the single-system-of-law principle as well as the 
need for a new paradigm for the regulation of property, it might not be the most appropriate 
direction of development for South African law to focus only on development of the common 
law. However, his call for greater innovation at the lower systemic level, instead of designing 
mechanisms to directly address high-level emergent properties, is useful and relevant to keep 
in mind in the South African context, especially if this is understood as referring not only to 
the common law, but to include legislative measures.
20
 Understood in this manner, Ruhl’s 
suggestion can be read in support of subsidiarity and the single-system-of-law principle.  
Luhmann is popularly regarded as the father of systems theory in the social sciences and 
his ideas on law as a social system have been widely recognised.
21
 Luhmann developed a 
modern version of legal-systems theory and identified several characteristics of law as a 
social system.
22
 A significant contribution of Luhmann’s work is his argument that systems 
theory explains how law determines its own boundaries.
23
 “Unity” of law is the manifestation 
of a characteristic of the legal system, namely that it is an autopoietic (self-creating), self-
distinguishing system.
24
 Luhmann argues that the boundaries of law cannot be determined by 
ethics or economics, but are determined by law itself. Moreover, systems theory is uniquely 
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 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
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 Luhmann N Law as a social system (2004; transl Ziegert KA) 3, 79-82, 88-94. 
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 Luhmann N Law as a social system (2004; transl Ziegert KA) 4, 95. 
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 Luhmann N Law as a social system (2004; transl Ziegert KA) 6, 98-104. Also see Luhmann N “The unity of 
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able to deal with complexity, and can be used to integrate “poly-contextual contexts”.25 Law, 
as an autopoietic and self-distinguishing system has adapted to societal developments 
regarding complexity by becoming more complex, but if left unchecked, it can undermine 
one of the core functions of law, namely to produce and protect expectations.
26
  
A particularly interesting aspect of Luhmann’s theory is that he argues that the content of 
the “programmes” (stabilising structures) of law is contingent.27 Because law is self-
observing, it is possible for law to identify patterns, determine what is connected and 
ultimately create normative programmes that reflect the system’s adaption to societal 
changes. The structures of law are therefore dynamic in nature, but because law is a highly 
complex system not all structures can be treated as subject to change at all times.
28
 Instead, 
structures are regarded as stabilising structures most of the time, and only regarded as 
contingent or dynamic under certain circumstances. Stated differently, legal rules are 
assumed to be “fixed”, unless challenged; thereafter the dynamic nature of the rules (the 
structures in terms of Luhmann’s theory) makes it possible for them to adapt when 
necessary.
29
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 Luhmann N Law as a social system (2004; transl Ziegert KA) 5. 
26
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Another interesting feature of Luhmann’s theory is his argument regarding the inherent 
nature of values. Values are not imposed on the system externally to stabilise its operations. 
Values exist internally, very much part of the system.
30
 The same can be said for rules of the 
system: rules are not separate from the system; they are fundamentally part of the system.
31
 
This is a crucial point also made and developed by Singer, Van der Walt and Gerhart: the 
rules (whether originating in common law or statute) are not outside the system, they are 
inherently part of it. The importance of this issue is discussed in more detail below.  
Systems theory and complexity theory can be useful in two ways: firstly, descriptively it is 
useful to understand the dynamics of the law as a complex system and, secondly, analytically 
it could prove useful to identify how certain changes or developments ought to be 
approached.
32
 In terms of analysis and identifying what and how change should be 
introduced, dynamic systems theory shows that ultimately the focus should not be on 
confronting “high-level emergent complexities head-on”.33 The lesson is that it is not only the 
rules of the system that have an impact on outcomes, but also the structure of the entire 
system.
34
 The non-linear nature of the legal system, coupled with the importance of emergent 
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properties at the systemic level, makes it difficult to predict the outcome of amendments to 
the system which could lead to unintended and unforeseen consequences.
35
  
General systems theory is a useful way of understanding various factors that impact on the 
interaction between law and society, but it does not seem to assist one with the development 
of solutions. Ruhl explains that there is an observational side to dynamical nonlinear systems 
theory which can observe effects that “had previously not been capable of cogent theoretical 
description”,36 without denying that even when basing future developments on this theory it 
would be extremely difficult to predict its success.
37
 
For purposes of this dissertation it is important that complex problems cannot be solved 
with simple or reductionist solutions, because analysis of the components falls short of what 
is needed to solve the problem. If a systemic problem is discussed purely through analysis of 
its basic constituents, “too much of the relational information gets lost in the process.”38 This 
is problematic when one considers the approach to the regulation of property in private law 
doctrine, which is essentially reductionist in nature. The absolutist approach, and to some 
extent even the inherent limitations approach, denies the complexity of the legal system in 
which property rights and limitations exist. The Constitution calls for greater consideration of 
the constitutional matrix and contextual considerations, and a suitable approach should create 
space for courts and legislatures to do so.  
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 Hornstein DT “Complexity theory, adaption, and administrative law” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913-
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 Cilliers P Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems (1998) 10.  
261 
 
Another important aspect that Cilliers points out is that it is the structure of a complex 
system that allows it to behave in certain ways. If the system is not properly structured, it can 
lead to random behaviour. This feature of complex systems holds true for the legal system as 
well and perhaps explains the creation of parallel developments. When the area of overlap 
between areas of law or sources of law is not properly worked out, there is too little structure 
(“too many degrees of freedom”), which can lead to inconsistency.39 Therefore, the design of 
the structure of the system is of utmost importance. Van der Walt has written on the desirable 
characteristics for a constitutional property system, and his work on the development of 
subsidiarity principles is arguably an attempt to create a suitable structure for the system to 
function in a non-arbitrary way, although his work is not based on the design principles of 
general systems theory.
40
 
Ultimately, systems theory (understood broadly to also include elements of complexity 
theory) is a useful descriptive tool and offers interesting insights for legal theory, although it 
is a dense area of study and capable of various interpretations and applications. In the 
following section I consider the systemic elements in current property theory to determine 
what the theoretical underpinnings of a systemic approach to the regulation of the use of 
property are, since it is not based on general systems theory or complexity theory.   
 
5 3 Systemic thinking in property theory 
5 3 1 Introduction 
In this section, I analyse how systemic thinking has influenced developments in property 
theory, specifically with reference to the regulation of the use of property. This is not a 
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comprehensive discussion of either information theory or progressive property theory, since 
the literature abounds with examples of in-depth engagement with these theories and it is not 
necessary to restate all that has been written on this matter.
41
 Instead, I consider the systemic 
elements of each theory, and compare it to general systems theory, in an attempt to better 
understand the extent to which systemic thinking has already influenced property theory, and 
to consider what the theoretical underpinnings of the systemic constitutional approach are.  
There is a heated debate in property theory between what Baron describes as information 
theorists and progressive theorists. Baron refers to these two sides of the debate regarding the 
way in which property “organizes human behaviour and social life.”42 On Baron’s 
classification, information theorists treat property as a machine by which clear signals are 
sent to the world regarding their behaviour vis-à-vis the property of others. Conversely, 
progressive theorists view property as a conversation, where complicating factors to a 
property dispute are always present and in fact welcomed, to ensure that the social 
relationships produced by the property system are appropriate.
43
 
Interestingly, both proponents of the progressive property movement and the information 
theorists include systemic considerations in their work. This indicates that although a 
systemic approach to the regulation of property might promote unified development of the 
regulatory system, it is not enough to ensure that both the protective and the transformative 
objectives of section 25(1) are met. More work should be done to determine how the system 
functions, how it ought to be developed and to what end. In the next section, the role of 
systemic thinking in the work of information theorists such as Smith is considered. 
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Thereafter, the systemic elements in the recent works of Singer, Van der Walt and Gerhart 
are discussed as examples of the alternative systemic approach to the regulation of property. 
Finally, a systemic perspective raises many questions, but normatively speaking it is 
particularly important to consider the merit of evaluating a constitutional order or property 
system in a piecemeal fashion.
44
 This is a valid point of criticism to consider, but Baron is 
arguably correct in saying that one can accept that property operates as a system and yet 
examine the operation, subcomponents and principles of that system in a piecemeal fashion, 
by determining when the focus of the analysis is centred on outcomes in terms of the 
relationships that the system produces and when the analysis is focused on how the system 
produces these outcomes.
45
 Furthermore, as Smith points out, it is important not to conflate or 
confuse “the ordinary level of analysis within a system with the metalevel of propositions 
about that system”.46 
 
5 3 2 Systemic thinking and information theory 
What Jane Baron describes as information theory has two key “commitments”: firstly, 
property is a system and secondly, property is exceptional in the sense that it is different from 
contract or delict (tort) because of the numerus clausus principle.
47
 According to Merrill and 
Smith, the numerus clausus principle shows that the content of property has remained 
                                            
44
 Vermeule A The system of the constitution (2011) 6. 
45
 Baron J “Rescuing the bundle-of-rights metaphor in property law” (2014) 82 University of Cincinnati Law 
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 Smith HE “Property as the law of things” (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1691-1726 1692. (Emphasis in 
original.) 
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 Baron J “The contested commitments of property” (2010) 61 Hastings Law Journal 917-968 938-939. These 
two commitments are not unique to information theory, and are in fact shared by progressive property theorists, 
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relatively stable and fixed, and the principle is seen “simply as a fact about the way in which 
the system of property rights operates”.48 They are not, however, denying that the state has 
the power to redefine property rights; instead, they argue that regulatory innovation should 
primarily be addressed by the legislature, and not the courts.
49
 Smith states that he is not 
necessarily in pursuit of different ends than progressive property scholars, even though their 
method or means of achieving the aims are different.
50
 While the progressive theorists 
directly address, for example, the promotion of human flourishing, Smith addresses this end 
indirectly, so as to not undermine the property system’s unique potential for solving 
problems.
51
 In many ways, Smith’s approach is more in line with classic general systems 
theory and complexity theory, which might explain why Smith’s work differs from the 
alternative property theories discussed in section 5.3.3, despite the presence of systemic 
elements. I return to this point below.  
Information theorists also see property as a social ordering system, which primarily exists 
to give clear guidance to “the world” about how to treat things owned by others.52 
Information theorists view property as relationships with things, not relationships between 
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 Merrill TW & Smith HE “Optimal standardization in the law of property” The numerus clausus principle” 
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people.
53
 Smith argues that, within this view of property as “the law of things” and property 
as delineated “modules”, there is an internal or systemic logic, which has both descriptive and 
normative elements.
54
 
According to Smith, property is an information system and concepts are merely 
“shortcuts” that lower the cost of handling complex information.55 Modern conceptualists are 
sceptical of the notion that legal doctrine can or should be amended because of its 
consequences.
56
 Hence, Smith criticises later realism for its failure to adequately consider the 
importance of the “holistic emergence of property’s institutional features”.57  
An important systemic element of Smith’s work is his focus on the emergent properties of 
the property system.
58
 He argues that failing to distinguish between the purpose of property 
and how it functions leads to the fallacy of division.
59
 Although we might want property as a 
system (“in all its parts”) to reflect certain stated purposes, it does not follow that all the parts, 
each of the rules and concepts of the system, ought to reflect the purposes of the system as 
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well.
60
 The characteristics or “desirable features” of a property system, according to Smith, 
include stability, promotion of investment, autonomy, efficiency and fairness.
61
 Smith 
explains that many of the features of the property system are emergent, and identify some of 
these emergent properties as efficiency, fairness, justice, and virtue promotion. This does not 
mean that each rule or sub-component of the property system has to exhibit all of these 
features. For example, the emergent property of stability can only be evaluated with reference 
to its systemic role – in other words, as an aspect of the system – and not in an individual 
fashion as a “detachable feature or lever to be dialled up or down”.62 Many aspects are only 
describable and measurable at the systemic level, and therefore it is crucial for property 
theory to take cognisance of the property system’s effects, which emerge holistically.63  
Information theorists want property to be “systemically simple” to best communicate clear 
signals to the world about how to behave in relation to others’ property.64 According to 
Smith, property has the potential for simplicity, or ideally, “overall complexity through local 
simplicity”.65 In this sense and insofar as information theorists argue that the property system 
can exhibit emergent properties on a systemic level, through the interdependencies of the sub-
components, thereby creating a complex (but not necessarily complicated) system, they add 
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valuable insight to the discussion on the desirable characteristics of property law under the 
Constitution. 
Smith’s approach has many characteristics of a systems approach, as opposed to a 
systemic constitutional approach. He makes use of systems-theory terminology and ideas, 
mainly to support his argument that a conceptual, modular approach to property is the most 
efficient way to respond to the complexity of the system.
66
 Smith explains that concepts (and 
certain other formal devices) supress some context to manage complexity.
67
 This is 
necessary, according to Smith, “because legal relations have their form based in part on 
people’s cognitive limitations.”68 Central to Smith’s argument is the economic function of 
concepts, arguing that it is an efficient way of keeping information costs low. While this may 
be true, the law and economics perspective of the consequences of conceptualisation is but 
one aspect of the problem. Smith does not deny this, but argues that awarding greater 
consideration to context increases complexity, which the law is not equipped to respond to. 
He addresses the reductionist nature of his theory by explaining that cognitive property 
theory allows for a combination of reductionism and holism. He reconciles these seemingly 
opposing positions by explaining that in cognitive theory, one can be reductionist in 
principle, whilst being holistic in practice. This is achieved by accepting or developing 
reductionist strategies (such as concepts and modularity) to deal with complexity, which will 
in its application promote holism.
69
 Insofar as “holism” in Smith’s view can be equated to the 
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systemic features of the alternative theories discussed below, it shows that Smith’s systems 
approach does not look outside of the traditional conceptual framework, and therefore his 
approach is not an example of systemic thinking in property theory, as understood in the 
systemic constitutional approach.  
 
5 3 3 Systemic features of other theoretical approaches 
5 3 3 1 Background 
In this section, I consider systemic aspects of the work done by Singer, Van der Walt and 
Gerhart. These three scholars work with different theoretical perspectives, but offer 
alternatives to the information theory approach discussed above. Similarities in their work 
pertain to systemic claims made to support vastly different outcomes than that of general 
systems theory and information theory. It therefore seems necessary to consider their work as 
alternative examples of systemic thinking.
70
 None of the authors’ works presents a 
continuation of general systems theory, Luhmann’s work on law as a social system or 
complexity theory. Despite the references to systems theory terminology, it is a new approach 
to focus on the constitutional legal system in its totality.  
What distinguishes Smith’s work (as an example of information theory) and the academic 
works that I discuss below is that Smith’s work is reductionist in nature, despite the systems 
and complexity language. He emphasises individual rights within the property system, while 
the works discussed below are essentially non-reductionist and acknowledge the complexity 
of the constitutional legal system into which property (the parameters for protection as well 
                                            
70
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as limitations) fits in a specific way. Denying the complexity, or trying to manage it with 
reductionist strategies, distorts the role of property and the functional relationship that exists 
between property and regulation in the constitutional context.  
5 3 3 2 A systemic democratic view of property 
In Singer’s notion of property in a democratic legal system, property for constitutional 
purposes is not regarded primarily as the embodiment of economic liberty. It is a 
constitutionally-framed right in a democratic constitutional legal system that serves a variety 
of important, political or constitutional objectives with strong systemic elements.
71
  
According to Singer,
72
 property is a system “because it regulates relations among 
individuals in a manner that alters the nature of the social world”.73 Therefore, although 
property rights are viewed or conceptualised as individual entitlements, private property is a 
regime and a social construct, and the choice of property rules can have far-reaching systemic 
effects for society.
74
 This means that these systemic effects have to be considered – but not 
only must they be considered; they must influence the meaning and scope of property 
rights.
75
 Ultimately, Singer argues that regulation of the property system “is essential to 
create social relations that put ownership and human dignity within everyone’s reach”.76 
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Many existing property rules serve systemic objectives or promote systemic norms. Singer 
explains that this means that existing property rules serve other purposes than merely 
protecting individual entitlements. According to Singer, these types of rules, geared toward 
promoting “systemic norms”, exist (at least in part) to create a well-functioning property 
system.
77
 For example, limiting the types of property rights is one example of a rule intended 
to promote systemic efficiency.
78
 Not all rules are aimed at promoting efficiency, though 
Singer refers to landlord-tenant law as an example, where the rules create a context for other 
systemic values such as human flourishing and dignity.
79
  
Judged from a systemic perspective both Singer and Smith adopt some form of a systemic 
approach to property and acknowledge the importance of systemic norms or emergent 
properties of that system. However, Singer goes further and argues that it is possible and 
necessary to also view the property system as a “quasi-constitutional framework for social 
life”, to indicate the importance of viewing it as more than a mechanism of coordination or a 
way of managing complexity. Singer accepts (to some extent) property’s systemic, 
foundational and modular nature, but argues that when the focus of the system is 
coordination, valuable insights regarding property as part of a bigger constitutional problem 
are lost.
80
 Ultimately, Smith’s normative objective for using systemic thinking is to focus on 
the systemic elements and structures necessary to “enable any legitimate values to be 
promoted”.81 Singer, on the other hand, employs systemic thinking to identify the values that 
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property should promote, instead of assuming them.
82
 Smith’s system protects the system, 
while Singer’s system protects the foundational values of a free and democratic society. 
 
5 3 3 3 A modest systemic role for property  
The second example of systemic thinking that I consider is put forth by Van der Walt in his 
recent article concerning the limited (“modest”) systemic role that property plays in the legal 
system. Van der Walt develops a view of property’s role under the South African 
constitutional system, to find the appropriate place and role for property law in the 
constitutional setting.
83
 His theory is thus both descriptive and normative, showing that in 
case law non-property rights are often upheld to the detriment of property rights, and more 
importantly, that there are important systemic constitutional reasons for this to be so.
84
 
According to Van der Walt, the property system can be either simple or complex: it is 
simple insofar as a small number of clear rules regarding limited standardised property forms 
exist.
85
 It is complex insofar as the application and interpretation of these rules are influenced 
by contextual and normative considerations.
86
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15-106.  
84
 See Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and 
Society 15-106 28-30 where he makes this argument with reference to case law that dealt with the right to life, 
dignity, equality, free movement and free speech or assembly, to illustrate the point that in certain cases 
property rights yield (and ought to yield) to other, non-property rights, because of the systemic importance of 
the non-property right. 
85
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 17-24 links up with the systemic-efficiency arguments of Smith and the importance of the numerus 
clausus principle in that context, but like Singer, Van der Walt acknowledges that there are other systemic 
norms of importance that necessitate the inclusion of further complicating factors.  
86
 See Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and 
Society 15-106 22. Van der Walt relies on Baron’s distinction to evaluate the simple or complex nature of the 
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Van der Walt argues that the importance of protecting property rights has been over-
inflated in the past for a variety of reasons.
87
 To combat the over-inflated notion of property 
as an individualistic right, the “modest systemic role in law” of protection of property should 
be recognised.
88
 Although property rights are important, within the bigger picture (viewed 
systemically), the exceptions and qualifications to the protection of property are often more 
important because of the systemic purposes they serve.
89
 He makes two important arguments 
in this context, firstly, that property need not be protected “as the guardian of every other 
right” and secondly, that where property and non-property rights are in conflict with one 
another, the appropriate methodology is not the balancing of the rights, but rather a 
demarcation exercise.
90
 Stated differently, where a systemically important non-property right, 
such as life, dignity or equality is involved, the aim is to ascertain where the limits of 
property rights lie so as to secure the non-property right. This leads to the development of 
what Van der Walt calls “systemic limitations” on property rights, which is fundamentally 
different from the “proportionality-based justification of a limitation that is imposed on an 
                                                                                                                                       
property system, and not necessarily on the technical meaning of these terms as developed in general systems 
and complexity theory. See Baron J “The contested commitments of property” (2010) 61 Hastings Law Journal 
917-968.  
87
 These reasons include for example the perceived link between property and liberty and the idea that other 
fundamental rights can be protected through property (property as “the guardian of every other right”). See Van 
der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 15-106 
26-27.  
88
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 27; Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 241-247.  
89
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 27.  
90
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 51.  
273 
 
otherwise restricted right”.91  A systemic limitation could be classified as “a limitation that is 
inherent to property”, although Van der Walt is hesitant to pronounce definitively on this 
point.
92
 From a systemic point of view, it seems desirable to treat certain disputes involving 
property rights and non-property rights as a demarcation issue instead of a balancing or 
justification exercise.
93
 This point is also central to Gerhart’s property theory, which also 
exhibits strong systemic characteristics. 
Ultimately, what makes the “modest systemic status of property” theory so attractive is its 
potential for challenging paradigmatic structures that continue to underlie property disputes, 
even in the constitutional context.
94
 Van der Walt’s vision of the property system urges us to 
look beyond the existing doctrinal framework for solutions.
95
 An appropriate role for 
property in the constitutional legal system will not result from tinkering with the definition of 
ownership or property (as the Dutch functionalists have done), but will result from the 
recognition that property slots into a much bigger system, and it must function within the 
framework of that system. This has to be the point of departure for property disputes, to 
adequately account for the systemic effects of property. 
 
                                            
91
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 51. Also see Chapter 3.4.2 where I discuss the relevance of the source of the limitation, and argue that in 
the case of direct constitutional limitation the direct application of section 25(1) is limited. 
92
 Van der Walt AJ “The modest systemic status of property” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 
15-106 62.  
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 A similar point was arguably made (albeit in a slight different context) by Moseneke DCJ in Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 94, 115, 120 where he holds that 
there may be sound (constitutional) reasons for not protecting an interest as property for purposes of section 
25(1) of the Constitution.  
94
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 29. 
95
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 247.  
274 
 
5 3 3 4 A unified theory of property 
Gerhart’s theory of property and social morality is the third example of systemic thinking in 
alternative theoretical approaches I consider.
96
 I only discuss selected aspects of his theory, 
since, as the name implies, a grand unified theory of property is too broad in scope to discuss 
here. As with the previous scholars’ work, I focus on the systemic elements in his work, 
especially insofar as it concerns the regulation of the use of property.  Gerhart aims to 
develop a single theory to address and essentially overcome the dichotomies of property 
through what he calls a unified theory.
97
 He argues that such a unified theory of property 
must justify the existence and the scope of rights, so that “rights and their limitations can be 
understood to emanate from a single set of values”.98 Values play an important role in 
Gerhart’s work. His emphasis on understanding how the same values that give rise to 
property also limit property rights, is telling. He criticises existing property theories insofar as 
they explain and justify the existence of the institution of private property, but fail to 
                                            
96
 As mentioned at the outset of this chapter and section, Gerhart is not a progressive property scholar, but his 
work provides an interesting example of systemic thinking within the property context, in a way that seems 
more in line with progressive property theory than information theory and is therefore discussed as an 
alternative theoretical perspective. In a sense his work offers a median between information theory and 
progressive property theory, insofar as his theory makes use of law and economics principles (much like the 
information theorists), but he does not consider the process of maximising individual welfare to be value-free or 
self-defining. See Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 6, 311-316.  
97
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 7, 13-17 identifies four dichotomies in property law, 
namely the dichotomy between essentialist and bundle-of-sticks approaches, between rights-based theories and 
assent-based theories, between values as inputs and values as outputs and, finally, between individual interests 
and social interests. Gerhart posits that his complete theory offers a unified theory of property that can address 
(or mediate between) all four dichotomies.  
98
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 4. 
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adequately explain the existence of limitations placed on property rights in the same terms 
used to justify the rights in the first place.
99
  
Gerhart’s unified theory provides a way of thinking about the values that underlie property 
law so that disputes are about how to best implement “a unified methodology” rather than 
attempting to balance values.
100
 This idea is interesting insofar as the problem with a 
“balancing methodology” is that one has to start somewhere, and it has a significant influence 
on the outcome whether one starts with the rights of the owners or with the rights of non-
owners or the community.
101
 Gerhart explains that when one starts with the rights of the 
owner, limitations are usually regarded as exceptions to those rights.
102
 The balancing 
methodology is problematic when it always starts with an absolutist approach to property, 
and offers little or no appropriate means to challenge the point of departure.  
Values play a significant role in Gerhart’s unified theory, as he regards property as the 
“expression of social values”, and argues strongly that what is important is not values as 
outputs (the value of property as a measurement device) but rather values as inputs. In terms 
of the latter view, the values that should be promoted by the property system is not the value 
we get out of a resource but rather the values that we want individuals to consider when 
making decisions about property.
103
  
                                            
99
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 5-6 argues that it is necessary to reconsider the 
relationship between property and values (as well as between property and limitations) in order to develop 
property theory that can respond to the dichotomies in property law. 
100
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 5, 83-92.  
101
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 11. This links up with the notion of the so-called 
presumptive power of property. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 525; Singer JW 
Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 3. 
102
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 11.  
103
 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 7-8 argues that when value is a measure of output, it 
refers to what people get out of something. However, when property is not conceptualised primarily as an 
embodiment of economic freedom, “value as output” cannot represent the whole picture.  
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Gerhart argues that a system of law reflects the values of society.
104
 South African law 
must be developed to reflect the values of society as embodied in the Constitution. The 
adoption of at least elements of Gerhart’s theory seems viable in South African law, 
especially because a shared set of values (as the basis for Gerhart’s theory) is embodied in the 
Constitution. The challenge for South African law lies not in the development of shared 
values, but in the fundamental paradigm shift it would require to see reform not as an attempt 
to impose the value system of the Constitution on existing law, but to imagine that property 
law is built on the foundation of the identified shared values and that individual entitlements 
can exist only to the extent which the foundation allows.
105
 
The three theoretical perspectives offered by Singer, Van der Walt and Gerhart differ in 
many ways, but also have some important aspects in common. Mainly, the emphasis on 
viewing limitations as part of the system, instead of something external to the system is 
telling, as well as the importance that values play in their work. Although not examples of 
classic systems theory, all three scholars make use of systemic elements and considerations to 
further their arguments, and illustrate the use of systemic thinking for purposes of developing 
law. 
The single-system-of-law-principle requires not only unity, but systemic development. The 
systemic features in the abovementioned property theories indicate that a systemic 
constitutional approach to the regulation of property is not only possible, but preferable. A 
systemic constitutional approach opens up space to develop the role of property and 
regulation in the larger constitutional context. The Constitution creates a framework in which 
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 Gerhart PM Property law and social morality (2014) 73-83. 
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 This is arguably the most explicit systemic element of Gerhart’s work, and this aspect closely resembles 
Singer and Van der Walt’s suggestions regarding the role and purpose of property in law and in society.  
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law must operate, and this means that it is necessary for a viable theoretical approach to be 
able to respond to overlaps in the system.  
 
5 4 Conclusion  
Systemic thinking is useful in reconceptualising the approach to the regulation of property 
and provides new and innovative opportunities to develop a regulatory system that is in line 
with the Constitution. However, systemic thinking in itself is not enough, as is evidenced by 
the systemic thinking of the progressive property scholars as opposed to that of the 
information theorists. 
The alternative or progressive theories are concerned with the social relationships that 
property achieves, which makes them more open to change. The information theorists’ strong 
preference for certainty and stability leads to them accepting a lesser degree of change, as 
well as a strong preference for regulatory interference by the legislature instead of the courts. 
In progressive theory, many important developments can be effected through judicial action 
as well as legislation, which suggests that progressive theorists are foresee the possibility that 
reform can be achieved in various ways, and not only in terms of legislation.
106
 
The study, analysis and coherent development of systems are not achieved by taking a 
granular approach in the hope of discovering the system’s governing meta-principles. 
Systems arguably do have governing meta-principles, but reductionism is not the way to 
identify or develop these principles.
107
 One simply cannot deny that there is no “theory of 
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 Baron J “The contested commitments of property” (2010) 61 Hastings Law Journal 917-968 945. See State v 
Shack 58 NJ 297 (1971) as an example of judicial action and the Fair Housing Act 42 USC (2006) as an 
example of legislative reform.  
107
 Ruhl JB “Complexity theory as paradigm for the dynamical law-and-society system: A wake-up call for legal 
reductionism and the modern administrative state” (1996) 45 Duke Law Journal 849-928 893.  
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everything” or “master key” to resolve issues of complexity.108 Insofar as it is possible to read 
Singer, Van der Walt and Gerhart as attempts to discern the meta-principles of a sustainable 
property system through synthesis instead of analysis, and by acknowledging the 
complexities and uncertainties introduced by the interdependency between property and 
social control, their work creates the theoretical basis for developing property law in a 
systemic manner, as part of a constitutional legal system.   
The systemic constitutional approach is not a meta-narrative of the principles of the 
regulation of the use of property; it proposes a methodology of addressing problems arising 
from the overlap between fields of law in relation to the regulation of property. One of the 
main advantages of adopting a systemic constitutional approach is that it acknowledges the 
interaction between the regulation of property (as a sub-system of the property law system, 
which in turn is a component of the constitutional legal system) and other components of the 
legal system. Instead of avoiding or denying complexity, it creates the space to engage with 
and address complexity. It allows for a consistent yet contextual way of addressing regulation 
disputes.   
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 Cilliers P Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems (1998) ix; Ruhl JB “Complexity 
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6 1 Introduction 
 
“If something is really complex, it cannot be adequately described by means of a simple 
theory.”1 
 
In June 2015, the Constitutional Court handed down an important judgment for constitutional 
property law in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic 
Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others.
2
 The court 
delivered three separate judgments, which differ on several fundamentally important issues.
3
 
One central aspect was whether the issue before the Court (a legislative regime change 
involving liquor licences) ought to be addressed within the framework of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, hence as a deprivation-of-property enquiry. In two of the three judgments, 
Froneman J and Madlanga J agreed that liquor licences do constitute property and that the 
issue should therefore fall within the ambit of section 25(1). Moseneke DCJ held that liquor 
licences should not be recognised as property for constitutional purposes, arguing that there 
were other options available in the constitutional framework to control instances of excessive 
or arbitrary regulation of such an interest. He referred to the notion of administrative justice 
and the provisions of administrative law as one possible option, but ultimately held that the 
statute should have been challenged on the basis of rationality (based on the principle of 
                                            
1
 Cilliers P Complexity and postmodernism: Understanding complex systems (1998) ix.  
2
 [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015). 
3
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015). The judgment written by 
Froneman J constitutes the main judgment. Moseneke DCJ wrote a separate concurring judgment, where he 
agrees with the final order but not with the route taken to reach the outcome. Madlanga J wrote a (partially) 
dissenting judgment where he agrees with the majority that the interest in question ought to be recognised as 
property and that the regulatory regime change brought about a deprivation of property, but unlike the majority, 
Madlanga J held that the deprivation was arbitrary.  
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legality). The substantive protection would have been the same as that offered by the main 
judgment, albeit without engaging with and deciding whether the interest in question was 
property.
4
   
The question of whether administrative law had any role to play in the Shoprite matter 
illustrates the point that there is a complex relationship between sections 25 and 33 of the 
Constitution. Froneman J dismissed the possibility of resolving the dispute based on the 
provisions of PAJA, and held that “what is challenged is a legislative change to the regulatory 
framework for the sale of liquor, not its administrative enforcement”.5 But Moseneke DCJ’s 
judgment seems to suggest that administrative justice principles may have a wider 
application, and can influence the outcome of whether or not a commercial interest such as a 
liquor licence ought to be regarded as “property” for purposes of section 25. Moreover, 
criticism of the APD case shows that it might not be easy to determine whether a matter can 
be (or, more importantly, should be) resolved on the basis of PAJA instead of section 25(1), 
depending on what it is that litigants wish to challenge.
6
 
To my mind, the Shoprite case raises several important issues, and the Court’s engagement 
with issues that are often skipped over (presumably because of the so-called arbitrariness 
vortex) are enlightening.
7
 It shows that South African law is still very much in the process of 
developing a property law system with constitutionally desirable characteristics. It shows that 
the relationship between the property clause and other constitutional rights and provisions has 
                                            
4
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) paras 128-129. 
5
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others [2015] ZACC 23 (30 June 2015) para 30. 
6
 Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2015 (2) SA 584 (CC). See the discussion in 
Chapters 1.1 and 4.4. 
7
 Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 3 (2nd ed 
OS 2003) 46 2-5, 9-11, 23-25. 
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not yet been fully worked out, and that more work needs to be done to determine when an 
issue should be dealt with in terms of section 25(1) directly. It raises questions regarding 
what a constitutional conception of property looks like, and what the implications for 
effective state regulation of the use of property are. None of these are simple questions with 
simple answers, as the different approaches in the Shoprite judgment show. This dissertation 
engages with some of these questions and suggests an approach to engage with some of the 
issues that arise from the regulation of the use of property. I reconsider the relationship 
between property and regulation in the constitutional context and argue that instead of 
eroding or undermining private property, regulation is a systemic device that can be used to 
minimise unwanted systemic effects and assist with the promotion of the transformative 
objectives of the Constitution, namely to promote constitutional non-property rights and 
interests.
8
  
Chapter 1 sets out the research questions that this dissertation addresses. Firstly, I wanted 
to determine which approach to the regulation of the use of property is subscribed to in 
private law doctrine. The second question that I wished to answer was whether the approach 
to regulatory limitation of property in the constitutional context is compatible with either one 
of the main theoretical approaches in private law. Thirdly, if neither of the existing theoretical 
approaches to the regulation of the use of property is satisfactory, the aim was to establish 
what an appropriate approach to the regulation of the use of property for constitutional 
purposes is. Finally, I set out to consider how the proposed approach responds to potential 
overlaps between regulatory systems. In the following section, the outcomes of these research 
aims are set out and evaluated. 
 
                                            
8
 Singer JW Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 142-144, 208. 
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6 2 Regulation of the use of property in the constitutional context 
6 2 1 Overview 
The Constitution, with its ethos of transformation, makes it necessary to reconsider the 
disconnect that exists between property and regulation in private law doctrine and mandates a 
single system of law, based on and informed by the Constitution. The single-system-of-law 
principle and constitutional supremacy makes it possible (and, in fact, necessary) to adopt a 
systemic view of the regulation of property, as part of the single constitutional legal system.
9
  
The regulation of the use of property forms an important part of the constitutional legal 
system and the challenge is to align the theory of the imposition of limitations on property 
rights with the norms and objectives of the system in its entirety.
10
 Van der Walt argues that 
the Constitution creates a framework for a property system that it wants to promote and 
argues that property law ought to be developed to display certain constitutionally desirable 
“systemic characteristics”.11 
From the preceding chapters, I draw the general, overarching conclusion that both theories 
in private law doctrine that purport to explain the nature of limitations are reductionist in 
nature. They do not and cannot adequately address the myriad of issues that arise from the 
regulation of the use of property, because the conceptual tradition of private law doctrine fails 
to account for the complex systemic features of the constitutional legal system. Therefore, I 
propose to follow a constitutional systemic approach as a means of engaging with the 
complex nature of the system in which both rights and limitations (in the form of regulation) 
form part of the system.  
                                            
9
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 131.  
10
 Consider the approach in Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, 
Western Cape and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). Refer to the 
discussion in Chapters 1.3 and 3.4.2. 
11
 Van der Walt AJ Property and constitution (2012) 26. 
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This means that constitutional property is not regarded as a natural, pre-social right which 
merely tolerates restrictions. It is more appropriately conceptualised as an entitlement that is 
both recognised and circumscribed by the provisions of the Constitution and therefore the 
regulation of property must be understood with reference to the broad constitutional matrix.
12
 
Consequently, disputes regarding the protection of entitlements cannot be determined or 
adjudicated without reference to the objectives of the system as a whole. In this view, the 
protection of individual entitlements is but one aspect of the system, and regulation is 
understood as a mechanism through which a variety of democratic values, such as liberty, 
dignity and participation, are promoted, whilst avoiding the unjust concentration of power, 
haphazard developments and uncertainty regarding the influence of the Constitution on 
existing property rights.
13
  
In the Waterfront case, we see (largely unarticulated) traces of a systemic constitutional 
approach, insofar as the court viewed the applicant’s property rights through the appropriate 
constitutional lens and held that, properly construed, the applicant’s property rights did not 
include the right to exclude the respondents from its property on a permanent basis.
14
 
Effectively, the court relied on the respondents’ constitutional rights to life and freedom of 
movement to determine the content and limit of the applicant’s property rights, keeping in 
mind the importance of finding an appropriate balance between the private and the public 
interest. The court’s approach indicates that it is necessary to reconsider the way property 
rights and limitations are conceptualised in the constitutional context. I return to this point 
below. 
                                            
12
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 14. See also Van der Walt AJ 
Property and constitution (2012) 29.  
13
 Singer JW Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 142-144, 208. 
14
 Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape and Others (Legal 
Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) 448.  
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6 2 2 Continued relevance of the inherent/external debate 
The process of defining private ownership has a long history of development. In the first 
formal definition, Bartolus defined dominium as the most complete and comprehensive 
control (so called “perfecte disponendi”) that a person could have over a thing, within the 
limits of the law.
15
 Subsequent writers accepted Bartolus’ definition, mainly emphasising the 
“perfect control” component, as a means of establishing authority for the absoluteness of 
ownership. Schrage, for example, tells us that this part of Bartolus’ definition formed the 
basis of the “eternal myth of the unlimited, unrestricted and borderless power of the owner to 
do whatever he pleases”.16 However, academics have shown that when the context of the 
definition is considered, Bartolus merely used the term perfecte disponendi to differentiate 
between dominium and possessio and that this part of the definition has been over-
emphasised by, for example, the Pandectists, to support and develop a notion of absolute 
ownership.
17
 Grotius’s formulation of dominium plenum implicitly viewed this form of 
ownership as the pre-eminent right over property.
18
 His work presented a subtle shift in 
thinking, away from the medieval notions of dominium directum and dominium utile as two 
forms of ownership and toward a hierarchical view of full ownership and limited real rights, a 
view that was extremely influential in South African private law.
19
 
                                            
15
 Bartolus on D 21 2 39 1 n 3. See the discussion in Chapter 2.3.2. 
16
 Schrage EJH “Ius in re corporali perfecte disponendi: Property from Bartolus to the New Dutch Civil Code of 
1992” in Van Maanen GE & Van der Walt AJ (eds) Property law on the threshold of the 21st century (1996) 35-
67 44. 
17
 See Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.3.4. 
18
 Milton JRL “Ownership” in Zimmermann R & Visser D (eds) Southern cross. Civil law and common law in 
South Africa (1996) 657-699 559. 
19
 Feenstra R “Historische aspecten van de private eigendom als rechtsinstituut” 1976 Rechtgeleerd Magazijn 
Themis 248-275 272; Visser DP “The absoluteness of ownership: The South African common law in 
perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 41; Van der Walt AJ “Unity and pluralism in property theory – A review 
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These developments are not moot historical developments for two reasons. Firstly, 
Bartolus’ and Grotius’s definitions are still accepted in South African law as a point of 
departure. Secondly, the imposition of limitations on property rights has to be accounted for, 
and private law doctrine offers two main theoretical approaches to explain the nature of 
limitations. The absolutist approach, mainly under the influence of German Pandectism, 
holds that ownership is fundamentally absolute and unregulated and that an owner has the 
free use of his property, although limitations can be imposed externally. The limitations do 
not affect the essence of the right and the right returns to its natural (unlimited) form when 
the limitation falls away. In terms of this approach, “property is a basically unrestricted right 
that can accommodate restrictions – by way of exception – when the need for a restrictive 
measure is justified by a clear, immediate or overriding public interest”.20 
The alternative approach holds that ownership is inherently limited and that regulatory 
limitations are manifestations of these inherent limitations. The inherent versus external 
nature of limitations was a heavily debated topic in South African private law in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
21
 This debate was a result of the way in which ownership had been conceptualised 
in private law doctrine and this dissertation shows that neither approach is suitable in the 
constitutional context.
22
  
The absolutist approach is based on the assumption that ownership is a pre-social right, the 
absoluteness of which guarantees private freedom against state interference. Limitations 
imposed upon ownership are therefore by definition external, later in time, and in principle to 
be treated with the necessary circumspection. To a certain extent this assumption explains the 
                                                                                                                                       
of property theories and debates in recent literature: Part I” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 15-42 20-
22.  
20
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 15. 
21
 Van der Walt AJ “Introduction” in Van der Walt AJ (ed) Land reform and the future of landownership in 
South Africa (1991) 2. 
22
 This point is made in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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general perception that the imposition of a regulatory restriction deprives the owner of an 
entitlement that he would otherwise have had.  The notion of deprivation is then understood 
to imply that a previously complete right is somehow diminished through regulation.  
Although the inherent-limitation approach to the regulation of the use of property is 
followed to some extent in the constitutional context, it does not adequately address all issues 
relating to the regulation of property and therefore I propose a systemic constitutional 
approach to the regulation of the use of property.
23
 While the notion of inherently-limited 
property rights makes it doctrinally easier to accept the constitutional justification of 
regulatory limitations of property, it is still hampered by its private law, doctrinal origins, and 
fails to envision the facilitative role that regulation of the use of property can play in 
achieving constitutional objectives.  
A systemic view of property and regulation makes it possible to focus on more than just 
the protection of individual entitlements and therefore offers an alternative approach to 
regulation that can address the shortcomings of the approaches in private law. Moreover, a 
systemic constitutional approach supports the development of a system of regulated property 
rights that exhibits constitutionally desirable characteristics. This creates the opportunity to 
explain the regulation of the use of property in a manner that promotes a balance between 
individual entitlements, the public interest and effective regulation in South Africa.  
In the systemic constitutional approach, the question of inherent or external limitation 
becomes less important because one can recognise that certain limitations are inherent, but it 
would still have to satisfy the constitutional requirements for a valid deprivation. Moreover, 
the effects of the limitation would also be subject to constitutional scrutiny, irrespective of 
whether the limitation is inherent or external to the right. The important point is that 
limitations are inherent to the system, rather than inherent to the right. However, insofar as 
                                            
23
 The systemic constitutional approach is developed throughout Chapters 3 and 4. 
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the categorisation has implications for the burden of proof, it may remain relevant to 
expressly consider how limitations are viewed.
24
 Even unconscious categorisation of 
limitations as inherent or external could lead to (often unarticulated) presumptions regarding 
who the owner is, what she can do and ultimately who has the burden of justifying changes to 
entitlements.
25
  
The analysis in Chapter 2 showed that a new approach to the regulation of the use of 
property is necessary for constitutional purposes. Re-evaluating the inherent/external debate 
had two important consequences: firstly, it showed that property rights have always been 
subject to some form of limitation. Secondly, it supported the argument that the centrality of 
the debate in private law doctrine is based on assumptions regarding the role, nature and 
function of property in the traditional rights paradigm, and showed that both approaches are 
in effect ill-suited to respond to constitutional demands. Therefore, I concluded that even if 
the inherently-limited approach is accepted, its potential for enabling transformation of the 
ownership concept is limited, because it is firmly rooted in private law doctrine. In the next 
section, I briefly set out the main conclusions regarding the application of the proposed 
systemic constitutional approach as a response to the inadequacy of the private law 
approaches. 
 
6 2 3 An alternative approach to the regulation of the use of property 
As was mentioned above, the Constitution provides the framework for a “new” property 
system and property law ought to be developed to display certain constitutionally desirable 
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“systemic characteristics”.26 An essential part of the property system is regulation of the use 
of property, and constitutional control over that process of regulation. In this view, property 
and regulation form part of the larger constitutional legal system, and therefore limitations are 
not imposed externally on rights. Adoption of the systemic constitutional approach means 
that regulation is regarded as an intrinsic, inevitable part of the system and that state 
regulation is a mechanism through which constitutional goals and objectives are promoted 
and unwanted systemic effects are minimised.  
This approach fits in with the single-system-of-law principle that was set out by the 
Constitutional Court in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers decision.
27
 From a systemic 
perspective of regulation, an owner derives his entitlements from the legal system as a whole, 
rather than from the common law or one single section in the Constitution that explicitly 
protects property, and the framework for regulation is deduced from the entire constitutional 
context and not only the principles of private law or section 25. 
A systemic constitutional approach can respond to three problems. Firstly, it 
reconceptualises the relationship between property and regulation to ensure that the use of 
property can be legitimately and effectively regulated, while simultaneously providing 
mechanisms to challenge excessive or unauthorised regulatory measures. Secondly, a 
systemic constitutional approach acknowledges the area of overlap between the regulation of 
property and the right to just administrative action, and suggests a methodology for 
identifying and addressing the overlap. Moreover, it enables the development of a 
constructive mutual reliance between the provisions, especially insofar as the analysis in 
Chapter 4 shows that the relationship between constitutional property law and administrative 
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law extend to non-overlap cases. Thirdly, this systemic approach recognises and engages with 
the issues that arise from the complex nature of the property system and the constitutional 
legal system as a whole, which means that it is not reductionist in nature.  
Despite the fact that a systemic view might appear less obviously appropriate than is the 
case in German constitutional law, for example, it is nevertheless possible to adopt a systemic 
view in the South African constitutional context, as a response to the inadequacy of the 
private law doctrinal approaches to regulation. The (systemic) constitutional approach to 
regulation of property in German law developed in response to similar inadequacies and 
shows that when property is protected and regulated in a manner that is in line with the value 
system of the broader constitutional context, it is easier to find an appropriate balance 
between the individual and the public interest. This allows for more consistency when dealing 
with regulatory disputes. Moreover, a systemic view supports the development of a single 
system of law, where all law fits into the constitutional system and with no unjustified 
parallel developments, which is of vital importance in the South African legal context as well. 
The Waterfront case is one example where the courts have responded to the mandate of 
reconceptualising the relationship between property and limitations in the constitutional 
setting. The court’s approach of adjudicating the dispute with reference to how property 
rights affect the constitutional rights of others, to determine the limits and content of an 
owner’s rights, is in line with a systemic constitutional approach and it shows that it is 
possible to strike an appropriate balance between the protection of private entitlements and 
the public interest.
28
 
A systemic constitutional approach differs from existing private law approaches in that the 
former accounts for the complexity inherent to a constitutional legal system, and does not 
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exclusively rely on reductionist strategies to respond to complexity. The systemic 
constitutional approach does not pit property and regulation against one another, but 
recognises that regulation is state action that is undertaken for a public purpose, and quite 
often the public purpose aligns with constitutional objectives. Property and regulation exist 
together as interrelated and interdependent components of the property system. Adopting a 
systemic constitutional approach to the regulation of the use of property in response to some 
of the constitutional challenges that the South African legal system are facing in relation to 
the regulation of the use of property allows for the reconsideration of the relationship 
between property and regulation in the constitutional context. It allows for property and 
regulation to be reframed as two components in a larger system, governed by the rules and 
values of the entire system.
29
 In this view, property and regulation are not at odds with one 
another, but function together and inter-dependently. Accordingly, to create a functional, 
sustainable and consistent single system of law, we cannot ignore the relational nature of 
complex systems.
30
  
The courts acknowledge the need to develop the property law system in accordance with 
the aims and objects of the Constitution. For this development to succeed as part of the larger 
constitutional project, it is imperative to look for solutions outside of the tradition of the 
conceptualism of private law doctrine. In Shoprite, Froneman J emphasised that South 
African law has not yet reached consensus on how property ought to be conceptualised in a 
constitutional legal system, but that the answers lie in the “framework of values and 
individual rights in the Constitution”.31 It is important to reconceptualise the relationship 
between property and regulation to reflect the values of the Constitution, because property is 
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not and cannot be insulated from social control, and it must be possible to effectively regulate 
the use of property to respond to the aims and objectives of the Constitution.  
Moseneke DCJ’s approach is arguably informed by his view that the constitutional 
protection of an interest as “constitutional property” might have the effect of shielding the 
interest against (in his view) legitimate state regulation.
32
 However, a constitutional systemic 
approach to the review of regulatory measures in terms of section 25(1) is arguably nuanced 
enough not to inhibit effective state regulation. Recognising liquor licences as constitutional 
property will not necessarily have the effect of insulating the interest against limitations. 
Moseneke DCJ raises important concerns regarding the appropriate approach regarding the 
constitutional scrutiny of state action, but his suggestion to decide the matter on the basis of 
the principle of legality does not necessarily address these concerns either. In fact, direct 
reliance on a broad constitutional notion (rationality review, based on the principle of 
legality), which is meant to respond to lacunae in the constitutional legal system in cases 
where a more specialised framework for review exists, can obfuscate the issues. The controls 
in section 25(1) can be applied with enough sensitivity regarding the importance of allowing 
legitimate state regulation to respond to Moseneke DCJ’s concerns. Side-stepping the issue 
by relying on definitional regulation does not support the development of a constitutional 
property system that is capable of striking the desired balance between individual protection 
and the public interest in effective state regulation.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the Constitution requires an approach to the regulation of 
the use of property that acknowledges the complexity of the system and that can respond to 
the mandate of developing a single system of law. In my view, the systemic constitutional 
approach can respond to these challenges. The systemic constitutional approach offers a 
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methodology for dealing with different types of limitations, originating from different 
sources, which are subject to scrutiny based on different areas of law. While the systemic 
constitutional approach may not always offer clear-cut answers to all property regulation 
disputes, it will at least draw attention to possible areas of overlap, and support attempts to 
ensure that property disputes be addressed in a non-modular fashion. This opens up space to 
consider non-property interests as well as the systemic effects of property and regulation. 
Hopefully, increased awareness regarding areas of overlap and the consequences of parallel 
development will encourage greater engagement with questions regarding the applicable 
regulatory system and the implications of the decision. In turn, this can lead to several 
positive developments.
33
 Firstly, increased consistency when adjudicating property regulation 
disputes will lead to greater legal certainty, which means that it is possible to both account for 
complexity and avoid “randomness” in outcomes.34 Secondly, legal development will take 
place with reference to the role and function of both property and regulation in the 
constitutional legal system and this supports the creation of a property system that exhibits 
constitutionally desirable characteristics. 
The regulatory processes that determine the exact content and limits of property rights at 
any given time are themselves subject to regulation in various forms. This is the principal 
constitutional guarantee of private property rights. This “regulation of regulation” can be 
based on one or more of a set of different constitutionally sanctioned sources and procedures, 
which in some cases overlap. APD is one example where legal development would arguably 
have benefitted from greater engagement with the area of overlap between the regulation of 
property and the right to just administrative action.
35
 Regardless of whether or not section 
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25(2) of the Constitution was the appropriate framework to review the effect of the regulatory 
measure in question, more explicit engagement with the area of overlap would have led to a 
more structured judgment with clearer implications. The systemic constitutional approach 
requires careful engagement with areas of potential overlap to determine the role and function 
of fields of law in relation to one another, because as is evident from the APD case, the 
importance and extent of the overlap might not always be readily ascertainable.  
The area of overlap that I engage with for purposes of this dissertation is between property 
and the right to just administrative action.
36
 There is an overlap between sections 25 and 33 
of the Constitution when the use of property is regulated through administrative action. The 
complicating factor is that the overlap is not “complete”, in the sense that not all regulatory 
measures assume the form of administrative action. The use of property can be regulated 
directly through common law or legislation, or through acts of the executive or judiciary. 
This means that section 33 of the Constitution (together with PAJA) will sometimes apply 
directly to regulatory disputes involving property, but not always. A methodology is needed 
to address the area of overlap and to determine which regulatory framework applies. An 
extension of the subsidiarity principles indicates that the provisions of PAJA should always 
be used to challenge administrative action that adversely affects the property rights or 
legitimate expectations of a person, or the rights of the public, when property is the subject 
matter of regulation. Direct application of section 25 should be reserved for cases of direct 
statutory deprivation or deprivation effected through the common law directly and without 
the involvement of a decision by an administrator. Where more than one regulatory 
framework appears to be potentially applicable, the subsidiarity principles should be used to 
                                            
36
 The area of overlap and the relationship between the provisions are discussed in Chapter 4.  
295 
 
determine what the appropriate framework is, to avoid the creation of parallel systems in the 
constitutional legal system.
37
  
In Shoprite, the possibility of reviewing legislation in terms of the principle of legality was 
raised.
38
 If the majority of the Constitutional Court held that the liquor licences in question 
did not constitute constitutional property, this would have been an appropriate basis for 
review. However, insofar as Moseneke DCJ’s judgment is based on the assumption that 
property is protected too strongly in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, and that this is 
the reason for not viewing liquor licences as property, it is effectively creating a possible 
parallel legal system, to make commercial interests more responsive to state regulation.
39
 The 
uncertain scope and application of the principle of legality makes it a measure of last resort, 
and Moseneke DCJ’s judgment should not be read as authority for relying on the principle of 
legality instead of section 25(1). The principle of legality should only be relied on directly 
where neither PAJA nor section 25 is applicable, for example where the use of property is 
regulated through executive action.  
The approach suggested in this dissertation proposes a methodology for identifying the 
applicable framework to review regulatory measures, as a check to avoid the unjust exercise 
of state power. It also engages with the area where property law and administrative law 
overlap to set out the scope of direct application of section 25 of the Constitution, and to 
consider when and how principles of administrative justice influence property regulation 
disputes. This dissertation argues that there are signs in case law that the courts acknowledge 
the overarching influence of certain constitutional notions, which is why administrative law 
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principles can have an impact even in cases not involving administrative action. If the courts 
are consistent in their approach, it could have the positive effect of aligning the content of 
constitutional notions such as legality, procedural fairness, reasonableness and non-
arbitrariness on a normative level. Moreover, it avoids the creation of parallel routes of 
development. 
In non-overlap property cases (where the matter is adjudicated with reference to section 25 
or the principle of legality, or both) the principles of administrative law may play a role by 
informing the content of similar constitutional notions, such as procedural non-arbitrariness 
in the context of section 25(1).
40
 This interconnectedness between similar constitutional 
notions that serve similar constitutional purposes fits in with the single-system-of-law 
principle, because it means that review measures are based on and reflect the same normative 
commitments.  
In summary, the main contribution of this dissertation with regard to the systemic 
constitutional approach is that it maps out the problematic aspects that arise from the 
regulation of the use of property in the constitutional context, with specific emphasis on the 
relationship between property and the right to just administrative action. By adopting a 
systemic constitutional approach it is possible to set out how these two areas of law function 
together in a constitutional legal system where both are constitutionally entrenched rights. 
 
6 2 4 Implications of the conclusions 
A systemic understanding of property and regulation is a challenge to dominant mainstream 
ideas regarding the fundamentally absolute freedom of owners to do as they wish with their 
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property. One of the main criticisms that I anticipate will most likely originate from a 
utilitarian perspective, insofar as the constitutional systemic approach’s main objective is not 
simplification or efficiency. However, accepting or acknowledging complexity and allowing 
it to influence the approach to resolving legal problems need not lead to vagueness, 
randomness or inconsistency.
41
 In fact, the opposite is possible. The systemic constitutional 
approach aims to provide a methodology for engaging with issues of complexity in a clear 
and consistent manner that will prevent arbitrary decision making, while also avoiding 
reliance on reductionist strategies.  
Another important question is whether the systemic constitutional approach leaves too 
much responsibility to the courts to determine the limits and scope of property rights. Even if 
it is accepted that the limits and scope of property are determined by the existing laws, it 
might still seem like a Herculean task entrusted to courts to interpret the effects of law on the 
scope and content of existing property rights, keeping in mind that courts are not 
democratically elected institutions. I would argue that the systemic constitutional approach 
can facilitate involvement of other branches of government in regulatory matters, because the 
legislature will know what the constitutional parameters for regulation are, while ultimately 
holding all acts of regulation accountable to the Constitution. It aims to balance the need for 
protecting individual entitlements and the need for effective state regulation in the public 
interest.  
The centrality of section 25(1) in future legal development will depend to a large extent on 
how broadly or purposively other constitutional provisions are interpreted. The American 
example, where the narrow interpretation of the Contract Clause caused the Takings Clause 
to emerge as the “principal bulwark of property rights”, illustrates this point.42 In effect, the 
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mirror image of this argument was recently endorsed by Moseneke DCJ in Shoprite, where 
he held that the notion of constitutional property need not be extended to include liquor 
licences, since other constitutional mechanisms existed to address arbitrary or excessive state 
action.
43
 This shows that the relationship between section 25(1) and other constitutional 
provisions will become more and more important to determine when property as an 
embodiment of economic liberty is protected, and when (if at all) property is protected 
because of its potential to indirectly protect other rights. I argue that property for 
constitutional purposes has some function as a civil or political right which also protects other 
constitutional values, but it remains an open question whether section 25(1) (as the 
constitutional property law framework for regulation) can or should be relied on directly 
where there are other constitutional provisions available. 
 
6 3 Final remarks 
This dissertation engages with a variety of issues that arise from the regulation of the use of 
property and sets out to revisit a theoretical debate in private law in light of the Constitution. 
It shows that reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation in the 
constitutional context is a necessary part of the on-going process in South African law to 
adapt to a changed legal paradigm. However, the topic of the dissertation also brought to the 
fore questions of methodological importance for constitutional law. The focus therefore 
subtly changes from Chapter 3 onward, moving from a focus on the content of law, toward a 
methodological question of how certain types of legal problems ought to be addressed. The 
constitutional imperative creates exciting opportunities for scholars to look for solutions 
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outside of the four corners of existing legal doctrine.
44
 The systemic constitutional approach 
to the regulation of the use of property attempts to rise to this challenge.  
The Shoprite case shows that property and regulation remain contentious issues in the 
constitutional setting. This dissertation does not purport to solve or even address all the issues 
that arise from property regulation disputes. It merely emphasises (like the Shoprite case) that 
property carries with it the underlying or unarticulated belief that property stands outside the 
constitutional system, insulated from social control. This problematic conceptualisation of the 
relationship that exists between property and regulation has the potential to threaten “the 
success of our constitutional project”.45 Reconsidering the relationship in a way that supports 
constitutional objectives and aligns property and its regulation with South Africa’s 
commitment to live as a nation of free and equal persons is part of an ongoing constitutional 
conversation. That conversation can only take place when we explicitly engage with 
questions regarding the role, function and status of property and regulation in the 
constitutional legal system.  
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